Georgian Dream’s Unorthodox Offer on ‘State Religion’ Scares Church

The ruling party’s veiled campaign promise to declare Orthodox Christianity the state religion appears to have fallen flat before the party even had a chance to pronounce it. What looked like Georgian Dream’s attempt to win over religious voters ahead of crucial parliamentary elections now risks backfiring and casting the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), the country’s single most influential non-state institution, as another victim of the party’s increasingly authoritarian drift. 

On August 29, Georgia’s top clergy exited their high-level meeting articulating a polite rejection of the indecent proposal, apparently mindful of saving the face of the one who proposed it. 

“There was a proposal to declare [Orthodox Christianity] the state religion, and it meant to convey the meaning of elevating the role of the Church and reinforcing it through a constitutional provision,” Andria Jagmaidze, head of the patriarchate’s public relations department, said after the meeting. He said there was an agreement over the latter, but the exact wording was still being worked out. “For sure, it won’t be in the form of declaring [Orthodox Christianity] the state religion.”

To allay fears that the ruling party might be targeting the church’s independence, Jagmaidze also asserted that “the state has reiterated that no provision will be added without the [Georgian Orthodox] Church’s consent, so the Church’s independence will not be threatened.”

Other GOC representatives were more direct in their opposition to the proposal. Speaking on behalf of the GOC the day before, Protopresbyter Giorgi Zviadadze told Formula TV that the move would mean “subordination” and was therefore “unacceptable to the Church”. Zviadadze also made clear that the Church was satisfied with the privileged legal position it already enjoyed under the 2002 Constitutional Agreement with the state. Some clergy who left the August 29 meeting hinted that the discussion was postponed indefinitely, while others cited Metropolitan Shio Mujiri, locum tenens of Georgian Patriarch Ilia II, as voicing the patriarch’s wish “not to rush” the issue.

Secret promise

Church officials confirmed media reports about the proposal on August 27, after Georgian Dream kept hinting about holding “consultations” on a constitutional amendment that it refused to disclose. The “secret promise” came as part of a package of four constitutional amendments the party promises to implement if it wins a constitutional majority in October’s parliamentary elections. The other three are a crackdown on LGBTQ rights, a ban on major opposition parties, and another vague provision on restoring territorial integrity.

As for the fourth proposed amendment, GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili only hinted that it was “of existential importance for our state and faith,” leaving Georgian liberals bracing for yet another repressive, far-right campaign promise from the party. But after the ruling party’s intentions were finally made public, some experts sounded the alarm in a less expected direction: that the party was seeking to gain control over the Church as well.

The Georgian Dream government “is destroying every formally or practically independent institution or actor: branches of government, civil society, the media, has announced the banning of opposition parties, and of course has the same desires toward the [Orthodox Church] Patriarchate,” theologian Beka Mindiashvili wrote on Facebook.

The exact institutional arrangement that GD had in mind with this proposal remains unknown. While current and historical practices of the state church in Orthodox Christianity differ in this regard, what they have in common is “not only the interference of rulers in church affairs but even the legitimacy to manage the life of the church” from the state, Shota Kintsurashvili, a theologian and researcher of church history, told Civil.ge.

According to Kintsurashvili, this was the case in the Byzantine Empire, in Peter the Great’s Russia, and later in the Soviet Union, while the current example is modern Greece, where the church is “accountable to the state.” The latter involves, among other things, the need for financial transparency and state approval of bishops proposed by the Council of the clergy. In return, Kintsurashvili says, the church may expect some benefits. These could include state-paid salaries for clergy, state-provided theological education, church participation in social policy along with the state, state recognition of church-issued documents, a better structured and organized church, etc.

More to lose than to gain

The Georgian Orthodox Church, however, already enjoys significant legal and financial benefits. Thus, the proposal to “elevate” its status may seem less attractive. Article 8 of the Constitution already recognizes the GOC’s “outstanding role” in the country’s history but also posits “its independence from the state.”

The relationship between the Church and the state is further regulated by the Constitutional Agreement of 2002, often referred to as the “Concordat,” which grants the Church benefits, including legal immunity for the Patriarch, various tax exemptions, preferential conditions for the purchase/handover of state property, restitution and preservation of religious facilities considered to be national cultural heritage, recognition by the state of degrees from religious academic institutions and church-issued marriage certificates, and a commitment by the state to pay compensation for damages suffered by the Church under Soviet rule.

The agreement has been repeatedly criticized for giving the GOC preferential treatment that other religious groups do not enjoy or enjoy to a much lesser degree. The GOC has received a stable annual GEL 25 million (USD 9,3 mln) from the state budget for many years, not counting other economic benefits. And this year, in what critics saw as a campaign move, the government gave a further 35 million, most of which, according to the decrees, will go to Church-run educational projects. 

But in addition to its existing benefits and independence, the proposed deal could cost the church something far more valuable: public trust and authority.

Not worth it?

More than 83 percent of Georgians are known to identify with the Georgian Orthodox Church, while Muslims make up the second largest religious group at about 10 percent, followed by about 3 percent of Georgians who belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. Orthodox Church Patriarch Ilia II has consistently topped the approval ratings of Georgian public figures, with over 90 percent of Georgians having a favorable opinion of him. A 2021 poll found that 62% of Georgians also approve of the special legal status granted to the GOC.

In recent years, the church’s positions have often been closely aligned with the increasingly conservative government, including in leading the homophobic crackdown or defending the GD’s “peace” rhetoric amid the Ukraine war. Yet, the Patriarchate has traditionally been reluctant to lend a part of its legitimacy to reinforce ruling parties in crisis and risk alienating opposition-minded parishioners. The potential returns on backing the GD proposal seem even more doubtful, given the slim chances of GD actually winning the constitutional majority in October.

“Our recent history shows that in critical moments, every ruler has tried to legitimize or consolidate his status through the church,” Kintsurashvili says. “But the Patriarchate and the Patriarch have always tried to avoid clear positioning.” The theologian recalls Patriarch Ilia II’s refusal to appear in parliament on the eve of the Rose Revolution in 2003, as well as the clergy “openly criticizing” the United National Movement, the former ruling party, in the last year of its rule.

With this in mind, and aware of the Patriarch’s enduring authority, the government’s proposal “seeks to deprive the Patriarchate and individual clergy of their political weight and public authority, so that their positions do not pose a threat at a critical moment,” Kintsurashvili suggests. Referring to the experience of the fledgling first Georgian republic in 1917-1918, when the self-governance of the Church was also restored, he points to the concerted effort of the religious and civic leaders at the time to separate the Church and State. The theologian says declaring a state religion is “completely alien and far from our political and religious traditions.”

It is unclear whether the ruling party will dare to pressure the church amid the campaign. State-Church relations have not been without their scandals in recent years. Security file leaks in 2021 revealed that clergy were among the main targets of massive state-led surveillance. But for the political force that has increasingly turned to religious sentiments to maintain its power, any attack on the Church now could mean shooting itself in the foot.

Nini Gabritchidze/Civil.ge