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Analysis

“Omi Ginda?!” – Ruling Party Campaign Dares Georgians to “Vote for War”

With less than three months left until the Parliamentary elections, it’s becoming increasingly difficult for the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) to convince its voters that it’s delivering on its EU integration promise. GD officials still maintain that Georgia will join the EU in 2030, with disclaimers, though, such as that it will be done “with dignity” and on GD’s terms.


Nata Koridze is the managing editor of Civil.ge; She previously worked closely on NATO and EU integration issues as a Georgian diplomat


However, Georgia’s Western partners have recently discarded diplomatic niceties and restrained rhetoric. They are saying directly that Georgia won’t be able to continue EU integration unless it repeals the foreign agents’ law and reverses its anti-democratic drive.

Still, in a twisted campaign, GD continues to insist that Georgia will become an EU member by 2030 while simultaneously doubling down on anti-Western propaganda.

However, despite GD’s well-versed propaganda, it seems it will be very difficult to convince the Georgian people that with GD in power, Georgia will improve its relations with the West and will achieve the long-coveted goal of EU membership, or that its relations with its strategic partner, the United States, will improve.

War and Peace

So, instead the Georgian Dream is now betting on scaring Georgians into voting for it in the October elections. Its main campaign narrative is that keeping GD in power is the only way for Georgia to avoid war with Russia. It is telling voters: if you want peace and stability – vote for us, if you want war and chaos – vote for the “collective UNM” (a catch-all label for anyone who does not support GD).

While the opposition describes the elections as a choice between Europe and Russia, GD has framed them as a choice between war (if the opposition wins) and peace (if GD wins).

An integral part of this narrative is the “Global War Party” (GWP) conspiracy theory – an authentic Georgian invention, which now can be found on Wikipedia. GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili famously backed up and elaborated on this narrative in his landmark speech on April 29.

The GWP encompasses virtually unidentifiable but ostensibly powerful forces in the US, EU, and NATO, which are behind the Russia-Ukraine war and are allegedly pressuring the GD administration to drag Georgia into war with Russia. GD officials regularly remind citizens of the government’s heroic efforts to resist these malicious forces and guard the peace.

“Is it war that you want?”

The critics and opponents of the GD have long criticized its rift with the West and for the consistent policy of rapprochement policy with Russia. That policy included restoration of direct flights with Russia, refusal to join Western sanctions against Moscow, an unrestrained influx of Russian citizens to Georgia, encouragement of the restoration of economic dependence and trade, refusal to let in critical Russian journalists or activists, lack of support to and deterioration of relations with Ukraine, and other elements. The GD rebuttal was that Georgia could not behave otherwise for fear of an escalation with Russia.

“Omi ginda?!” – “Is it war you want?!” has become a much-caricatured, meme-ized retort to any criticism of GD’s Russia policy. In official statements, that coined phrase is often expanded to apocalyptic detail of what would happen to Georgia if it behaved differently (and, by inference, if GD was no longer in power).

Indeed, the shadow of war is still fresh in the Georgians’ minds: after all, it’s only been 16 years since the Russo-Georgian war, with daily reminders of the ongoing Russian occupation, such as kidnappings, occasional killings on the occupation line, gross human rights abuses of the Georgian population still residing in the occupied territories, and so on.

The freshness of that traumatic memory, rekindled daily by the news of atrocities and bombings in Ukraine, is precisely what makes the GD narrative all the more devious – and dangerous.

The false dilemma

Without going into the moral side of manipulating the war issue in an already traumatized and vulnerable country and blackmailing your citizens with war, how much merit does this narrative hold?

Granted, Georgia has many vulnerabilities. But has the GD government made the country less vulnerable in the twelve years it’s been in power? Has it made the country more secure and more resilient? Has it deepened the relations with Georgian partners, who have traditionally played a key role in boosting the country’s defensibility?

Georgia’s security has depended on its strategic cooperation and solid partnership with its main strategic partners—the United States and Western organizations such as the EU and NATO. If we take a closer look, the relations with all have deteriorated due to stark anti-democratic trends, growing anti-Western rhetoric, and a vivid shift in geopolitical preferences.  

United States

Relations with the leading strategic partner- the US, have hit an unprecedented low.

In 2023, the U.S. sanctioned several Georgian judges “for significant corruption,” highlighting the serious problem in Georgia’s judiciary, which, according to local and international watchdogs, is ruled by the clan tied to the ruling party. This was followed by sanctioning the former Prosecutor General and Bidzina Ivanishvili’s crony, Otar Partskhaladze, for his ties to Russia’s FSB and for exerting Russia’s malign influence in Georgia.

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced the comprehensive review of bilateral relations in May 2023. The U.S. State Department imposed visa restrictions against several dozens of Georgian individuals for undermining the Georgian democracy.

Currently, two bills – MEGOBARI and GPA – have been initiated in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate respectively, envisaging sanctions and other measures if the Georgian government continues on the anti-democratic course and persecution of opponents.

In July 2024, the U.S. has indefinitely postponed the Noble Partner military exercise with Georgia.

Finally, Secretary Blinken announced the freezing of USD 95 mln in direct assistance to the Georgian government.

Relations with other Georgian partners in the West have also deteriorated, with some of them, such as France and Denmark announcing cuts in their assistance.

European Union

Relations with the EU have reached a historical low: the failure by the government to implement most of the EU’s initial 12 steps to achieve candidate status (only three were implemented according to both EU and Georgian civil society assessments); the Georgian government’s anti-Western rhetoric; the rapprochement with Russia (including the opening of direct flights and alleged involvement in sanctions’ circumvention); the first attempt to pass the Foreign Agents’ law in 2023 and the ensued massive protests; the withdrawal of the law, accompanied by the persecution of the government opponents and critics, be it from the political class, or civil society have all played a role in this process.

The divergence in foreign policy with the EU is vividly demonstrated by the statistics of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy statements and the EU’s calls for Georgia’s increased alignment. This means that the Georgian government and the EU don’t see eye to eye on many global issues, threats and approaches.

The re-introduction of the Foreign Agents’ law in April 2024 and its eventual adoption, despite the mass popular protests and multiple warnings from partners, as well as renewed attacks on opponents and repression, became the last straw in the already strained EU-Georgia relations. In July 2024, High Representative Josep Borrell said the EU halted Georgia’s EU accession process and froze aid to the Ministry of Defense.  On August 2, the EU announced it was considering suspending direct assistance to the Georgian government.

NATO

NATO integration (and even more so membership) has vanished from the authorities’ discourse. NATO has openly criticized the Georgian government for its lack of democratic reforms. Meanwhile, Georgian Prime Minister Garibashvili has blamed NATO enlargement for the Russian war against Ukraine. The Georgian PM skipped two recent NATO Summits. The final document of the 2024 NATO Washington Summit, has, for the first time, omitted the wording of the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit’s commitment that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance, and Georgia got only one mention in the document, in the context of the appeal to Russia to withdraw its armed forces from Georgian territory.

The termination of NATO’s SNGP StratCom initiative in March 2024 is just one example of the setback in practical cooperation with the Alliance. Another is the unprecedented decline in NATO-Georgia Commission meetings last year. Meanwhile, the government announced at the beginning of 2024 plans to build a civilian airport on the territory of its strategic Vaziani military base, which – experts say – could paralyze its normal functioning. Vaziani, a key base strategically positioned near the capital, also hosts the Combat Training Center (CTC) of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC).

What does this spell for Georgia’s security?

Military and political assistance from the West has long been the backbone of Georgia’s security, whether through direct assistance and military exercises with the U.S.; cooperation with NATO, including in the SNGP framework, through Black Sea security dialogue and participation in NATO operations and in joint exercises; or cooperation with the EU, including through the EU-Georgia security dialogue or Peace Facility instrument.

Meanwhile, in recent years Georgia’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP has been steadily decreasing, which means Georgia has been becoming less and less capable of protecting itself and making it costly for the enemy to invade.

The non-recognition policy is another crucial issue in which cooperation with the West has been a key to success. Western partners – EU, US, NATO, and others – are the ones who have helped Georgia since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to counter Russia’s relentless attempts to persuade or pressure countries on all continents to recognize Georgia’s occupied territories as independent countries. Their support ultimately contributed to the undoubted success of the non-recognition policy.

Now, that relations with virtually all strategic partners have deteriorated due to GD’s anti-Western rhetoric and anti-democratic behavior, the Georgian government is jeopardizing the achievements of the non-recognition policy. Georgia’s partners have not changed their position. They will continue supporting Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the future. Still, inevitably, the worsening of the relations with the West will gradually diminish its attention to Georgia’s problems and the West’s commitment to (pro-actively) spend its political capital on protection of Georgia’s interests, including the implementation of the non-recognition policy.

New-found Partners

While the GD administration has pursued a rapprochement with Russia, it also deepened ties with China and Iran.

Along with direct flights and letting in hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens without sound control, under the GD rule, Georgia’s dependence on the Russian market and hydrocarbons has steadily increased, with imports of petroleum and petroleum oils growing by 192.65% and petroleum gases by 30.61%. in 2022; this upward trend continued in 2023, with further increases of 17.30% for petroleum and petroleum oils and 16.55% for petroleum gases.

Meanwhile, high-ranking Russian officials have been praising the GD government for its “sound” policy vis-à-vis Russia and for the adoption of the foreign agents’ law. Against this background, dubious political entities known to be linked to Moscow have reactivated their calls for Georgia’s neutrality.

The GD has deepened relations with China, including the signing of the joint statement on strategic partnership, the abolition of the visa regime for Georgian citizens, and the announcement of the winning of the Anaklia port tender by the Sino-Singaporean consortium.

The GD government has also actively pursued relations with Iran, with the Prime Minister visiting Iran twice this year. GD members have claimed that Iran is not helping Russia in its war against Ukraine, with the Speaker of Parliament saying on July 30: “Iran is not an accomplice to any war, at least not this one.”

Si vis pacem, para bellum

The ancient maxim “If you want peace, prepare for war” is obviously not what the GD government follows. Its actions in the international arena have led to disarming Georgia vis-à-vis its centuries-old adversary, which has invaded it several times. These actions have also led to the already felt isolation of Georgia, which is disastrous for Georgia’s national interests.

Whether it’s alienating its traditional strategic partners who helped build Georgia’s statehood and security system, engaging in anti-Western rhetoric, rolling back democratic reforms, getting closer to Russia, or increasing its dependence on it, all of this makes Georgia less secure. And if Georgia should have learned anything from its history, it is that the less safe it is and the fewer friends it has, the greater the temptation for Russia to attack.

The only reasonable conclusion that a well-informed citizen should draw from the GD’s policies is that they have made Georgia less secure and that this trend will deepen in the future. The government’s complete failure to strengthen Georgia’s security during the 12 years it’s been in power is undeniable, no matter how much it tries to convince the citizens otherwise.

This post is also available in: ქართული (Georgian) Русский (Russian)

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