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Venice Commission: further electoral changes needed, long-standing recommendations must be addressed

In its new opinion, prepared jointly with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and issued on December 19, the Venice Commission states that the current amendments to the Electoral Code and the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Georgia concerning the composition of the CEC and the election of its (non-partisan) members and chairperson are a step in the right direction, but need to be further developed and other previous recommendations need to be addressed.

According to the Venice Commission, the legislative issues that remained unaddressed in recent reforms relate to, among others, constituency delimitation, restrictive residence requirements for presidential and parliamentary candidates and other undue criteria on voter and candidate eligibility, additional aspects regarding the formation of election commissions, provisions on the misuse of official position for campaign purposes, high donation limits for election campaigns affecting the level playing field, further regulation and oversight of campaign finance, further elaborating media campaign regulations, strengthening the framework for electoral dispute resolution to ensure effective legal remedy, recounts and annulments, and measures to prevent voter intimidation.

“The frequency of amendments to the electoral legislation of Georgia in recent years is striking”, the Opinion says. Following a political agreement of April 19, 2021 between the majority and several opposition parties, significant amendments – concerning inter alia the composition of the Central Election Commission – had been implemented in 2021 which were in principle welcomed by the Venice Commission and ODIHR. In the meantime, a series of further amendments have been adopted which moved away from this broad political agreement, notes the Opinion.

The draft amendments on the election code only concern the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the election of its non-partisan members and Chairperson. They are “complicated and rather confusing”, the Opinion reads. As opposed to preceding reforms of 2022 and 2023, the current draft amendments were prepared in a rapid process on the initiative of the ruling party, apparently without much consultation with relevant stakeholders.

The Venice Commission notes that the timing of the current reform is certainly not ideal, as it would be adopted less than one year before an election scheduled for October 2024. It acknowledges the intent to address electoral framework shortcomings before the October 2024 parliamentary elections. However, Commission express regret that several earlier recommended changes have not been implemented. The opinion emphasizes the significance of stable electoral legislation for public trust and warns against frequent amendments, citing potential confusion for voters and electoral authorities.

The Venice Commission reiterates previous recommendations relating to the composition of election commissions and recommends:

  • Changing the draft amendments to ensure that consensus on the appointment/election of the non-partisan members and Chairperson of the CEC is sought; this might imply requiring a 2/3 parliamentary majority in the first place and, in any case, an anti-deadlock mechanism which favors qualified majorities, before possibly resorting to simple (or absolute) majorities as an ultimate deadlock resolution;
  • Considering lengthening the proposed limited timing between the different stages of the anti-deadlock mechanism;
  • Transferring the nomination authority for the non-partisan members and Chairperson of the CEC back from the Speaker of Parliament to the President of Georgia;
  • Requiring that any decisions by the Speaker of Parliament and the President of Georgia on nomination, rejection and appointment of a candidate for CEC member or Chairperson be reasoned;
  • Removing from the draft the abolishment of the deputy chairperson elected from among the opposition party-appointed CEC members;
  • Modifying the draft amendments with respect to the term of office of the non-partisan members and Chairperson of the CEC, in order to ensure that appointments made on the basis of the anti-deadlock mechanism are significantly limited in time and cannot be prolonged.

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