Interview | What Happens in Washington is the Key

The future of liberal democracy is uncertain against a backdrop of rising authoritarianism in many parts of the world, raging conventional and hybrid wars, and the weaponization of information.
Civil.ge’s Nata Koridze had the privilege of sitting down with Dr. Francis Fukuyama, renowned author, political scientist and one of the most prominent public intellectuals and scholars of the liberal order, to explore the challenges facing democracy today. Dr. Fukuyama arrived in Tbilisi to deliver a lecture to the sixth cohort of the Leadership Academy for Development, a joint program of Stanford University and the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC). Focusing on Russia’s war in Ukraine, the dynamics of the Black Sea region, the U.S. elections, and the broader context of democratic decline and polarization, Fukuyama offers unique perspectives on these critical issues and the implications for the future of global democracy.

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Civil.ge: Dr. Fukuyama, thank you very much for taking time out of your busy schedule to sit down for an interview with Civil.ge. It’s been a very difficult year for democracy and for Euro-Atlantic security. What do you think are the main challenges facing democracy today, and how have they evolved recently? And do you think democracies are losing this battle?

It’s impossible to say whether they are losing, but there has certainly been a setback for democracy in recent years. And there are several dimensions to this. One is that just in the aggregate, if you measure the number of democracies and their quality, it’s really been declining since about 2008 or 2009.

…If you measure the number of democracies and their quality, it’s really been declining since about 2008 or 2009.

One manifestation is the rise of Russia and China as deliberate opponents of democracy that are trying to weaken democracy around the world. Another separate phenomenon is the rise of populist nationalists in many countries. So, this is Viktor Orban, Narendra Modi, Donald Trump. There’s a long list of them now.

And they all come together, in a sense because, Russia and China both want to weaken the West and weaken the United States. And they support these populists. So, the Russians are counting on Donald Trump being elected in the United States as their way of winning the war against Ukraine because he’s clearly going to weaken NATO, he’s going to weaken Ukraine, he likes Putin, and so forth.

I actually think that the most important event that’s going to happen this year is going to be the American election…

I actually think that the most important event that’s going to happen this year is going to be the American election, because it’s a very stark choice between Biden, who will continue a Euro-Atlantic internationalist policy of support for other democracies, and Donald Trump, who is basically on the wrong side. He likes Putin more than he likes Zelenskyy, and he doesn’t like the idea of NATO and American solidarity. I think that’s really going to be the most important decision among many elections that will be held around the world.

And this year is unprecedented in terms of a number of elections all over the world, including Georgian elections. So, let’s focus on Georgia before zooming out. Georgia unfortunately has seen a noticeable decline in its democratic credentials in recent years. And this decline has caused concern within civil society and among our international partners. It’s become a problem in the context of the EU membership and opening negotiations. Reforms in judiciary, in particular has become the key and prominent issue. As a prominent scholar who has studied democracy for decades, how do you assess the processes that are unfolding in Georgia right now? How does it look from the other side of the ocean?

I think the main thing that makes Georgia unique is that you’ve got one oligarch who is holding power indirectly. It’s not a transparent system. Ivanishvili can deny that he’s actually manipulating the system when everybody knows that he’s really the secret power behind the Georgian Dream and the current arrangements in Georgia.

Ivanishvili can deny that he’s actually manipulating the system when everybody knows that he’s really the secret power behind the Georgian Dream and the current arrangements in Georgia.

And he has a very different idea of where Georgia belongs, than the rest of the Georgian population because as far as I can see the vast majority of Georgians want alignment with the EU, they want a good relationship with the West, and with the United States, but Ivanshvili has a different opinion. Yet he doesn’t have to be elected, he doesn’t have to stand for any kind of popular accountability, and that’s really what I think makes Georgian democracy very problematic today.

And against this background, we will be having parliamentary elections in October. Do you think there could be a breakthrough? I mean, for that you have to go into internal…

Well, I don’t know enough about the specifics of the upcoming Georgian elections. But I do have a general observation that in many countries, including Georgia, the more liberal political parties and groups have a hard time unifying. And I think that that’s Georgia’s problem as well. It was a problem in Ukraine.

…In many countries, including Georgia, the more liberal political parties and groups have a hard time unifying. And I think that’s Georgia’s problem as well.

It was a problem in Egypt. It was a problem in Russia that you have situations where actually there are many liberal groups that largely agree on the substance of policy, but their leaders don’t want to work with each other, they just want to promote their own status and positions, and as a result you end up with a non-democratic or anti-democratic alternative. And I think that’s something that Georgia has faced in the past and unfortunately may face again in the future.

Yes. There is an alarming trend that, along with anti-liberal tendencies and legislation such as foreign agents law, for example, that Georgian Dream tried to pass last year, and rhetoric, the Georgian Dream has distinguished itself in recent years by attacking international organizations, including those that work here in Georgia, such as NDI, IRI, such as USAID. What, in your opinion, is the role of these organizations in these circumstances, and what should be their response to such behavior?

The main pushback has to come from within Georgia. And I think that happened last year when Georgian Dream tried to pass the Russian-style NGO [foreign agents] law. I think outside organizations need to show solidarity with Georgia.

I think outside organizations need to show solidarity with Georgia.

The fact that Georgia has a future with the European Union, NATO, and different kinds of international organizations, and they’re part of this family of democracies, means that this kind of international pressure will still be important for Georgian Dream and Ivanishvili. It’s also important to note that Georgia is providing material support to Russia in its invasion of Ukraine by basically allowing sanctions violations to take place on Georgian territory. And I think that the West hasn’t paid enough attention to that.

Why do you think that happens?

Because of the war, you know, there are a lot of things [going on], it’s not just the war now, there’s a war in Gaza, the United States has to worry about Taiwan and Chinese expansionism there. So I think Georgia just fell off the agenda because even a big country like the United States can’t pay attention to everything at the same time. So I think that’s part of the problem.

The Black Sea region has become a focal point of geopolitical tensions, as the war in Ukraine has so vividly demonstrated. Do you think it’s fair to say that the fate not only of the future global security architecture but also of democracy is being decided in Ukraine today?

Well, yes, I think that Ukraine is not just a fight about Ukraine, it’s a fight about the restoration of the former Soviet Union. That’s really what Putin’s objective is. And so if he’s not stopped in Ukraine, he’s going to continue to put pressure on Georgia, on Moldova, on the Baltics, on many other countries.

Would you agree that the West is still punching below its weight when it comes to the standoff with Russia? Even though Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has done what its aggression against Georgia didn’t, which is to sober up Western politicians, it seems that there is still no clear realization in these societies of the dangers that Russia’s possible victory could have on the whole of your Atlantic security. Do you think Europe has it in itself to step up its game, especially against the backdrop of what’s happening in the United States right now?

It has the potential to do that. I just think, realistically, it’s a very big change that’s happened in the last two, three years. That realization just takes a long time.

One of the biggest laggards is obviously Germany which has promised at Zeitenwende but has been very slow to deliver it.

One of the biggest laggards is obviously Germany which has promised at Zeitenwende but has been very slow to deliver it. Specifically, their weapons systems, like these Taurus missiles, would be very useful to Ukraine. And Chancellor Scholz doesn’t want to provide them. I think you just have to see this in the context of the last 70 years of German foreign policy. It’s very hard to move a supertanker quickly.

In other places you just have just have coalition politics. And so many Eastern European countries, like Estonia, are very eager to help Ukraine, but they’re also small. And they don’t have as much weight, whereas the larger players are much slower to move and less convinced. And then the United States itself is a whole other issue. I mean, basically, the Republican Party has switched sides from being pro-Ukrainian to being pro-Russian.

Do you think we can put it like that?

Well, of course, that’s what’s happened. The hard core of the Republican base is anti-Ukrainian right now.

We have seen growing polarization in the United States. That’s something we’re very familiar with in Georgia, but I think the United States has seen a lot of that recently- the divisions and the polarization. How do these domestic challenges relate to the broader discussions about democratic decline and around the world? How serious is this challenge not just to U.S. democracy, but to global liberal democracy?

It’s the most important challenge in the world right now, because if the United States basically drops out of the democratic coalition, it’s going to affect everybody just because of the role that the United States has played militarily, politically, economically, and so forth.

… if the United States basically drops out of the democratic coalition, it’s going to affect everybody just because of the role that the United States has played militarily, politically, economically, and so forth.

It’s very hard to see how that coalition is going to hold together if the United States essentially not only pulls out, you know, actually changes sides and becomes more pro-Russian. And that’s obviously going to be a disaster for everybody in Europe.

So, you think that if Donald Trump wins, that’s what we should expect, and that no other forces within the United States and within the political establishment, for example, would be able to somehow mitigate that.

Well, there will be a fight. There are still Republicans who are internationalists, but they’ve been very much marginalized within the party. And I think that even if Trump doesn’t formally pull the United States out of NATO, he’s going to fatally weaken it. He said that if NATO countries don’t pay their dues, we’re not going to support them.

There are still Republicans who are internationalists, but they’ve been very much marginalized within the party. And I think that even if Trump doesn’t formally pull the United States out of NATO, he’s going to fatally weaken it.

He actually invited Russia to attack anyone that didn’t pay up. You can’t imagine a clearer signal than that of what his intentions are. And I think people need to take that very, very seriously. At the very least, Europe has got to be able to defend itself without the United States. And that means really massive investments in their own military, its own industrial base and so forth.

Given the rise of authoritarianism in many parts of the world and the fact that authoritarianism is in some ways faster and more efficient than democracy, what strategies can democracies use to build their resilience and to promote democratic values so that they become more attractive.

It’s a really broad question and I don’t think there’s a single answer because different democracies face different kinds of challenges.

I think that many democracies have had a hard time delivering because they tend to be overly procedural… and they could do a lot to streamline.

I think that many democracies have had a hard time delivering because they tend to be overly procedural, it’s hard for them to build things because they’ve got so many different legal requirements and the like, and they could do a lot to streamline. I mean one of the big competitions going on in the world right now is over infrastructure. China has its Belt and Road Initiative which is the biggest development initiative in human history. And they can do things quickly and relatively cheaply because they don’t observe the same level of safeguards that Western projects observe.

And I think that in order to compete with that, it’s a matter of resources, and it’s also a matter of adjusting the kinds of safeguards that Western projects feel they have to observe, not necessarily to become more like China, but to be a little bit less demanding in the kinds of legal constraints that they place on themselves. That would allow them to deliver results more readily.

There’s also a very sensitive cultural issue because the way that Western liberal societies have interpreted individual rights has evolved from basic equality of rights for ethnic and racial groups to include women’s rights, rights for LGBTQ rights. And I think that this rapid expansion of our understanding of equality has been used by authoritarians, especially when you get into things like transgender rights. About 10- 15 years ago, people didn’t even understand that there were transgender people in the world and now a lot of liberal societies act like this is the forefront of social justice and if you don’t have equal rights for transgender people then you’re not really a liberal society. And I think that, unfortunately, many societies are quite socially conservative and this kind of emphasis doesn’t play well.

Including Georgia…

Yes. And Putin has played on that, by saying that if you become part of the EU your children are going to change genders, and your boys are going to become girls and vice versa. It’s not true, but it’s a very effective form of propaganda.

It’s not that you should take those things off the table but I think that there are more important rights that need to be respected, basic freedom of the press, the right, to vote, an equal playing field for political competition, and that we should focus on those kinds of issues rather than these cultural issues that actually a lot of people find very disruptive and offensive.

You have a lecture tomorrow at a Free University called Navigating Free Speech and Wokeism in Today’s Liberal Democracies. And that’s a very interesting and unusual topic for a lecture in Georgia, where both liberalism and woke-ism are in a kind of nascent stage, compared to say, the Western societies.  

Well, it’s a very American issue. It’ not even that important in continental Europe.

It has really has a lot to do with America’s racial history. America had slavery and then it had legal segregation up until the 1960s and so the central domestic social justice struggle was the struggle for racial equality and that’s become a model for all subsequent social movements, so feminism, LGBTQ rights, all saw themselves as part of a single struggle for equality. The term “woke” itself comes from African Americans who wanted people to understand their particular marginalization in American society. That’s where the term woke comes from. 

It’s important to understand this aspect of American politics though, because it’s really this woke-ism that provokes the right.

It’s important to understand this aspect of American politics though, because it’s really this woke-ism that provokes the right.

There’s been a shift in the understanding of the progressive left in the United States. And it’s stronger in Commonwealth countries like Great Britain or Australia, New Zealand, and then less so in continental Europe. But I think that it’s very powerful among progressives in the US and Britain…. And that’s a shift from the 20th century understanding of progressivism, which was about equality between social classes, to now equality between these very specific small identity groups. That has characterized a lot of progressive politics.

And then that sets off a reaction on the part of the right. So, now a lot of white people in America feel that they’re the ones who are being marginalized because of all this attention that’s being given to women, to blacks, etc.

That’s also been taken aboard by pro-Kremlin/anti-Western forces. These kind of tensions are being very shrewdly manipulated.  

You know, I think that in terms of gender relations, this is something broader than the United States because if you look around the world, over the last 50 years, hundreds of millions of women have entered the workplace. It’s created all sorts of new tensions. There are ones that can be overcome, but look for example, at the issue of sexual harassment. The Me Too movement has been very, very big in the United States ever since the mid- 2010s, Harvey Weinstein and the scandals that surrounded that. And I think that that’s a function of the fact that women are now in the workplace universally, and there has to be a major change in norms about the way that men treat women when they’re co-workers… And that’s just a hard transition, but it’s one that I think, for the most part, has been made successfully. But it has also affected the status of men.

So, if you look, it is an almost universal fact that women graduate from universities at much higher rates than men do. And actually there was a book written last year by Richard Reeves, who’s a scholar at the Brookings Institution, where he basically says that if you look at one of the demographic groups that’s actually suffering the most, it’s actually white men, actually, because they don’t have the education, they used to regard themselves as the chief wage-earner in families, and now in many families it’s the woman that actually is the more economically powerful and a lot of men are having a very difficult time adjusting to this situation.

And I think that’s just a byproduct of shifting into a post-industrial society where women have a bigger place because they can do the kind of useful work in a service economy that men are less able to do. So, that’s also one of the big drivers of this insecurity.

I think it also created a lot of problems in relationships between women and men, which the previous generations didn’t have.

If you want to get into this further it’s also one of the reasons why you have these really disastrously low birth rates in many countries, because when you combine large numbers of educated women with very socially conservative societies, women basically respond by not having children, by not getting married or delaying marriage and having a much smaller number of children.

…When you combine large numbers of educated women with very socially conservative societies, women basically respond by not having children, by not getting married or delaying marriage and having a much smaller number of children.

And this is true in Japan, in South Korea, in Taiwan, in Singapore. It’s true in southern Europe compared to northern Europe where the fertility rates are much, much lower. This is the case in Italy, Spain, Korea, Japan, where total fertility rates have fallen. In Korea, the fertility rate has dropped below one. You have to have around 2.1 or 2.2 in order to maintain a stable population. And many of these societies are actually facing this huge demographic crisis because women don’t want to have as many children.

And that in itself is going to be a major source of disruption in the future.

What do you think will be the most important factors in determining how things will play out in Ukraine in the next couple of years?

It’s what happens in Washington. Unfortunately, that’s really the key issue. I hope that the American Congress will eventually restore military assistance to Ukraine, but it shouldn’t be taking this long. Every day that goes by, the Ukrainians don’t have the ammunition to keep fighting the Russians. Apparently State Secretary Blinken came to the Kyiv Security Forum a few days ago and said that he thought it would happen relatively soon, but we’ll have to see.

This post is also available in: ქართული (Georgian) Русский (Russian)