The Georgian Dream party is weaving a narrative that the promise of territorial integrity can offset the promise of EU membership. However, the reality is far more complex. Indeed, the West and Russia each have a highly desirable reward and a significant repercussion up their sleeves for Georgia. And as their confrontation intensifies, the pressure may mount to put those cards into play.
Sticks and carrots
Let us consider the sticks and carrots that Georgia may expect from Russia and the West, leaving aside, for the sake of analytical clarity, its own will for a moment.
Each side in the geopolitical rift can offer Georgia their ‘ultimate reward’ and ‘ultimate reprisal’. Let us call the ‘ultimate reward’ each side’s most appealing incentive for securing Georgia’s allegiance. And conversely, the ‘ultimate reprisal’ is their harshest disincentive for preventing Georgia from aligning with the opponent.
Russia’s “ultimate reprisal” could encompass formally incorporating South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia, resorting to military force against Tbilisi, or (re)imposing economic sanctions. Russia’s “ultimate reward” that the Georgian Dream has been hinting at is a peace plan leading towards the reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia.
It is easy to see that the array of reprisals looks both more credible and more feasible, while the “rewards” don’t sound credible enough to provide genuine benefits.
A “peace plan” that Russia may propose could appeal to Georgians. Still, it won’t go down well in Sokhumi, where people have resisted attempts to let Russians buy land or business, or in Tskhinvali, which seeks incorporation into Russia. Even if Russia were to make such an offer, any tangible progress would require time and possibly trigger violence. The historical precedent shows that Russia can not be trusted with its commitments to Georgia – but neither is it known to protect its professed allies – as Armenia bears recent witness. Ultimately, Russia’s capacity for “bringing Georgia together” depends on the degree of control it has over Tbilisi. And even the current government’s ardent supporters in Tbilisi are likely to balk at “reunification” if it came at the expense of sovereignty. The sticks on the Russian are, as ever, closer at hand.
The ultimate Western reward – fast-tracking Georgia’s inclusion into NATO and/or the EU seemed far-fetched only a year ago. But the Russian aggression in Ukraine has led to a sea change in European politics. Tbilisi applied for EU membership, and NATO may deepen cooperation with Ukraine, thus creating an opening for providing enhanced security guarantees to Georgia.
Just like Russia, the West also has potent punitive measures. If Georgia continues to tilt towards Russia, the West could consider imposing broad sanctions and ultimately taking the leaf out of the manual of diplomatic isolation akin to Belarus. The West’s reward and penalty are both credible and consequential.
Conversely, while Russia can pose severe threats, it rewards lacks substance and credibility for Georgia that could offset the associated risk.
This situation presents a choice between a significant but calculated risk with the promise of a considerable reward from the West or facing an immense, inevitable risk from the West for an elusive reward from Russia. In weighing these options, the logical choice – even if we set aside the loftier notions of the national interest – appears to lean towards aligning with the West. But do the government’s actual choices follow this logic?
Present Dynamics
In a recent dialogue at the GLOBSEC, PM Irakli Garibashvili presented his vision of Georgia’s dilemma between Western integration and potential Russian backlash. His statement was tinted with a grievance about Europe’s claimed inaction during Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.
PM Garibashvili said Georgia would be willing to fulfill the EU conditions once the candidacy is granted rather than as a pre-condition because accepting them without a guaranteed path to accession would expose the country to risks.
The ruling party is drawing on the reservoir of frustration among many Georgians about the West’s inability to back its verbal support for Georgia’s territorial integrity with concrete penalties against aggressive Russia in 2008, which, some feel, left Georgia to bear the brunt of the aftermath largely on its own.
But while it is true that the EU – and the United States – did not penalize Russia for aggression in 2008, it is disingenuous to argue that Tbilisi was left to bear the burden on its own. To name only one figure, the EU did pour in 2 billion EUR, helping keep Georgia’s economy afloat and kickstart it after that war.
So the system of incentives that Georgian Dream, the ruling party, is responding to, seems more complex than pining over less-than-full-throated backing in 2008. The PM spoke about “depolarization” and lowering the electoral threshold as conditions he was willing to fulfill after the candidate status was granted. Those are domestic political issues with little actual link to external threats. By invoking those issues, PM Garibashvili exposed a simple fact that the government’s increasing rhetorical tilt towards Russia and away from the EU rhymes with its increasingly Kremlin-inspired politics at home.
Despite the now open spat with the Prime Minister, President Salome Zurabishvili is locked in playing the game of “good cop” with Brussels in synch with the PM’s “bad cop.” Zurabishvili is peddling essentially the same message as the Georgian Dream leadership but from a more positive angle: while claiming to be speaking in the name of the majority in favor of the EU, she also calls for accelerated candidacy without Georgia meeting the EU’s conditions. This is because she promises reforms that she can not deliver – due to her limited political capital at home and the negligible official powers of her office.
In the meantime, Russia did provide minor but sensitive “concessions” (or rather, withdrew its previous punishments, as PM Garibashvili rightly noted): the resumption of direct flights and visa-free travel. And while this closeness, coupled with the influx of Russians fleeing mobilization, irks some (if not most) Georgians, the economic benefits of Russians spending their dollars in Georgia are tangibly trickling down to ordinary people.
So what game is the Georgian Dream playing? Is it really about fearing potential Russian repercussions? Or is it about reaping domestic political benefits as the 2024 elections are approaching? Or are there more enticing financial offerings being discussed behind the scenes? Has the EU’s denial of candidate status inadvertently nudged Georgia toward the Kremlin? These questions demand scrutiny of Georgia’s geopolitical alignment, as they are driving domestic dissent and international concern.
But on a more basic plain, much depends on incentives or rather on the likelihood of these incentives – the “ultimate punishment” or the “ultimate reward” is perceived.
Toward a crucial decision
The forthcoming decision by the European Union on Georgia’s candidacy status, an interim one due informally in October and the final in December 2023, looms as a pivotal determinant. This decision could steer Georgia toward the decisive alignment – towards the West or Russia – and end the current administration’s tergiversation.
It is significantly influenced by the perceived capacity of Russia to deliver on its threats and promises – which is intrinsically linked to the (even tentative) outcome on the Ukraine frontline.
But despite this significant factor playing an important role, the ball is largely in Tbilisi’s court concerning the EU’s decision, despite the statements of the Georgian officials to the contrary.
Most EU conditions involve openness and transparency of the country’s internal politics and its institutions’ principled alignment with the EU Copenhagen criteria. Nothing that Georgia does about the structure of the Central Election Commission, its courts, or party financing is of Russia’s immediate concern. At least not to the extent of triggering “the punishments” or deferring the already extended “rewards.” What Russia does not want, is Georgia locked on the path of European integration. Ultimately, as the end of the year approaches, Georgia’s ruling party and its shadowy patron would have to make that decision for themselves.
The steps they make and the rhetoric they adopt may trigger a positive verdict from the EU regarding Georgia’s candidacy. This, of course, is not the end of the road but embarks the country decisively into the daily grinder of approximation. Especially since Ukraine and Moldova will likely precede Georgia with one step – opening the accession negotiations. The progress of the two countries will continue to put pressure on Georgia to adjust. Purely politically, the Georgian Dream is likely to capitalize politically from the candidacy ahead of the 2024 parliamentary polls. Will this benefit outweigh the perception of risk – national and personal, to Mr. Ivanishvili – from Russia? Will Russia be willing to set the wheels in motion to – say – annex South Ossetia while failing to hold on to its newly annexed territories in Ukraine? Too many factors and incentives remain unknown to us.
On the other hand, if the ruling party continues to use incendiary rhetoric at home and towards the European institutions and takes further steps to undermine the country’s democratic credentials, the EU’s predictable rejection of the candidacy will fall on the fertile ground of grievance that the Georgian Dream officials have cultivated: “Europe does not want us as we, Georgians, are, with our traditions, customs, and dignity.”
The failure to get the candidacy might precipitate Georgia towards a more pronounced alignment with Russia. But will the Kremlin be in a position to deliver any additional tangible rewards as the year wanes? As the Ukrainian forces pound Russian fortifications, this is currently a big unknown.
What is known though, is that the rejection from the EU will exacerbate Georgia’s internal political polarization, incite massive demonstrations against the government, and may descend into violence. This seems a heavy price to pay for the Georgian Dream, ahead of the 2024 elections, compared with the relatively breezier chances of success if they “win” Georgia’s the EU candidacy.
What is about to happen?
Georgia’s position on the Ukraine war, coupled with its sovereigntist, anti-Western rhetoric, politicized and corrupt judiciary, and eroding freedoms and democracy, are partly reflecting the values that Georgia’s ruling party espouses, and are partly a result of the fog of uncertainty that surrounds international and regional geopolitics. Being “stuck in the neutral” while pushing on the breaks is a symptom of those two factors combined. The attempt to externalize the decision – to put the ball in the EU, or Russia’s court – is a rational emotional response to this high-risk, high-uncertainty situation. And this posture is also unsustainable. By the end of the year the Georgian Dream will have to shift into the gear.
Until the crunchtime comes, the policy of keeping both options open will continue. But even in the neutral gear, the Georgian Dream is leaning towards its intrinsic value choice, which seems to be “conservative” – oligarchic, authoritarian, and illiberal. Even if the external correction – EU’s geopolitically driven determination to grant Georgia candidacy despite its faults, or Russia’s dramatic failure in Ukraine – pushes the Georgian Dream toward Europe, its value choices are unlikely to transform and may even accelerate.
