Op-ed | EU Should Not Get Squeezed Out of Georgia with a Whimper

The Georgian Dream is not done making Georgia an authoritarian state. The work is still in progress. As the new repressive legislation advances through the rubber-stamp parliament, Brussels has little time to figure out a response. However, if European diplomats think the Georgian Dream cannot worsen the relations further, they must think again. And Brussels shall not go quietly when citizens resist under its blue flags.

Vano Chkhikvadze is a visiting lecturer at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA).

This Op-ed is based on an article published in GEOpolitics, a leading source of analysis on foreign policy issues that relate to Georgia. You can learn more about the EU’s policy options on visa liberalization and visa suspension mechanisms by clicking on the full article link here.

Economic arguments that once made Georgia’s EU alignment seem inevitable are losing weight. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), a central pillar of Georgia’s Association Agreement with the EU, was once hailed as a game-changer for Georgia’s economy. It was offering businesses privileged access to the world’s largest single market. Yet, the Georgian government worked steadily over the past decade to erode this promise. In 2015, Georgia’s exports to the EU accounted for 28.3% of total trade. By 2024, that figure had collapsed to just 8.7%.

Once enthusiastic about the EU’s market opportunities, Georgian businesses now face trade barriers, shifting regulatory requirements, and political uncertainty. The economic actors closely aligned with the ruling have cultivated deeper financial and commercial ties with Russia and China, reducing their reliance on Europe. As a result, the once-powerful business sector, a key advocate for EU integration, has fallen noticeably silent. The private sector, which previously saw EU trade as a ticket to modernization and economic stability, now appears resigned to accompany Georgia’s pivot toward alternative markets.

The EU must recognize that its economic leverage over Georgia is diminishing. The Georgian Dream may feel emboldened to pull the plug on DCFTA and continue its drift away from the EU.

The Georgian Dream’s policies leave the Association Agreement in tatters. Article 2 of the AA states clearly that values are not optional but fundamental to the partnership between Georgia and the EU. Article 4 of the AA obligates Georgia to develop and strengthen democratic institutions, guarantee judicial independence, and uphold the rule of law. Article 13 of the AA explicitly obligates Georgia to promote human rights, media freedom, and access to justice. Article 4 of the AA commits Georgia to strengthening its anti-corruption institutions and ensuring their independence. The violation of these values and principles is out there for all to see, and the Association Agreement is legally binding.

Furthermore, Article 427 allows either party to denounce it. If Tbilisi intends to signal its ire, withdrawing from the agreement would be the logical step.

The key lesson from Iceland’s withdrawal from the EU application in 2015 (for entirely different reasons) is that once a government politically commits to reversing EU integration, it can do so unilaterally, regardless of public sentiment. In Iceland, that decision was made without a referendum or full parliamentary approval despite strong demands for a national vote. Georgia risks following the same trajectory — except in its case, the consequences would be far more severe. To justify such a drastic move, the Georgian Dream could attempt to shift blame onto Brussels, pointing to the lack of progress for Ukraine and Moldova as evidence that EU membership was never a realistic prospect.

The question is no longer whether or not the Georgian Dream wants to remain on the EU path— but if the Georgian public and opposition forces can resist its retreat before irreversible damage is done.

The EU cannot afford to be passive in this looming deterioration. It must increase its scrutiny of Georgia’s democratic trajectory, making it clear that withdrawal from the accession process would not simply be a political maneuver but a catastrophic decision with real consequences. Expanding the EU Rule of Law Report to include Georgia could be one way to keep pressure on the government. In 2024, four enlargement countries – Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia – were for the first time covered in the EU Rule of Law report to stress the crucial importance of irreversible progress towards democracy for accession. Georgia could get a mention, too. The visa suspension mechanism, another tool at the EU’s disposal, could also serve as leverage.

If the Georgian Dream believes it can quietly walk away from the European project while continuing to enjoy EU cooperation’s economic and travel benefits, Brussels must prove otherwise.

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