GD Proposal to Ban Opposition Kills Discussion on Local Elections

After a long and tense winter of protests, Georgia finds itself facing a political crisis that continues to deepen as the weather warms. But despite the warming weather the country seems frozen in anticipation. The question on many minds has been whether the opposition would be able to present a coherent, unified strategy regarding the election or moving forward with the protest. But as soon as the upcoming local elections, scheduled for October 4 have emerged as a topic of political discussion, the ruling party has undercut it with its proposal to ban main opposition parties.

Why did the Georgian Dream turn the tables once again, just when the temperature of protests seemed to be going down?

The Current Political Environment in Georgia

Georgia’s political reality is bleak. Local and international watchdogs widely described the controversial local elections on October 26, 2024, as profoundly flawed. Much of the opposition and its supporters believe they were outright rigged. GD’s rejection of the EU membership agenda shortly afterwards, police brutality towards protesters, mass arrests, and human rights violations have exacerbated tensions. They also led to sanctions imposed by several EU countries, the US, Ukraine, and the UK.  The protests have lasted over a hundred and twenty days now. Georgia saw a rupture in its strategic partnership with the United States, a sharp decline in relations with Western allies, and growing isolation on the international stage.

Internally, GD has pursued a policy of mass dismissals of civil servants, passed a series of repressive laws in the essentially one-party rump Georgian Dream parliament, and moved to consolidate power further. The result is a political environment that raises grave concerns about the country’s future.

GD’s Reaction to Persistent Protest

The protests, which continued through and despite the traditionally family-centered New Year’s celebrations that usually span December 25 to January 7 (Orthodox Christmas), defied GD’s predictions that Georgians would abandon their cause. The protest continues, although the protesters’ hopes of it growing into a massive social resistance have not yet materialized.

Instead of attempting a meaningful dialogue or compromising on the protesters’ two key demands—new elections and the release of those illegally detained—GD has scaled back violence, but doubled down on repression. GD is betting on the opposition parties’ persistent passivity and protesters’ demoralization, thinking that draconian fines for minor real or imagined infractions during protests would suffocate the resistance.

But above all, GD is attacking the institutional foundations that sustain free thinking and speech. The international context seems to have turned in its favor: the abrupt cut in the U.S. foreign aid weakened civil society and independent media.  The GD is delivering the additional – it hopes final – blow by adopting the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Modeled on a 1930s U.S. law designed to fend off fascism, the Georgian version omits the U.S. legal precedents that shaped it in the subsequent decades to protect civil society groups and media. GD has made it clear that CSOs and media will be targeted, and that the sole fact of their getting foreign funding would be considered as “acting on behalf of a foreign principal” – also in contrast with the U.S. precedent.

Local Elections: Temptation that Wasn’t

Georgia’s political system is clearly in crisis, and the status-quo is hardly sustainable. The GD has been providently busy preparing for the local elections slated for October 2025 by tailoring the Electoral Code to its advantage.

Changes to the law abolished the 40% threshold for winning the majoritarian districts outright in municipal councils (Sakrebulos). The threshold had been set in 2021, as part of the EU-brokered agreement between Georgia’s political parties, to improve competitiveness in a ruling-party-dominated context. Now, this safeguard is gone. In addition, many more local councillors will be elected through majoritarian contest, further consolidating the GD’s influence. And finally, the electoral threshold was raised to 4% (from 3% nationwide and 2.5% in Tbilisi), which opponents argue will marginalize smaller parties and reduce political pluralism.

To complement the changes, the Chair of the Central Election Commission (CEC), considered loyal to the ruling party, was given the authority to gerrymander the districts. Local watchdogs have criticized the amendments, while the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission – an authority on legal matters – said the amendments undermine principles of equal suffrage, help entrench GD’s chokehold on power, and must be repealed.

Opposition’s Dilemma

With the local elections looming, Georgia’s four main pro-Western opposition forces that have passed the threshold in 2024 parliamentary elections, have been grappling with a dilemma: to participate or to boycott. Those in favor of boycotting have argued that participating would legitimize the results of the rigged 2020 parliamentary elections, validate the GD regime, and undermine the broader protest movement demanding new elections and the release of detained political prisoners. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe agreed recently, that current repressive drift in Georgia is “not conducive to holding the 2025 local elections in a trust-based environment.”

Some opposition figures have already taken a stance, while others are hesitant. Whatever any given opposition decided, GD would likely to spin the decision to its advantage to further discredit and divide the opposition. GD would’ve derided those who would participate as “complicit,” while those who would boycott the elections would’ve been labeled as “radical.” Indeed, GD parliament speaker Shalva Papuashvili said on March 24 that those who reject participation in the local elections are “enemies of democracy.”

GD’s New Strategy: Banning the Opposition

Yet, on March 27, GD leadership upended this unfolding tactic. In a move that brings Georgia one additional step closer to consolidated authoritarianism, GD’s parliamentary leader, Mamuka Mdinaradze said GD was introducing a bill that he called “Successor Parties’ Law” that will ban political forces “whose activities, the personal composition of decision-makers, or statutory goals” are identical to those of “the collective UNM.” The GD consistently calls all main opposition political forces a “collective UNM”, even those that have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from the United National Movement, as well as GD splinters like former prime minister Giorgi Gakharia’s party For Georgia. Mdinaradze made it clear, that the decision on who would be called the “successors” would be based on similarities in objectives, composition of the political boards, and simply “similar statutes.”

The development is taking place as the so called “investigative committee to investigate the actions of the UNM administration” has been convened at the rump parliament, chaired by the hardline former minister of justice, Thea Tsulukiani. Mdinaradze said “it is already clear that the final conclusion of the temporary investigative commission of the Parliament will give us a solid basis” to ask the Constitutional Court to ban UNM and its satellites.”

Why the shift?

There are different theories on how the apparent drive towards holding the local elections can be reconciled with banning of the opposition parties. On the one hand – as Mdinaradze himself pointed out – banning of the UNM was one of GD’s campaign objectives.

On the other hand, the absence of the political opponents in the parliament is embarrassing for the GD, as the recent press-conference of the GD FM Maka Botchorishvili with her Austrian counterpart showed. Banning the parties could allow GD further consolidate its power, while also allowing it to arrange the semblance of “representative diversity” in local government through the spinoff parties, like People’s Power. GD leadership may also hope to use the threat of banning as leverage to co-opt others, smaller opposition parties. Such quasi-opposition parties may be granted a share of seats in the local sakrebulos, and, if all goes smoothly, even the early parliamentary elections could also be envisaged.

Such a move would most certainly complete the authoritarian consolidation and kill the genuine political process in the country for a long time.

A Bargaining Chip with the West?

Some analysts do not exclude that GD move may also mirror some of the Russian tactics of “what’s mine is mine, and what’s yours we could negotiate about.” By dangling the possibility of banning the opposition, GD leadership may hope to bargain for softened stance from the West.

The announcement of the upcoming ban came just as the punishing MEGOBARI Act cleared its first hurdle at the U.S. Senate. Seeing the transactional tendencies of the new U.S. administration, GD may be attempting to propose an exchange, for instance such as dropping of the MEGOBARI Act in exchange for GD dropping the opposition ban, or in exchange of stopping possible prosecution of opposition leaders.