RFE/RL’s Investigation Explores Concerns Over Georgia’s Expanding Surveillance System

On February 6, RFE/RL‘s Tbilisi bureau published a detailed report on the rapid expansion of surveillance cameras across Georgia and the lack of public awareness regarding their management and capabilities. Although surveillance cameras have become an omnipresent feature of Georgia’s urban landscape, and of Tbilisi in particular, issues such as who controls these cameras and what they are fully capable of remain unclear. With privacy and oversight concerns unaddressed, there are alleged cases of Georgian Dream authorities illegally accessing footage from private companies or, on the contrary, preventing access if it does not suit them.

The growing network of surveillance cameras has heightened concerns, as it coincides with an increasingly authoritarian trend in the country, the brutal repression of protests and dissent, and the shrinking of civil liberties in Georgia. The number of cameras has reportedly increased exponentially, particularly at the sites of the ongoing popular protests, which have now passed the 70-day mark. In recent days, many of the protesters have been summoned by the public prosecutor’s office in connection with alleged road blockades in December and January. On top of this, on 6 February, the ruling Georgian Dream party rushed through repressive legal amendments tightening restrictions on assemblies and demonstrations and increasing administrative and criminal penalties.

The attack on Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the Gakharia for Georgia opposition party demonstrates in Sheraton Batumi Hotel on January 15, highlights growing concerns about selective access to surveillance footage in Georgia. The hotel, which was supposed to share the footage with the victim’s attorneys, claimed that the footage and the servers were no longer available, sparking suspicions of evidence tampering. Natia Mezvrishvili, one of the party leaders, said that the party suspected that the hotel was making a deal with the police and could have handed over the footage and the servers to the police. 

RFE’RL sheds light on the expanding surveillance system in Georgia.

Who Controls the Cameras?

One of the most alarming aspects of Georgia’s surveillance expansion is the lack of transparency regarding its operation. There are no clear indications in public spaces about which agency is responsible for specific cameras. This ambiguity raises concerns about the potential misuse of recorded footage and the risk of unauthorized access. While the government has not publicly acknowledged whether these cameras have audio recording capabilities, similar models in other countries do, intensifying concerns of mass surveillance.

The Innovations and Reforms Center estimates that there are at least 4,318 “smart cameras” installed across Georgia. “The government has never explained how it processes and stores the information obtained through surveillance cameras, or whether some of these cameras are used with facial recognition systems,” Nastasia Arabuli, the author of the report, writes.

The government insists that facial recognition technology is only deployed at airports and border crossings, using an EU-funded system developed by the Japanese company NEC. However, Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs also employs facial recognition tools licensed from Papillon Systems, a company with alleged ties to Russian intelligence services.

MIA’s Expert-Criminalistic Department also possesses facial recognition systems. It uses an automated recognition application, POLYFACE, licensed by Papillon Systems. “Papillon Systems is a company connected to Russian intelligence services, with its headquarters in Moscow,” the investigation says.

Who ships Cameras to Georgia?

According to the investigation, most of the cameras are made by two Chinese companies: Hikvision and Dahua Technology. Both companies are sanctioned by the United States. Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Australia have refused to use their equipment.

The official distributor of Chinese Hikvinson products in Georgia is Neotech. Video surveillance systems in major cities of Georgia, including Tbilisi, Rustavi, and Gori, are distributed by Neotech. The head of the sales department of the company told RFE/RL that “the government agencies have never expressed concerns about the security of Chinese-made cameras and that their requirements for companies participating in tenders are fully met.”

Hikvision, and Dahua Technology cameras, the report notes, were used by the Chinese government as repressive tools in Xinjiang province against the Uyghur population: “China’s communist regime had the ability to surveil ethnic and religious minorities because surveillance cameras could recognize Uyghurs and distinguish them from the Chinese.”

Security Vulnerabilities and Cyber Risks

The report cites the journalistic investigation of the Radio Free Europe’s Ukraine Bureau on Chinese-made surveillance cameras, which revealed that through the TRASSIR video surveillance system, which is sold by the Russian company DSSL, Russia has access to surveillance footage from cameras located on streets and buildings in Ukrainian cities. This same company is a strategic partner of the Chinese Hikvision, whose cameras are also installed in Georgia.

“70-80% of government agencies are equipped with Chinese surveillance cameras. Technically, these cameras are not bad considering their price, but they have a security issue – it is hard to say who has access to the footage. These cameras and systems are particularly vulnerable to hacker attacks,” the RFE/RL report quotes an anonymous IT and surveillance camera specialist. He also recalled an experiment conducted by the BBC in 2024, which showed that a professional hacker needed less than a minute to hack a Chinese Hikvision camera system.

Regulations vs. Reality: How is Data Handled?

Since January 1, 2024, the GD government required businesses with a turnover exceeding 500,000 GEL to install surveillance cameras. This includes wholesale/retail facilities, hotels, restaurants, and bars. Surveillance is also required for casinos, tobacco bars, medical institutions, markets, shopping centers, gas stations, microfinance firms, and currency exchange booths, with casinos often including audio recording. Surveillance must be continuous, with data stored for 1 to 6 months, though the specific duration for each facility is unclear.

“It is noteworthy that a study published in 2020 by three authoritative universities (Cambridge, New York, and Northeastern) concluded, based on 40 years of criminal case analysis, that surveillance cameras reduced crime by 13%. The study also found that cameras reduced crimes such as car and house burglaries and petty theft, but had no impact on violent crimes,” the report notes.

Speaking to RFE/RL, former Georgian State Inspector Londa Toloraia highlighted systemic failures in data processing, noting that in 80% of cases reviewed between 2018 and 2020, surveillance footage was handled illegally. Many agencies fail to track who accesses or manipulates footage, making accountability almost impossible. In particular, Toloraia highlighted significant problems within the MIA related to the disorganization of video surveillance systems.

She stated: “The Ministry of Internal Affairs was very disorganized among state agencies. Why does the Ministry of Internal Affairs benefit from this system’s disorganization? Because when it suits them, there are records, and when they don’t need the records, they usually don’t exist… when the responsibility of a police officer could be questioned or police misconduct is revealed, in such cases the records don’t exist”.

Toloraia also pointed out that there are cases when police have unlawfully allegedly accessed surveillance footage from private businesses without a court order. “When we asked why the police were given access to these recordings, they said they were afraid to resist [the police],” Toloraia told RFE/RL.

The report says that an example of unlawful access to footage from private institutions, which was also identified by the State Inspector’s Office, is the case of TV Pirveli’s cameraman, Lekso Lashkarava. In this case, MIA requested footage from a medical facility, showing his image, without a court order, and published it on the day of his death. “The footage, which included both his image and audio from several locations, tarnished the reputation of the journalist, who had been severely beaten during a violent protest,” Toloraia said.

Also Read:

• 22/01/2025 – Opposition Member Says Sheraton Hotel Batumi May Be Involved in Cover-Up of Attack on Gakharia
• 08/02/2024 – Privacy and Security Risks of CCTV Surveillance in Georgia
• 24/09/2021 – Interior Ministry Fined Over Violating Deceased Cameraman’s Data Privacy