SSSG 2024 Report Takes Aim at Western “Disinformation,” “Discreditation”, Broaches Planned “Liquidation” of GD Leadership
The State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) published its annual report for 2024, according to which the elections held in several dozen countries in 2024 have “changed the global geopolitical agenda” and “significantly facilitated the implementation of national policies for those countries that are committed to the protection of traditional values and values”. The main threat remains the Russian occupation of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, SSSG said. A significant part of the report is devoted to the issue of attempts by external and internal actors to undermine Georgia’s political and economic processes, including the alleged coup attempt and the alleged planned “liquidation” of representatives of the ruling party. The report takes aim at disinformation from “certain Western countries.”
Amid unpredictable global geopolitical processes, the report said, the level of threats to Georgia remained, and in some cases increased. SSSG stressed that foreign intelligence services, as well as internal and external actors, sought to interfere in Georgia’s political and economic processes using so-called hybrid warfare tools. “There were attempts to change the government through violent means,” it said.
It added that those actors actively used disinformation and propaganda campaigns, in which representatives of “certain Western countries” were involved.
SSSG states that in 2024, “it was also revealed that one of the priority directions of foreign powers was to intensify efforts targeting Georgia’s youth segment, with the aim of shaping a new generation loyal to foreign countries and aligned with their national and societal values,” the report stated.
Occupied Territories
The Russian occupation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia continued to pose the most severe threat to national security, the agency said, adding that “various tools of the so-called hybrid war were still being used… which were particularly damaging to the humanitarian and security environment on the ground.”
Russian military bases in the occupied territories conducted illegal activities, including exercises and the rotation of personnel. Dozens of drills were held involving special Russian forces. Illegal detentions and so-called borderization also remained ongoing.
“The Russian Federation was actively pursuing processes aimed at the Russification and subsequent annexation of the occupied territories of Georgia,” the report said.
The report speaks of further encroachment attempts by Russia, citing as part of the trend the illegal transfer of the Bichvinta dacha complex to Russian control; the so-called Apartment law; the so-called investment law; granting preferential treating to Russian businesses; attempts to agree on police cooperation between Sokhumi and Moscow; the restoration of Sokhumi airport, and the construction works on a Russian base in the Ochamchire district.
Russian-led Russification initiatives continued through so-called educational projects, especially in the Gali (occupied Abkhazia) and Akhalgori (occupied Tskhinvali region) districts. Russian universities established “open education” centers that retrained teachers and schoolchildren in the Russian language and other subjects. The report also said efforts were made to cultivate and strengthen an “enemy image” of ethnic Georgians.
The report says the annexation attempts of the occupied Tskhinvali region remained a threat, citing examples of Russian economic expansion in Tskhinvali region, which include the issuance of a local operational license to the Alania Investment Bank and signing and entry into force of the so-called agreement between the Russian Federation and the occupied Tskhinvali region on the development of military-technical cooperation.
Particularly noteworthy, according to the report, was the start of oil exploration works in the occupied village of Gromi with the participation of the Russian company Stroiprogress.
In terms of economic dependence, the report notes that in 2024, Tskhinvali’s budget totaled $87.8 million, 79.5% of which was financed through direct Russian subsidies. In Abkhazia, 23.5% of the $155.4 million budget came from the Russian Federation.
In 2024, 36 Georgian citizens were illegally detained near the occupation line in Tskhinvali and 37 near the occupation line in Abkhazia. At the end of 2024, a total of eleven citizens remained in illegal detention.
The SSSG also said the occupation made it impossible to properly investigate the 2023 killings of Georgian citizens Tamaz Ginturi and Vitali (Temur) Karbaia by occupation forces. The report warned that such cases foster a climate of impunity and embolden criminal practices in the occupied regions.
Illegal “borderization” continued during the year, with 45 documented cases in the Tskhinvali region and one in Abkhazia. “Freedom of movement was still restricted,” the report said, citing periodic closures of crossing points by Russian-controlled forces.
The report stressed the “policy of deliberate discrimination against ethnic Georgians” in both occupied regions, which is aggravated by the fact that international human rights organizations are unable to enter and/or fully function in the occupied territories of Georgia.
State Security and Counter-Intelligence
According to the report, the war in Ukraine caused a serious geopolitical crisis in the region, including Georgia, as it fundamentally worsened the security environment in the region and created complex challenges.
In terms of state security, the report mentioned that certain groups operating both inside and outside Georgia, allegedly “generously” funded by foreign states and supported by “certain parliamentary and non-parliamentary political figures”, not named in the report, were planning civil unrest and destabilization efforts “under various pretexts”, citing the Foreign Agents’ law as one of such “pretexts.” The report stated that the “ultimate goal” was the violent overthrow of the government.
“At various times, Georgian citizens living abroad, particularly certain individuals fighting in Ukraine, actively participated in criminal plans, expressing readiness to return to Georgia and take part in violent actions against police forces, which would have resulted in an extreme escalation of the situation,” the report said. It also claims that among such plans were plans “to liquidate the ruling party representatives.”
“To increase protest momentum and radicalization, plans were made to provoke law enforcement officers into clashes with demonstrators, which would have led to casualties,” the SSSG further claimed.
The Service claimed that protesters planned to disrupt the presidential election scheduled for December 14, 2024.
According to the report, law enforcement officers were among the primary targets, with protest organizers using methods and tactics associated with “color revolutions” to “provoke and demoralize the police.”
The report said that “foreign special services paid special attention to creating levers of influence on the domestic and foreign political processes in Georgia” with the aim “to direct the ongoing political processes in accordance with the desired scenario.”
In particular, the report notes, a certain political organization operating in Georgia was identified, “which openly cooperated with foreign forces, including political ones, and participated in events organized by them.” Without naming the organization, SSSG says that “the attempts of the mentioned political organization and its representatives, as well as other forces with similar political views, to actively participate in the political processes of the country were identified.”
The report further asserted that “the non-governmental sector, scientific and expert groups, educational organizations, and individuals loyal to this or that country” allegedly worked toward gathering intelligence information.
Additionally, the SSSG said it identified active attempts by foreign intelligence services “to establish connections with various political forces and their leaders to advance the interests of their states.” The agency claimed that journalists, private companies, diaspora organizations, and foreign citizens residing in Georgia were also targeted.
The report said that foreign intelligence services sought to exert economic influence over Georgia, with the SSSG giving “special attention to identifying economic and business projects that could be used by relevant services of foreign countries to gain economic leverage over Georgia.” According to SSSG, foreign business interests sought to enter key Georgian economic sectors to influence government decisions.
The SSSG also said that in 2024, “foreign special services attempted to actively exploit religious organizations operating in the country,” aiming to involve religious representatives in political processes.
The report also addressed cases where foreign nationals attempted to obtain residency or refugee status in Georgia using fictitious marriages, fraudulent labor contracts, student visas, or other means.
The agency reported that individuals and organizations with separatist ideology, operating both inside and outside Georgia, engaged in “anti-Georgian and anti-nationalist rhetoric,” which, according to the report, propagated separatist sentiments.
Migration-related security measures remained a priority, SSSG said, noting increased efforts to strengthen state border protection and tighten defensive procedures.
Disinformation and Propaganda
In 2024, the tools of hybrid warfare included soft power, clandestine operations, information campaigns, cyberattacks, and the emerging use of artificial intelligence.
According to the report, “the main objective of the information campaigns conducted by various forces within the framework of information warfare was to damage Georgia’s partnerships with its strategic allies, hinder the process of integration into European structures, discrediting Georgia’s image as a country that upholds democratic and Western values, increase public distrust and dissatisfaction toward state institutions, and raise the level of polarization within society.”
These information campaigns, the SSSG said, were conducted by individuals or groups associated with foreign countries’ intelligence services, and by representatives of international or regional institutions. Notably, the SSSG maintained: “The results of the disinformation campaign conducted by certain Western countries and institutions during the reporting period showed that, unlike in previous years, this approach significantly facilitated the effective anti-Western propaganda of the special services of certain countries in the country.”
The report further states: “During the reporting period, certain media outlets and journalists were identified who, on the instructions and with the financial support of persons affiliated with foreign special services, governmental or non-governmental organizations, implemented projects in Georgia that served the interests of certain countries, openly engaged in propaganda in favor of foreign countries and unfounded criticism of the State.”
Regarding soft power and covert activities, the report stated that foreign intelligence services “through financing political forces, state institutions, specific funds, non-governmental organizations of various profiles, and research centers,” organized seminars, trainings, media forums, and other events, aiming to implement destructive projects.
The SSSG noted that, through its counter-intelligence operations, it identified Georgian youth as a principal target of foreign influence — a point stressed in the report and consistent with the Georgian Dream’s recent narrative focusing on youth.
Cyberattacks targeting Georgia’s critical information infrastructure were also highlighted as major security challenges in 2024.
The report further addressed the development of artificial intelligence technologies, warning that “groups affiliated with political parties” were planning, ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, to use AI tools to disseminate “falsified video and audio recordings” in an effort to manipulate public opinion.
Fight against Terrorism
Terrorism-related threats and challenges remained the same in 2024, SSSG said. These included the possible return of Georgian citizens currently fighting with DAESH and Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq, the infiltration of international terrorists, and the possible use of Georgian territory by terrorist organizations for transit purposes, attempts to finance from Georgia terrorist organizations, and the possible recruitment of Georgian citizens by terrorist organizations.
The SSSG noted that there were no terrorist acts in Georgia during the year. It also says that the possibility of terrorist financing in Georgia has decreased significantly.
Fight against corruption
In 2024, the Service’s anti-corruption agency opened 23 criminal cases, and 39 people were charged with crimes such as bribery, abuse of office, and others.
Also Read:
- 21/04/2024 – State Security Service 2023 Report
- 07/07/2023 – State Security Service of Georgia Issues 2022 Report
- 18/04/2022 – State Security Service Issues 2021 Report
- 19/04/2021 – State Security Service Reports on Internal, External Threats of 2020
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