To reverse Georgia’s democratic backsliding, the EU should act with resolve; it should temporarily suspend the visa-free regime for Georgia and impose stricter financial and economic restrictions.
“Mark my words, Beso, few people understand the meaning of what has happened today. Over there the English ships are sailing away. Europe has gone. We have been abandoned again in Asia … Up till now we had two paths: either Russia or Europe. Now we are left with one: the Moscow path, which is Red and thorny.”
Mikheil javakhishvili, kvachi kvachantiradze and his adventures, 1924
Hardly any other literary scene captures the Georgian intellectuals’ generational longing for Europe as fully and powerfully as the one written by Mikheil Javakhishvili, one of the most prominent Georgian novelists of the 20th century. Voiced through his flamboyant character Kvachi Kvachantiradze in the eponymous novel of 1924, the passage conveys a profound sense of Georgia’s unfulfilled historical aspirations and Europe’s lukewarm attitude to this civilizational pivot, an experience that later generations of Georgians would come to describe as “geopolitical loneliness.”
Sitting on the dock of the Batumi port – Georgia’s gateway to Europe – in the summer of 1920, Kvachi, a petty nobleman with strong pro-European and anti-Russian leanings, watches with worry as British battleships retreat from his restive homeland. As he laments their departure to his loyal friend Beso, Kvachi’s words strike a deep chord of the impending demise of everything he and his generation held dear. For him (read: Mikheil Javakhishvili), British withdrawal marks the beginning of Georgia’s inevitable descent into Soviet occupation – a loss not only of sovereignty and national independence, but also of the hope for a European Georgia.
Kvachi’s forecast soon came true. Left without Europe’s backing, Georgia failed to fend off the Soviet invasion of 1921. Its brief, but eventful period of independence was quickly swept away, and what had once been a promising political project of bottom-up democracy was soon made into a breeding ground for Communist ideological engineering. Hundreds fled the country, while others took up arms, only to be suppressed with brutal force again.
Javakhishvili’s own fate was no less tragic. His literary genius earned him a measure of respect within Communist ranks, but his anti-authoritarian and anti-imperial writings, as well as his earlier involvement in the Georgian independence movement, would haunt him until the end. His works, including Kvachi, were heavily censored. He was sidelined and criticized; and in 1937, he was tortured to death as “the enemy of the people.” His body was never recovered. Just one among the many pro-independence, pro-European Georgian writers, artists, and politicians who vanished into the dark chambers of the Soviet NKVD.
Is history repeating itself? Are we once again witnessing the loss of a European Georgia?
The events of 1921 and 1937 may seem distant, but they remain in the collective memory as a stark reminder of the tragedy that wiped out an entire generation of politically and socially active Georgians. It is, therefore, no surprise that, as Georgia drifts to authoritarianism once again, many Georgians can’t help but ask: Is history repeating itself? Are we once again witnessing the loss of a European Georgia?
And as the shadows of the past grow larger, Georgians are once again turning their eyes and attention to Europe. “Where do the European Union and European countries stand in all of this?”, they quietly ask in their conversations on Rustaveli Avenue and elsewhere. Are they doing enough to support the country’s embattled civil society – or have they, once again, boarded the ships and turned away?
Confusion in adversity
No country is immune to democratic backsliding. Yet, few modern democracies with elected governments have slid toward authoritarianism as quickly and visibly as Georgia. Once regarded as the region’s most vibrant and promising democracy, Georgia now finds itself on the brink of authoritarianism, marked by the erosion of democratic norms, the capture of independent institutions, and the rise of one-party rule.
Initially, the EU’s response to the unfolding crisis in Georgia seemed promising. At the height of the crackdowns in December 2024, Brussels moved to limit all high-level contacts with the Georgian authorities while freezing approximately 150 million Euros earmarked for the country under various regional and bilateral programs. The European Commission also floated the possibility of targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials, but Hungary and Slovakia blocked this proposal. Still, several EU member states, including Estonia, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania, imposed bilateral travel bans on Georgian officials.
Despite good initial steps, the EU got bogged down in the following months.
Yet, despite these good initial steps, the EU got bogged down in the following months. Only Czechia and Poland joined the sanctions effort, imposing travel bans on several Georgian officials involved in violent crackdowns. The Baltic states expanded their measures as well, targeting GD enablers across various institutions, but no EU member state has gone further than travel bans, let alone to show real political resolve to apply meaningful pressure. This is particularly evident in the case of France, a country where Bidzina Ivanishvili holds substantial assets (and a dual citizenship), which has remained puzzlingly inactive. The only financial sanctions to date have come from outside the EU – the United Kingdom and the United States.
In late January, the EU finally managed to reach a consensus on suspending visa-free travel for holders of diplomatic passports and government officials. Yet, this too proved to be symbolic; numerous reports indicate that the restrictions apply to passports, not individuals, allowing many, including GD ministers and lawmakers, to continue traveling to Europe using regular, non-diplomatic passports.
To make matters worse, the EU also failed to follow through on its pledge to reallocate frozen funds to civil society organizations and independent media in a timely manner, leading to severe funding deficits from January through March, when such assistance was most needed.
In the meantime, GD authorities were fining, raiding, and arresting civic activists, dismissing or otherwise silencing critically minded public servants, fast-tracking new restrictions, and preparing to rubber-stamp even more predatory legislation to eradicate the final pockets of opposition.
Emboldened by the sluggish Western reaction, GD has moved to dismantle the country’s greatest asset—and the very foundation of its ties to the EU—its democracy. In doing so, GD’s message has been clear: they hold the position of power and will dictate the terms of relations with Brussels.
Tbilisi’s reckless brinkmanship is one thing, but just how proactively should Brussels respond to Georgia burning its bridges with the EU? Should it quietly accept the new realities, or is it time to raise the stakes?
Reach out or toughen up?
True, as an actor that operates primarily through positive conditionalities, the EU has not been prepared to respond to such a sharp U-turn, both by default and by design. To be sure, no one expects Brussels to move at lightning speed, especially considering the global dynamics. Similarly, no one expects the EU to sever ties with Georgia entirely. The country sits at a strategic crossroads, maintains significant trade and people-to-people ties with the EU, and plays a key role in the Black Sea region, all of which are important for the EU’s own security. So, one way or another, communication channels will need to be maintained.
That said, the EU’s handling of the Georgia debacle is still hard to justify. Not only did it fail to respond adequately to the scale and severity of the human rights crisis, it also failed a basic test of foreign policy agency: GD’s repeated acts of repression and democratic backsliding – a direct assault on the idea of Europe in Georgia, as well as EU’s credibility as a normative actor in the region – were left unanswered, sending a signal to Tbilisi and other countries that norm-breaking is acceptable and tolerated.
Against this backdrop, recent statements coming from Brussels that do not rule out dialogue with the Georgian authorities appear to be misplaced, ill-timed, and above all, fundamentally flawed. Not only do they fail to honor the thousands of Georgians who have been protesting nonstop under the EU banner, they also risk normalizing authoritarian behavior, sending the message that democratic erosion will eventually be met with engagement rather than consequences.
So where do we go from here? What is the solution if not engagement?
First, any further steps must be based on the understanding that the situation is urgent, and that the consequences of inaction could be far-reaching for both Georgia and its people. It must, however, also rest on the assumption that any immediate engagement with GD authorities would signal Brussels’ acceptance of the new status quo.
The consequences of inaction could be far-reaching for both Georgia and its people.
Hence, the EU’s objective before engaging should be to change the behavior of the authorities in Tbilisi—at a minimum, to reverse the democratic backsliding to pre-crisis levels and, at a maximum, to put the country back on the EU integration rails. For this to happen, blinking first is not the right approach.
What Brussels needs to do is to radiate strength and resolve. There are at least two powerful tools available to Brussels officials to make this a reality. The first is the visa suspension mechanism. For some circles in Tbilisi and Brussels, suspending visa-free travel is seen as counterproductive – a measure that would harm ordinary Georgians, restrict people-to-people mobility, and affect their livelihoods. Sadly, all of that is true. But the uncomfortable reality is that both visa liberalization and labor migration are increasingly serving to prop up the Georgian Dream. They boost the ruling party’s coffers through remittances and, perhaps more critically, create a false sense of normalcy among EU-friendly voters within GD’s electorate, reinforcing the illusion that integration remains on track, despite clear signs to the contrary.
Brussels needs to radiate strength and resolve.
The other obvious consideration is that the deeper GD descends into shadowy governance, the more likely it becomes that Georgian passports will be treated as a commercial and political asset, available to those who can simply purchase them. And in this context, visa suspension is likely only a matter of time. The real question is whether Brussels will tie its decision to symptoms, such as non-compliance with technical requirements, or to the root cause: democratic deterioration.
The other powerful tool is the use of financial and economic measures. The EU member states must continue imposing sanctions on all senior GD leadership and officials, as well as their enablers in the law enforcement, judiciary, and businesses, including asset freezes targeting them and their businesses. They should also reassess the use of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), with a view to restricting exports and imports where Russia is the ultimate destination or origin, especially in areas where the agreement’s benefits are being misused. Such measures would reduce revenues that indirectly sustain the ruling party and could make Tbilisi more amenable to renewed cooperation.
To streamline the process, the EU should revive the idea of a “coalition of the willing”, preferably under German leadership – a mechanism to coordinate responses across all relevant domains and ensure unified, consistent European action. Equally important is communication: the EU and its member states must make it clear to the Georgian public that these sanctions are temporary and fully reversible, conditional on concrete steps by the authorities. These include the withdrawal of punitive fines against protesters, the release of political prisoners, the rescinding of repressive legislation, and enabling civil society and independent media to operate freely.
As Georgians mark the 165th day of nonstop protests and brace for the impact of new draconian laws, the EU must get its act together. It is time to up the ante and respond to GD’s overtures with confidence—or risk losing not only its credibility as a foreign policy actor but also those who have long looked to Europe with great admiration—the Georgian civil society.
The author is a long-term researcher and observer of Georgian politics. Due to professional circumstances, he identifies himself for this article under the pen name Khizambareli.
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