Interview | Fried: “GD Weakens Georgian Sovereignty”

On the margins of the 8th Tbilisi International Conference 2024, Civil’ge‘s Nata Koridze spoke with one of the conference participants, a distinguished American diplomat with extensive experience in the region and US-Georgia relations, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council Ambassador Daniel Fried.

In his forty-year career in the Foreign Service, Amb. Fried played a key role in shaping and implementing American policy in post-Soviet Europe. As Special Assistant and NSC Senior Director for Presidents Clinton and Bush, Ambassador to Poland, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (2005-09), he shaped the policy of NATO enlargement to Central European nations and, in parallel, NATO-Russia relations. As the State Department’s coordinator for sanctions policy, he drafted U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2014, resulting in the most extensive U.S. sanctions program to date, and negotiated the imposition of similar sanctions by Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia.

Amb. Daniel Fried is on the Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and a visiting professor at Warsaw University. As a due disclosure, the NED is also supporting Civil.ge.

The Tbilisi International Conference is organized by the McCain Institute for International Leadership at Arizona State University and the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC). It is also supported by the UN Association of Georgia, this publication’s parent organization.

Q: Ambassador, thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule for this interview. Given your extensive background working on U.S.-Georgia relations, it would be interesting to hear your perspective on the recent developments in Georgia in the run-up to the October elections.

There has always been an authoritarian temptation in Georgian politics. And this is not a monopoly of the Georgian Dream. I’ll get to them in a minute. But Saakashvili, in his later years, drifted in this direction. I remember the response to the 2007 demonstrations—not very good. So this was a problem.

Georgian Dream won the election freely and fairly. They won it because Georgians were disgusted with the police abuse and more. And this was reflective of the concerns about the bad side of Saakashvili’s rule, as opposed to the good side.

And their [GD] argument was: we are pro-Western, pro-European, pro-NATO, but we can get there without the negatives of Saakashvili. That was their argument, but they went much further in an authoritarian direction than Saakashvili’s worst moments.

The support for the Foreign Agents’ law and the promise to shut down opposition political parties are appalling. There’s no excuse for it. It is an openly authoritarian political promise.

The support for the Foreign Agents’ Law and the promise to shut down opposition political parties are appalling. There’s no excuse for them. It is an openly authoritarian political promise.

The Georgian Dream seems to be intentionally trying to ruin relations with the United States. They can [try to] explain what Georgian interest is thereby served, but I cannot understand it. It’s not that we support the United National Movement or any other political parties. It’s none of our business. We don’t care. But we do care about Georgian democracy.

It is clear that Georgian Dream is moving in an authoritarian direction, which weakens Georgian sovereignty and actually makes Georgia more vulnerable to Russia’s pressure.

And it is clear that Georgian Dream is moving in an authoritarian direction, which weakens Georgian sovereignty and actually makes Georgia more vulnerable to Russia’s pressure. Maybe they can explain what they have in mind, but I do not understand.

Could you have imagined that relations between Georgia and the US would be at such a low point today?

I never imagined. I never imagined that Georgia would, on purpose, pick fights with the United States. And on purpose attack the United States. This stuff about the Global Party of War: well, there is a Global Party of War, and that’s led by the people who start wars, like Vladimir Putin, who started the war against Georgia and started two wars against Ukraine – in 2014 and the big war in 2022. So, what are they talking about? Is it war-mongering to help a democracy like Ukraine defend itself?

It [GD rhetoric] weakens Georgia, alienates Georgia’s friends, and tends to isolate Georgia, which will benefit Russia.

They must be called to account for those accusations against the United States. That’s nonsense, and they know it. It weakens Georgia, alienates Georgia’s friends, and tends to isolate Georgia, which will benefit Russia.

If that’s what the Georgian people want, there’s nothing we can do about it. But I don’t think the Georgian people see their future in rejoining the Russian Empire.

What steps should Georgia expect from the United States before or after the elections?

Well, it depends on how the elections are conducted. The Georgian Dream does have support, but it’s not majority support.

There’s a question of whether the elections will be free and fair, whether they will be mostly free and fair, or whether they will be outright stolen.

There’s a question of whether the elections will be free and fair, whether they will be mostly free and fair, or whether they will be outright stolen. The United States will base its reaction on what actually happens on the ground. The Biden administration would much rather avoid a confrontation with Georgia.

Do you think additional sanctions will follow?

I don’t want to speak to particulars, but the concern in Washington about what the Georgian Dream is doing is high. The Foreign Agents Law goes into effect, I think, today. And there could be a reaction in Washington depending on how it is implemented.

Do you think the outcome of the U.S. presidential election will influence the U.S. policy towards Georgia?

Absolutely. There is a fight within the Republican Party right now about the direction of a possible Trump administration, but generally Trump seems to be attracted to the authoritarians and authoritarianism. This just seems to be his default mode. Harris is much more of a pro-democracy, pro-free world thinker, in terms of her strategy and her practice. And I think that it will make a tremendous difference.

So, is that to say that if Donald Trump wins in the United States, then his administration might not pay attention to what’s happening in Georgia, particularly the democratic backsliding?

Maybe if Trump wins there will be a fight, but if the pro-authoritarian elements around Trump succeed and have a decisive influence, he and his administration will not be interested in democracy, they will be interested in making deals with authoritarians. The word Yalta doesn’t have the same meaning here that it does in Poland, but you know what I mean. Yalta to the Poles, to the Balts, and maybe to Georgians, is drawing a line on a map, and you’re on the wrong side.

Thinking as he does, Trump and his people, I think, would be more than satisfied with drawing a line on the map, and they don’t care much about the countries on the wrong side.

Thinking as he does, Trump and his people, I think, would be more than satisfied with drawing a line on the map, and they don’t care much about the countries on the wrong side. They don’t say so explicitly, but sometimes they imply it.

And the very last question: What is your assessment of Russia’s ability to influence Georgia on Election Day, as well as its possible actions vis-a-vis Georgia, if it sees the GD lose power?

I think Russia is in a position to exert pressure on Georgia, no matter who wins. It seems to be in a favored position with respect to the current government. I do not understand why, but that is a question to ask them.