Georgia joined the rest of the world in commemorating the two-year anniversary of Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As part of this commemoration, conferences and round tables were held, with participation of diplomatic and academic community members, to discuss the ongoing war, the challenges and the ways to support Ukraine until its victory over the aggressor. Such was the case with the February 26 event co-organized by the Polish Embassy “‘Polish-Ukrainian Spotlight in Georgia: Fighting for freedom, defending Europe – the war in Ukraine and the role of its partners in the defense of Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security”, which was attended by the former Polish Ambassador to Ukraine.
And who better to shed light on these issues than the Ambassador of neighboring Poland to Ukraine- a diplomat who was at the center of diplomatic developments in the critical days before, during and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, representing a country that has been a key supporter of Ukraine since the earliest days of the invasion. Civil.ge took the opportunity to present our readers with another perspective (in addition to the academic one) – this time from the Polish diplomatic community, as we sat down for an interview with Ambassador Bartosz Cichocki.
Bartosz Cichocki served as an Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine in 2019-2023. Prior to that he held the posts of the Undersecretary of State at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017–2019) and of an adviser to the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency. He also worked at the KARTA Centre and as a Russian regional policy analyst at the Marek Karp Centre for Eastern Studies, and was a coordinator for the Russia and Euroasia programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.
Civil.ge: Ambassador, thank you for agreeing to speak with us. How would you describe the situation at Ukraine’s front at the moment?
I’m not a military expert, but I would call it false stability of the front line. False because every now and then serious changes to the advantage and disadvantage of Ukraine may happen. Plus, this is in some parts highly technological, high-tech warfare. We have witnessed Ukraine pushing Russia out of the Black Sea thanks to unmanned platforms. From time to time we hear about hitting strategic infrastructure, critical infrastructure deep into Russia. Russia is vulnerable as Prigozhin mutiny showed. So even if we don’t see game-changers at the front line, it’s boiling underneath. So, I would be cautious and I wouldn’t exclude significant dynamics within months even.
…We should not be somehow mistaken or misled by the fact that there are no significant gains to neither of the sides of the front, it’s a very vulnerable situation.
I would not exclude both gamechangers- to advantage or disadvantage of Ukraine. So, we have to be careful, as the international community supporting rules-based order and multilateralism; we should not be somehow mistaken or misled by the fact that there are no significant gains to neither of the sides of the front, it’s a very vulnerable situation.
What’s the room for diplomacy in this particular situation?
Well, maybe it’s not time for ultimate solution even if some maneuvering between big capitals is underway; there are important even if minor agreements e.g. on exchanges of the prisoners from time to time. There are contacts on exports, on some humanitarian aid. Diplomacy is always worth trying. Ultimately of course this war will be solved through diplomatic means. But let’s hope that it will happen when Ukraine has an advantage. If the peace negotiations started now, then I’m afraid Ukraine would be the weaker side.
Some say that upcoming elections in the US are actually encouraging Ukraine-Russia negotiations. We’ll probably be surprised when the deal is done. In late March, the peace conference in Geneva is expected to start. Definitely both sides wasted a lot of blood, money, resources. So maybe at some point even Russia would signal readiness. But we need to be careful not to repeat Minsk agreement mistakes, and just agree to a ceasefire or suspension of this war because this would allow Russia to regroup, rearm, resupply and hit again.
You mentioned that you think this war will ultimately be resolved by diplomatic means. So you don’t think it will be a military victory or defeat that will define the war and its outcome?
Even in major conflicts that were finished with clear victory of one of the sides, the treaties were produced by diplomats. So victory and capitulation also are a diplomatic job and a lot depends on the skills of the negotiators, not only the generals.
You were Ambassador when the invasion began. Did you expect this full-scale invasion before it started? And I also know that you were one of the very few ambassadors who stayed put, who stayed in Kyiv. Did this decision involve your personal input or was it entirely Warsaw’s decision?
I didn’t know what would happen. The reports, the assumptions were conflicting, contradicting each other from, let’s say, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – that there will be no invasion at all to, let’s say, the US, UK forecast that a full-scale invasion would happen.
So I tried to prepare for the worst-case scenario. I didn’t know what would happen, but since previous October, we started preparing for the worst. As for staying in Kyiv, there was no order or clear instruction, but in the run up to the war Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, President Andrzej Duda visited Kyiv. In fact, President Duda came to Kyiv hours before the invasion, February 23rd. And they repeated the same message: we will stay arm in arm with you. So I took it in a direct sense.
I’m not judging, I’m not criticizing my colleagues. The US has this trauma after Benghazi, the others had others… all of them, all of us, all the diplomatic family worked very hard. Ambassador of Georgia stayed until late March…
I was representing a neighboring country where hundreds of thousands of refugees moved to… The supplies also were coming from Poland, so my situation was different.
I was representing a neighboring country where hundreds of thousands of refugees moved to… The supplies also were coming from Poland, so my situation was different. Our Consulate General in L’viv stayed and it was crucial. They were working hard 24/7 on the border. We used to have five Consulates General in Ukraine before this invasion but most of them have been suspended.
You just mentioned the importance of Poland for Ukraine in this war. Recently there have been some contentious issues in bilateral relations between the two countries. Would you say that the mood has changed in Poland or is it still the same as far as support to Ukraine is concerned?
I would say that the mood is the same even though the farmers protest. They are not anti-Ukrainian. They have specific sectorial problem, and they want to turn the government’s attention to their problems. But they are not pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian. This is a long war, and we all have other concerns- inflation, migration, etc.
…If you gave all you had, naturally at some point your support will decrease. It’s true for arms deliveries: after we emptied our storages it’s difficult to continue with the same pace.
Well, those foundations or NGOs that collect aid for Ukraine admit that there is less and less money and resources being given. But if you give everything you have, of course your support will decrease at some point. It’s the same with arms deliveries: once we’ve emptied our warehouses, it’s difficult to continue at the same pace. So, yes, we have to address it, it’s not a matter of course. I think the Ukrainian government should also be more, I would say… nuanced and should continue to be nuanced and respectful of different obstacles. But there is no major force in Poland or any circle that says we should stop supporting Ukraine.
What do you think will be the key factors in 2024 that will influence the course of the war?
The same as two years ago: leadership, quality of leadership, consolidation of the society with army, consolidation among international community and flexibility and ability to introduce new solutions, technological or diplomatic, as soon as possible.
Thinking out of the box like Ukraine is doing all the time. Ability to identify your chances, bravery, sacrifice…
What’s your prognosis for the EU Parliament and US elections this year?
It makes this crisis even more complicated because some governments may feel tempted to present a success during the election campaign and exert pressure on Ukraine to come to the table and sign up to not the most effective solutions.
In Poland, for example, we’ve got local elections and we’ve got European elections, and with the farmers and their protests, we’ve got an agrarian party in the governing coalition and we’ve got a conservative opposition that’s very popular with the farmers outside the big cities. That obviously has an impact on this debate, and not just in Poland; the farmers’ protests are now happening all over the EU. And elections make politicians more populist and more susceptible to maximalist demands. But this is democracy, so what can we do? We need quality leadership. Sometimes you have to tell the public things that are not necessarily popular.
At the moment there is an election campaign in full swing in the United States. And Mr. Trump has on many occasions said things that are frowned upon by Ukraine’s supporters. He refrains from criticizing Putin and Russia’s policies. Do you think that if he is the next president of the United States, do you expect the policy of the United States towards Ukraine to change?
On the one hand, if President Trump wins, his second term may not be entirely copy-paste of his first term. But on the other hand, well, our thinking is based on experience, and we remember the first term, and we remember that his administration was a great supporter of the Three Seas initiative, of strengthening of the NATO’s eastern flank.
On foreign, security and defense policy, we had a great deal of mutual understanding. I hope that the election campaign in the US will finally be over and that they will finally elect a president, because that’s the most difficult time. We see this stalemate, this paralysis on the aid package. It’s not because the Republicans are anti-Ukrainian. It’s the domestic context of the campaign logic. Trump and the Republicans do not want President Biden to succeed on issues like the Mexican border, Israel, etc.
People, politicians say different things during political campaigns. It doesn’t necessarily translate into their policies afterwards.
And that is very unfortunate, to say the least. People, politicians say different things during political campaigns. It doesn’t necessarily translate into their policies afterwards. But yes, some statements, not only in the US, are unfortunate. It’s also, I think, the negative impact of today’s communication, which is very much dependent on social media. We tweet before we think, we have to be brief to get attention, and things in international relations are usually more complicated than a Facebook post or Instagram clip can explain.
Then there are elections in Russia…
There are no surprises there...
Well, we’ve seen what happened with Alexei Navalny, and I wouldn’t rule out that this kind of re-stalinization of Russia will take another step forward because of this dynamic.
We don’t have a timetable for elections in Ukraine, but obviously there is a comeback of internal politics, competition, let’s say. And while that’s perfectly fair for a democracy, in the short term, however, when you’re fighting for your existence, it doesn’t help.
As for Ukraine, we don’t have a timetable for elections in Ukraine, but obviously there is a comeback of internal politics, competition, let’s say. And while that’s perfectly fair for a democracy, in the short term, however, when you’re fighting for your existence, it doesn’t help. I would call it defragmentation … I would say it’s challenging the consolidation, which is crucial. But on the other hand, if people are competing in their programmes, political concepts, it’s generally positive if people have a choice, maybe someone from outside the government would come up with better ideas.
Just to zoom in on Georgia, what can you say about Georgia’s support to Ukraine so far?
Firstly, you can always help better. Even in Poland, Lithuania and in Georgia, there is always room for improvement. That’s universal. But secondly, we have to respect local contexts and frameworks. You have Russian troops an hour or two hours drive from Tbilisi. And I don’t know your public opinion polls, but I would expect that people feel concerned and people are not so eager to provoke Russia.
There is also overwhelming support for Ukraine among the citizens.
I’ve heard about hundreds of Ukrainian kids accepted here to spend holidays or to be taken care of. I’ve heard about humanitarian support, about your voting on the international fora. So I think there is no question about your position, position of Georgia.
It’s …not a secret that Ukrainian-Georgian relationship is overshadowed by one issue, which I think is absolutely unhelpful, and both sides could maybe think of somehow being more constructive on President Saakashvili’s case
It’s also not a secret that Ukrainian-Georgian relationship is overshadowed by one issue, which I think is absolutely unhelpful, and both sides could maybe think of somehow being more constructive on President Saakashvili’s issue. And the fact that your Ambassador is still on consultations in Tbilisi definitely doesn’t help Ukraine – to put it mildly.
Yes, Georgia’s Western partners often voice the message that Georgia should sort out the relations with Ukraine.
We all live in the shadow of big Russia, of this big elephant in our part of the world. So, we should escape and avoid conflicts between us and do everything possible to stick together. So, I’m not judging who is right, who’s wrong but we should look for more cooperation. Ukraine should also feel this or continue to understand that her importance for the EU, for Euro-Atlantic community, is when they are representing, advocating for the others, not only for themselves. For Moldova, countries of South Caucasus, maybe also countries of Central Asia. Ukraine is too big and too important to limit her attention only to herself.
How are the prospects of the Black Sea region impacted by the war in Ukraine, in your opinion?
If it really is a region. I have my doubts whether, you know, such different “animals” constitute a region. You have NATO countries and you have a NATO enemy, I mean a country that sees NATO as an enemy, Russia.
But we also have three EU candidate countries in this region…
Yes. You know, I think that generally speaking this war reminded us of the importance of geography and physical distance. The countries like Türkiye, like Poland, like Georgia suddenly proved their importance. Türkiye is very important, as the Grain Corridor proved. The NATO enlargement, NATO embracing Romania, Bulgaria now pays off. I expect that cooperation will intensify. Romania now is reconstructing the Danube export corridor, and all the neighbors are working hard on modernizing the border crossings.
This conflict also reminded the world of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. It’s no coincidence that this conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, over Artsakh, has come back in the shadow of a bigger conflict. The Black Sea region, if it is a region, is already becoming more important with the leadership of countries that were perhaps not so much seen as leaders before. We’ll see, but paradoxically this war helps, pushes, makes cooperation a necessity.
War is a great verifier of all things.
Because of the geographical proximity, similarly to the Baltic States and Georgia, you can really feel something similar to what we feel, this existential threat. I remember seeing polls before the Russian invasion of Ukraine which showed that the population of the EU in general did not seem to be ready to fight if necessary. The numbers were generally not very impressive. What about Poland?
That’s why I say that consolidation and leadership are very important. Because of this aggression, at least in Poland, we are seriously discussing the prospect of war on our territory. In Poland it was a theoretical question only two years ago. We used to think, especially after we joined NATO, that wars were over; terrorism, okay, hybrid warfare, okay, but not conventional war.
In Poland it [war] was a theoretical question only two years ago. We used to think, especially after we joined NATO, that wars were over; terrorism, okay, hybrid warfare, okay, but not conventional war.
And, of course, I don’t have a crystal ball, and nobody can say, including President Putin, if there will be a war and when. But if we’re seriously considering it, then it’s a signal that we should do everything possible to deter such a scenario. We need to re-arm, we need to go into crisis mode in certain areas of legislation. We need to rethink education, maybe some elements of first aid, communication should be introduced at high school level or even at prep school level.
We should all do our best, not necessarily directly in military service. Not everyone is born to be a sniper or a tank crew member, but medical help or volunteering or inventing protection, cyber protection, etc.
The Ukrainians had this advantage because the war started in 2014. Thousands of men had some kind of military experience and skills. Families were used to the fact that father or husband, or wife, or son is rotating, is going to the front, coming back. We don’t have it, at least in Poland, maybe luckily.
Frankly, I am worried that our society has gone on a kind of geopolitical ‘holiday’. We have a small army. We don’t really have a navy, to be honest. Very limited drone capability. Some of the legislation is not helpful. So we have to adapt.
Frankly, I am worried that our society has gone on a kind of geopolitical ‘holiday’. We have a small army. We don’t really have a navy, to be honest. Very limited drone capability. Some of the legislation is not helpful. So we have to adapt. We have to adapt so that we are not in a situation where we have to defend our homes like the Ukrainians. God forbid. I hope that doesn’t happen.
On the situation in Russia: it has now truly transformed from an authoritarian to a totalitarian state. Does this diminish the hope of change from within, or on the contrary?
There’s always hope. Dictatorships are much more vulnerable, paradoxically, than democracies. Sometimes they last longer. Sometimes President Putin or whoever, rules for two decades but then it may crash and we’ve seen it happen to the Soviet Union, but also in Africa, when some dictatorships disappeared overnight. Some say that what happened to Navalny, what happened to Prigozhin are actually signals of Putinism’s weakness, not strength.
I have a feeling that Putinism, the system, is stronger than Putin himself.
I’m not so sure about that. The point, the real question is – would this change anything if miraculously, through election or through revolution the system of President Putin would change? I have a feeling that Putinism, the system, is stronger than Putin himself. I also wouldn’t over exaggerate our Western, outside world influence on developments in Russia.
And we have to take into account that we will, whatever happens to Ukraine, continue to live in direct vicinity of a threat. That post Putin’s Russia will also be non-democratic, and domestically and externally aggressive. I very much hope I’m wrong. I’ve been wrong many times, so there is a chance.
But I think we also missed, or we gave up on reacting to some signals during the past two decades. Putin’s said in the beginning of his rule that his priority was to double GDP, so it was about modernization.
Yes, and to catch up with Portugal’s GDP…But do you think that was really his priority?
We laughed back then but maybe actually we should’ve engaged.
I think it was his priority. He simply at some point realized that this is not going anywhere or he decided that this modernization is only a factor toward rebuilding an empire.
If politicians stay at the top for too long, with the same group of people around them, they start to detach from reality, they start to read some weird philosophers, start to believe that Kyiv’s Rus is your heritage and in some messianistic ideas. Maybe at some point in the 90sor early 2000. we should have been more active towards Russia.
Do you think the West is really to blame? Or would you say it’s the system that exists in Russia?
Yeah, all of us, we have lessons to learn, we made mistakes. This aggression definitely improved our thinking. Unfortunately, it’s late. It costs a lot of lives every day.
We should help Ukrainians, even if they don’t win this year, or next year, but they have to survive until hopefully something changes in Russia.
