It’s been two years since Russia launched its full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, which has left hundreds of thousands dead, devastated Ukraine, has had huge implications for Euro-Atlantic security and dealt a severe blow to the rules-based international order.
Civil.ge sat down with Daniel Szeligowski, Head of the Eastern Europe Programme & Senior Research Fellow on Ukraine at Polish Institute of International Affair (PISM) who was attending events co-organized by the Polish Embassy in Georgia to mark the second anniversary of the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We were keen to find out what he thinks about the status quo in Ukraine and how it will change, the impact of the war on the region, the role of the international community, internal developments in Russia, Poland’s support for Ukraine and other issues.
Civil.ge: How would you describe the situation in Ukraine two years after the beginning of the Russian invasion? Can it be called a stalemate, in the military and political sense?
I would rather say it is high-intensity positional warfare. It’s not fancy in political terms, but I fully understand why President Zelensky doesn’t want to use the word “stalemate” because words do have a powerful political significance, and they influence the whole discussion about outcomes, scenarios and about the need to negotiate with the Russians.
Because the moment that you admit there is a stalemate those who are in favor of negotiations with and concessions to Russia, decide that this is the moment move the discussion forward, which would be to the detriment of Ukraine and to the detriment of the whole international coalition that stands behind Ukraine.
What do you think will be the main factors determining the course of events in Ukraine this year?
I do not really see real possibilities for the Ukrainian army to advance along the frontline. What is important in 2024 is to gain momentum for rebuilding Ukrainian military capabilities and preparing them for another offensive in 2025.
What is important in 2024 is to gain momentum for rebuilding Ukrainian military capabilities and preparing them for another offensive in 2025.
So, this is a long game. The Russians have been preparing for a long run for a couple of months now at least. We have not been doing [enough] that because there are still disagreements among Ukraine’s Western partners what should be a desired outcome, whether we should really aim at defeating Russia in Ukraine or whether we should aim at some sort of negotiated settlement.
So, from the perspective of someone who is in favor of helping Ukraine defeat Russia, I say that the priorities are as follows: keep delivering weapons for Ukraine, build momentum for 2025 and make sure that the discussions that is already taking place in the West on Ukraine, on Russia and on the outcomes of the war, that they go in the direction that we would like them to.
…Counter the defeatist argument that you cannot defeat Russians, counter the arguments that all wars end with negotiated settlement, which is obviously not true. Wars end with negotiations, but not all negotiations end wars. This is something that we should be aware of.
Russians see the negotiations as an opportunity to diminish, to decrease the Western assistance for Ukraine.
So, counter the defeatist argument that you cannot defeat Russians, counter the arguments that all wars end with negotiated settlement, which is obviously not true. Wars end with negotiations, but not all negotiations end wars. This is something that we should be aware of.
Poland has been a key player in supporting Ukraine, a lifeline and a haven for millions of refugees. There have also been some contentious issues, including, as we’ve seen recently, the agricultural issue and Ukraine’s exports. We have seen the protests of the Polish farmers. President Zelensky even said that the situation on the border shows the erosion of solidarity on a daily basis. What’s your view on how this will develop?
There is no contradiction between supporting Ukraine and defending its market. And what is important is that this assumption is widely shared across the political spectrum. This approach [support to Ukraine] was taken by the previous government and the same approach is now being taken by the new government. And it will not change because there is, the wide recognition in Poland that you cannot pay twice for supporting Ukraine.
If you look at the relative economic potential of the Western countries that stand behind Ukraine, then the Polish assistance to Ukraine, which is around 3% of GDP, equals to four times the German assistance, 10 times the American assistance. It was the Polish society and the Polish farmers, who live in the eastern part of the country, on the border with Ukraine, who have borne the cost of supporting Ukraine from the very beginning.
The more solid economic footing there is in Poland, the more opportunities there are in Poland for maintaining support for Ukraine.
Now, the government does not approve of the border blockade and the border blockade does not stem from the contentious issues between Poland and Ukraine. This is the response to the policy of the European Union, to the so-called Green Deal and the climate policy of the European Union and triggered protests in Poland, France, Belgium.
I’m optimistic as I do believe there will be a consensus between Poland, Ukraine and the European Commission. But why we have not yet had this consensus? This is the political price that the Ukrainian leadership is now paying for the loss of President Zelensky in the United Nations General Assembly.
It was negatively received in Poland last year when Poland, which since day one has been standing with Ukraine, was accused of cooperating with Russia against Ukraine. This is the political price that now President Zelensky and his team are paying for being too emotional and sometimes for being to pushy towards the partners.
Although he did receive a lot by being pushy at the beginning of the invasion…
Yes, but what worked during the first year of the war no longer works. It was the right tactic right in the beginning. But now you see that there is a pushback in Poland, in Germany, in the United States, as well.
The political elites and societies are no longer accepting the emotional arguments, are no longer accepting the argument that Ukraine defends the freedom of the free world. There is a need for the Ukrainian elite to reconsider the approach and to reconsider the communication.
The political elites and societies are no longer accepting the emotional arguments,…There is a need for the Ukrainian elite to reconsider the approach and to reconsider the communication. I would advise our Ukrainian colleagues to use the language of benefits…
I would advise our Ukrainian colleagues to use the language of benefits to show the discussion in the United States, to show the people that bulk of this money is spent in the United States and never goes to Ukraine. That it creates jobs. It translates into the impulse to the national economy. That it brings economic benefits to those countries that support Ukraine.
What is your assessment of Georgia’s support for Ukraine?
I think that the average Polish perception of the situation is that Georgia is trying to walk between the raindrops, or sitting on the two chairs simultaneously, but not making a decision.
This, unfortunately, affects the relations between the European Union and NATO, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other. This is not to say that Georgia must reconsider its approach, but it is to say that because it influences the perception and it influences the position of the EU and NATO.
Surely, this is the sovereign choice of the Georgian authorities, having in mind that every decision has its implications and costs attached.
Surely, this is the sovereign choice of the Georgian authorities, having in mind that every decision has its implications and costs attached.
How do you assess the prospect of European states increasing their military support to Ukraine in the near future?
There’s been an attempt in Europe to rebuild the defense industry. The political decision and first attempts to implement it are there. For instance, in Poland, different defense companies now have already tripled the production. But we need a lot of time at the very beginning to reestablish the lines, to find the people, to train them before we arrive at the situation that we are able to produce 24/7. And there is a gap which needs to be filled with the US assistance now, which is not arriving because of the internal discussions and internal conflict within the United States. So, at some point, I don’t know, it’s just a matter of probably a few months, hopefully not a year, that Europe will be able to produce much more.
Momentum and speed are crucial. The cost is the loss of the Ukrainian soldiers’ lives and territory captured by the Russian army.
Momentum and speed are crucial. The cost is the loss of the Ukrainian soldiers’ lives and territory captured by the Russian army.
Americans can fill the gap, but some of them lack the political will to do it because of the ongoing presidential campaign in the United States. And the long shadow of Donald Trump is really making a difference there. The people who normally support Ukraine and who support Ukraine, they are now afraid of doing so and they are reconsidering at least officially their position and aligning it with Donald Trump.
What do you think will happen if Donald Trump wins in the U.S. Presidential elections this year?
I think that even Donald Trump doesn’t know what he would do after the victory in the presidential elections. I would approach this question from a bit different perspective: I think that President Putin has some perception of what Trump’s victory would mean for him. He is sure that with Trump as a President of the U.S., he [Putin] would be given Ukraine essentially for free. Or at least he would be able to negotiate relatively cheaply.
Because if there is a perception in Moscow, and I believe it’s there, that time is on their side, and with Trump in power, Russia will be given a free hand in Ukraine, the obvious way is just to sit and wait until Trump is voted in.
This means Putin himself and Russia would likely not do anything stupid in the end of this year and would not be interested in any serious discussions and any serious negotiations, with the West, let alone with Ukraine. Because if there is a perception in Moscow, and I believe it’s there, that time is on their side, and with Trump in power, Russia will be given a free hand in Ukraine, the obvious way is just to sit and wait until Trump is voted in.
It doesn’t mean that Trump would do it because given various internal constraints in the United States, he might have to push back at Russians. So, I can imagine a situation in which Trump tries to support Ukraine militarily and with sanctions as well in his own showman way. “I will give you one year to settle the things out and then I will come and present you with my own, but you still have one year.” That’s fully Donald Trump’s style. I’m not going to say this would happen, but it’s entirely plausible.
Also, the fact that we focus on what would happen if Trump became President of the United States tells us more about ourselves than about the United States and Donald Trump. This means that we in Europe, collectively, are still not ready to provide for our own security and we still look for the United States.
Also, the fact that we focus on what would happen if Trump became President of the U.S. tells us more about ourselves than about the United States and Donald Trump. This means that we in Europe, collectively, are still not ready to provide for our own security and we still look for the United States.
Because countries on the eastern flank, so those who are close to Russia, they are increasing the defense spending, some of them real fast. But then you look at the countries in the western Europe, they don’t feel the sense of urgency, and they think that basically the Russian invasion is just an unfortunate incident, and you just have to wait until the whole situation is somehow settled.
So, I think Europe is still not there in terms of providing for its own security.
And this also tells us that there is no one willing to take the leadership role in Europe. The fact that the Americans really delivered the crucial amount of weapons to Ukraine doesn’t mean that it’s going to be the same over and over again. I mean, Europe has powerful military capabilities.
But look what’s going on. We have disagreements in Europe about whether we should buy ammunition for Ukraine outside the European Union. The Czech President saying: we have localized hundreds of thousands of shells for Ukraine; but you have a small coalition of France, Greece and Cyprus blocking it because they feel that that’s a moment to foster their own national economic interests. This clearly shows that they don’t feel a sense of urgency.
The war in Ukraine has had a huge impact on the entire Euro-Atlantic security, but if we zoom in on the Black Sea region, how would you describe the prospects for this region in the short term and in the longer term?
The Black Sea will remain a contested area for years to come. It will remain the area of confrontation. Because even if you push the Russians out of Ukraine, Russia is still a Black Sea country, and it will be present on the basin.
Russia has been preparing for a long war against the West and the Black Sea region will be one of these areas where this confrontation will be, including the hybrid one.
Ukraine has been able to establish its own sort of deterrence in the Black Sea, but I don’t consider it to be a done deal, so I would expect Russians to push back. I expect Russians will try again to block the Black Sea trade route for Ukraine and the intent basically to again, to try to, you know, recapture the Black Sea so it is de- facto Russian, so it makes up for Russian internal waters.
And then now, of course, it depends to what extent we will be able to help Ukraine with it, to what extent Romania and Bulgaria, especially Turkey, some other NATO countries with capabilities will be able again to push back against Russians. There are differences among not only the NATO countries but even among Black Sea NATO countries. This plays into the Russian hands.
Until the Russians lose control of Crimea, I don’t really expect that there will be any change within Russia, or any reconsideration of the Russian position.
The key flashpoint of the Russian war against Ukraine is Crimea. Until the Russians lose control of Crimea, I don’t really expect that there will be any change within Russia, or any reconsideration of the Russian position.
That’s the absolute key precondition for any changes in Russia. There is a divergence of opinions in the West on what Ukrainian victory means. I share the view of Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Ukraine defense intelligence who said that Ukraine will win this war, the moment the Russians would not be able to attack Ukraine anymore. And this of course is about Crimea.
But if we look at it from the other angle, the war in Ukraine has opened the doors of the EU to Black Sea region countries- Ukraine, to Georgia and to Moldova. Is that a factor when we’re talking about the Black Sea region and how it develops politically and also economically and in terms of how it’s connected to Europe?
Well, I think that these doors are half-opened. So many of the European countries were essentially pushed, towards opening these doors because there was the momentum on the Ukrainian side, there was a pressure coming from some of the Ukraine’s allies, and huge social pressure in Europe.
Now we are into this mundane, boring, long technical talks about the membership and about fulfilling the conditions. And I’m afraid that at the end of the day, this could turn out into some sort of, you know, waiting room, not necessarily the train towards the membership.
But now the social pressure has slowed down. Now we are into this mundane, boring, long technical talks about the membership and about fulfilling the conditions. And I’m afraid that at the end of the day, this could turn out into some sort of, you know, waiting room, not necessarily the train towards the membership.
If Ukraine wins this war, then the question of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership in EU and NATO, and basically this situation of the whole region will be part of a completely different discussion. After Russia experiences a military defeat in Ukraine there will be no political constraints on the Western side that you have to be careful and shouldn’t really push Russians too far, etc. If Russians are defeated, I believe that at least part of these arguments will be gone.
What about NATO membership?
Well, there is a precedent in the past which could be used, but again it requires political will. It’s tricky because it requires political will not only in the West, but it requires political will also in Ukraine and Georgia. I know that at least now there was no political will to follow this way in Kyiv and in Tbilisi, but the precedent is there, and it is German precedent.
I mean, that’s what happened in Germany. You accept Ukraine into NATO and Ukraine will have to officially declare it won’t seek to recapture the occupied territory by force but aim at peaceful reunification in future. And the Article 5 would not apply to the occupied territories.
It seems like Putin has everything under control at the moment. There are no dissenting voices are afraid to protest. Alexei Navalny has just been killed in a colony. Do you think this means that the system is so entrenched that there is no hope for change from within at all?
I don’t expect any change from within as long as the war is still ongoing. Because now the new social contract in Russia between the authorities and the society revolves around the war.
…The new social contract in Russia between the authorities and the society revolves around the war.
It means that the war brings dividends to the society, to the ordinary Russians, and war brings dividends to the law enforcement agencies, to the whole of Putin’s system.
Do you think it brings dividends to the ordinary Russians?
Yes, absolutely. If you are willing to go and fight in Ukraine, you can earn 12 times as much as the average salary in Russia. This is something that actually allows Russian families, especially in these poor regions, to enrich themselves.
Well, the point is that the system is really based on those people who support it massively. Because those who objected to the war, those who objected to the system are long gone. They are dead, or they left Russia, or they are in prisons.
So, the system is entrenched and is based on this passive majority. And they are getting benefits of the war. And the same with the “siloviki” and the law enforcement sector. They are getting contracts for the Russian army, they’re getting contracts to build infrastructure in the occupied territories of Ukraine, so basically out of the war the new social contract has been built which enriches both the society and the ruling elite. So as long as the war is ongoing I believe there won’t be any changes within Russia, and that again brings me to the conclusion that Russia must go through the decisive blow in Ukraine.
This could change the situation because then the new social contract would be gone. This could trigger some changes in Russia.
Thanks you very much for a very interesting interview.
