Since early April, Georgian Dream (GD) has been reshuffling its ranks in the face of ongoing protests and growing international isolation. These changes have sparked speculation about GD’s tactics as the party tightens legislation and attempts to deal with the continuing political crisis.
What Happened?
On April 2, GD’s Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, announced that Grigol Liluashvili, long-serving head of the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG), would be stepping down from his post to lead the newly formed Ministry for Regional Development. Only two days later, Kobakhidze quoted disagreements about staffing and priorities with Liluashvili, who was sidelined. Kakhaber Guledani, who previously served as Deputy Minister of Regional Development and Infrastructure (2016-2017) and as Deputy Mayor of Tbilisi, was tapped as the Minister for Regional Development.
Anri Okhanashvili, considered Kobakhidze’s ally and promoted from MP to Minister of Justice in November 2024, was appointed the new head of the State Security Service and promptly confirmed by the GD Parliament on April 4.
Okhanashvili’s deputy at MoJ, Irakli Beraia, another former GD MP, took over the Investigative Service of the Ministry of Finance.
Paata Salia, a GD MP, former director of the pro-GD TV station Rustavi 2, replaced Okhanashvili as Minister of Justice.
Reshuffling in Adjara
On the same day, April 2, Tornike Rizhvadze, the head of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, announced his resignation via a Facebook post. Later that day, GD-elected President Mikheil Kavelashvili nominated Sulkhan Tamazashvili, a UK-sanctioned former head of the Tbilisi Police Department, to replace Rizhvadze.
Lasha Gogniashvili, a former head of police in the Adjara and Kvemo Kartli regions, was appointed as the new head of the Adjara police. Grigol Beselia, the police chief of the autonomous region, also stood down to be replaced by Giorgi Bukharishvili.
Notably, both Gogniashvili and Bukharishvili, who served in the police under the United National Movement (UNM). Gogniashvili was marred in allegations of police violence, including allegations of harassing Georgian Dream supporters back then. Bukharishvili served as police spokesperson under UNM’s Vano Merabishvili. He also led the special operation to arrest ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili in 2021.
Context: A Rapid Shift Toward Authoritarianism
The personnel changes happened against the backdrop of repressive laws being rubber-stamped by the GD Parliament with exceptional speed. Over the past two weeks, the government has enacted a series of laws, among them laws that:
- Label individuals and organizations receiving Western funds as “foreign agents,” with criminal penalties for non-compliance.
- Reintroduced the “treason” article in the Criminal Code.
- Grant the Communications Commission the power to control the editorial policies of broadcasters.
- Officially exclude civil society organizations (CSOs) from public decision-making.
- Ban civil servants from engaging in academic activities without their superiors’ consent.
Furthermore, GD has introduced legislation to ban pro-Western opposition parties and limit the ability of independent observers to monitor elections.
Who benefits?
Political analysts agree that these reshuffles are part of a broader strategy to increase repression and consolidate political control ahead of the local elections slated for October. Many of the moves seem to strengthen Kobakhidze, pointing to him currying favor with Bidzina Ivanishvili, GD’s undisputed patron. Kobakhidze has been a proponent of an uncompromising, repressive stance towards the opponents, and carried particularly vitriolic attacks against the Western partners.
The replacement of Liluashvili with Okhanashvili – a staunch Kobakhidze loyalist- is particularly significant. This is the first time a sitting GD Prime Minister got to appoint a trusted ally to such a key position. Previously, all top security officials came from Ivanishvili’s personal circle. Outgoing SSSG chief, Liluashvili, was the head of Ivanishvili’s Cartu Group in 2015-2016.
Shota Utiashvili of the Rondeli Foundation linked Liluashvili’s to him losing Ivanishvili’s confidence after the embarrassing escape of Giorgi Bachiashvili -a former financial advisor who became Ivanishvili’s personal enemy – from Georgia. Utiashvili also points to Liluashvili’s alleged cultivation of back channels of communication with the United States.
Nika Simonishvili, a lawyer and former head of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, agrees that Liluashvili “is no longer trusted” by Ivanishvili and that he took the fall for the escape of Bachiashvili, who was “a very important prisoner for Ivanishvili.” Simonishvili also points out that Liluashvili has not been sanctioned and notes that the security chief recently traveled to the U.S., allegedly trying to smooth things over between the Georgian Dream and the new US administration. Evidently – without success.
The appointment of a new head for the SSSG and the reshuffling of the Adjara government are also seen as moves to tighten GD’s grip on the Black Sea region, an area that has traditionally been a hotspot for protests and plays a prominent role in the current protests as well. It is not incidental that the founder of the influential publication Batumelebi/Netgazeti was arrested in Batumi, the capital of the autonomous region during the protest.
What Purpose?
GD PM Kobakhidze defended the reshuffles, claiming they are designed to “improve the system” and ensure the “effective and rapid development” of the country. However, this vague explanation has led to varying interpretations, with many opponents arguing that the changes signal a move toward a more rigid authoritarian system.
The experts and opposition see the move in the context of the activity of the parliamentary investigative commission, established by GD to probe the alleged crimes of the previous government. While ostensibly focused on accountability, the commission has become a political weapon, summoning opposition figures and threatening criminal charges against those who refuse to appear. The commission is chaired by Tea Tsulukiani, a former Minister of Justice known for her uncompromising stance, who has already petitioned the Prosecutor’s Office to pursue charges against absent witnesses. GD leadership also openly stated that the outputs of the commission would be used to build a legal case to ban the opposition. Observers believe that ahead of the October 4 local elections, the tighter GD team will target the opponents through legal harassment, public vilification, or imprisonment.
A Path to Constitutional Majority?
Given the breakneck pace at which GD is passing new repressive laws (there are currently three new laws working in conjunction to ban CSOs and media), some pundits speculate that GD may even call snap parliamentary elections to coincide with the local elections. This would formally meet the demands for the early elections, but in reality, given the effective ban on the opposition parties and media, it could allow the GD to gain a constitutional majority and proceed to further consolidate autocracy.
Lawyer Davit Zedelashvili suggests that GD may hold early parliamentary elections, which only GD and factotum parties would contest. Zedelashvili believes that GD might use the local elections as a stepping stone for the broader strategy to remove questions over its legitimacy, possibly even eliminating the opposition entirely through arrests or other forms of suppression.
Others, like former Ivanivhsili-whisperer, political analyst Gia Khukhashvili, say that snap elections are unlikely. He suggests that the reshuffles are a part of Ivanishvili’s byzantine strategy to give Kobakhidze more power, thus distancing himself from the regime’s most controversial actions. Creating the illusion that he is relinquishing control to a more authoritarian figure, argues Khukhashvili, would allow Ivanishvili to position himself as a more moderate leader in the future, potentially cultivating the perception at home and abroad that he is indispensable for re-establishing civic peace if things go wrong.
Despite differences in opinion, it is widely believed that as Georgia faces an increasingly repressive political environment, these recent reshuffles appear to be part of a broader strategy by the GD government to consolidate power, suppress opposition, and strengthen its authoritarian control. While the specifics of GD’s next moves remain unclear, experts agree that the reshuffles signal a more rigid and repressive future, with the potential for significant political and social consequences leading up to the October 4 local elections.