Q&A | Georgia’s Ongoing Crisis: What to Expect?

The protests across Georgia have been going on for well over a month now taking various creative forms, and involving representatives of different professions, social groups, minorities, etc. Meanwhile, several Georgian partners have imposed sanctions on GD officials and other individuals for undermining democracy and violating human rights. However, the Georgian Dream seems to be doubling down on its anti-Western rhetoric and ignoring popular protest, as well as demands for the release of illegally detained prisoners and new elections. As the protests still go strong, questions are being heard: “So what’s next?” We posed this question to the four main political forces in Georgia, and separately to expert community representatives. We also asked their view on whether there are any signs that the GD will back down and agree to the demands of the protesters? If not, what can we expect?

Here is what they had to say:

Opposition Politicians

Salome SAMADASHVILI,  Strong Georgia Coalition

I do not see any signs that GD will back off any time soon. The only way they will agree to new parliamentary elections is increasing pressure from both, inside and outside. Protest needs to find a way to cause real discomfort for the regime, and sanctions need to expand to hit the main economic interests of Ivanishvili’s regime. Right now Georgian Dream continues functioning, albeit in isolation from the Western governments, but it still functions. Once the government becomes dysfunctional due to increased pressure, it will have to back off. Unfortunately, it means more damage to the country, but this seems to be the choice made by Ivanishvili, to continue until he can, even if this means ruining Georgia’s economy and people’s livelihoods.

Zurab (Girchi) JAPARIDZE, Girchi-More Freedom leader, Coalition for Change

It is challenging to discuss in detail the future steps we should take, but we can outline the strategic goals: a) the release of all political prisoners and b) new elections under revised rules and a new election administration.

To achieve this it’s necessary to isolate the regime as much as possible and exert pressure from both inside and outside until it collapses. With this in mind, we have two internal objectives and two external objectives. Internally, we need to continue: a) the regime non-recognition policy from all main political groups, which includes the non-recognition of the official election results, the de facto parliament, the de facto government, and the de facto President; and b) street protests in Tbilisi and other cities, which may take various forms.

Externally, we must: a) strengthen the regime non-recognition policy with support from other countries, including a complete cessation of business as usual with high-level representatives of GD; and b) implement various types of sanctions, including financial ones, against those enabling the Russian regime—such as politicians, members of the Ivanishvili family, representatives of the security apparatus, law enforcement officials, propagandists, and businessmen. No one can predict when the regime will falter or what the ultimate tipping point will be. The only certainty is that we cannot stop until we achieve victory.

Sergo CHIKHLADZE, International Secretary, “Strategy Aghmashenebeli” party, Unity-UNM

The question “What’s next?” is indeed critical as Georgia faces one of the most defining moments in its recent history. The ongoing protests, which have brought together people from all walks of life—professionals, minorities, and various social groups—are a testament to the resilience and determination of the Georgian people. However, Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili’s regime have shown no signs of backing down. Instead, they seem to be solidifying their authoritarian trajectory and severing Georgia’s ties with the European Union, the United States, and other Western allies.

Are there any signs that GD will back down? Georgian Dream’s actions and rhetoric suggest a deliberate pivot toward authoritarian governance. The refusal to release political prisoners, address demands for fair elections, or engage constructively with either protesters or Western partners underscores this shift. Their strategy is clear: suppress dissent, use state apparatus to maintain power, and continue leveraging anti-Western propaganda to consolidate their base. This trajectory threatens not only Georgia’s democratic aspirations but also its long-term stability and future as part of the Euro-Atlantic community.

What’s next? The solution lies in sustained, multifaceted pressure both from within and outside the country:

1. Ongoing Protests and Escalation to Strikes – The protests, already vibrant and creative, must evolve into an even broader movement. Strikes—both targeted and nationwide—are a powerful tool in the arsenal of peaceful resistance. Planned strikes and disruptions, if executed effectively, can paralyze key sectors of the economy and expose the regime’s vulnerabilities. Over time, such actions can create fissures within GD’s support structure, forcing public servants, mid-level bureaucrats, and even high-ranking officials to distance themselves from the regime. Early signs of such discontent are already visible, and a sustained protest movement will only deepen these cracks.

2. Sanctions and International Isolation – International sanctions, especially targeted ones, have already begun to take a toll on GD officials and their affiliates. However, these measures must intensify. The EU, the US, and other Western allies should impose more sanctions on individuals and entities linked to the regime’s anti-democratic actions, human rights violations, and oligarchic corruption. Sanctions on GD’s financial lifelines, as well as travel bans and asset freezes for its top officials, will further isolate the regime and amplify internal dissent. Moreover, diplomatic isolation—such as suspending GD regime’s access to certain international platforms or reconsidering cooperation agreements—will make it increasingly difficult for GD to function on global stage. This, combined with grassroots resistance at home, can create an untenable situation for the regime.

3. Erosion of Regime Loyalty – As protests and sanctions escalate, the regime will face increasing difficulty in maintaining loyalty among public officials, law enforcement, and other key sectors. The growing pressure will likely lead many within the system to calculate the risks of continued allegiance to GD. Once a critical mass of individuals defects or refuses to obey orders, the regime’s ability to govern effectively will be severely compromised.

4. The Demand for New Elections – Ultimately, the protesters’ core demand—a new electoral process under fair and democratic conditions—remains the only viable exit from the current crisis. For GD to agree to this, they must be cornered both internally and externally. The combination of unyielding domestic resistance and intensified international pressure will force the regime to the negotiating table.

How long it will take? The road ahead is not easy, and the process may take months. However, the unwavering dedication of the Georgian people, coupled with strategic international support, offers a clear path forward. This is not just a fight against a regime; it is a fight for Georgia’s democratic future, its place in Europe, and the aspirations of its citizens. History has shown that authoritarian regimes crumble under the weight of sustained, unified resistance. The Georgian Dream regime is no exception. Through relentless protests, strikes, and international solidarity, the Georgian people can and will prevail. Their cause is just, and their resolve is unbreakable.

Dimitri TSKITISHVILI, Gakharia for Georgia:

The Georgian Dream is trying to ignore the fact that the country is in crisis, although the country has all the symptoms of a crisis, namely a systemic, political crisis, not a parliamentary, governmental crisis. Such crises mean something different.

What we have is a deep, fundamental systemic crisis for which the Georgian Dream is trying to find a solution, proposing this and that and sometimes offering something to divert attention. There is no sign that they are backing down, but they will have to. The protest continues, this protest is neither managed nor planned… The main plan is what the society continues to do, stubbornly, in a principled way- not giving up on its position, demanding the release of the prisoners and new elections. This is both logical and the only correct demand.

The principled approach is the main instrument of pressure on the “Georgian Dream” and sooner or later they will have to make concessions. Then there is external pressure, whether in the form of sanctions or declarations. And I think that Georgian Dream will have to make concessions.

We, the political parties, and in particular Gakharia for Georgia, are continuing to work together inside the country, supporting the popular protests, being participants in them, and also working as much as possible with our [international] partners to ensure that external pressure is effective and targeted. It is very difficult to predict when the result will be, but all this will certainly lead us to a concrete result. We should not get tired in this process, the authorities should get tired. If we have such a large-scale civil, public protest in the country, and if this protest is unequivocally supported by all our partners, the position of Georgian society will prevail.

Scholars/Analysts

Kornely KAKACHIA, Georgian Institute of Politics, Jean Monnet Chair at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

The Georgian Dream (GD) government currently faces a significant problem: it lacks both internal and external legitimacy, leaving its grip on power fragile and the regime trapped in an irreversible spiral of international isolation. As time passes, there are three possible scenarios for resolving Georgia’s political turmoil:

The Belarusian Scenario: This involves full consolidation of authoritarian governance, further isolating Georgia internationally. In this scenario, Georgia becomes another authoritarian post-Soviet “pariah” state, serving as a hub for shadow economic activity and a grey zone for circumventing sanctions. Alienation from the West would push GD even closer to Russia, exposing state institutions to Kremlin infiltration and leading to political submission.

Regime Change: Under sustained internal and external pressure, GD’s governance system could collapse. This would force the party out of the constitutional framework, leading to new parliamentary elections organized by a transitional electoral administration under the supervision of President Zurabishvili and Western partners. In this scenario, GD is unlikely to survive as a viable political force. Georgia would then undergo a political reset, resuming democratic reforms and re-aligning with its Euro-Atlantic trajectory.

Negotiated Crisis Management: Through international mediation, GD and the political opposition might reach an agreement to hold free and fair elections under international supervision. This would result in the formation of a coalition government by opposition parties, with GD transitioning into the opposition. In this case, the fate of GD’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, would be negotiated with international partners, potentially ensuring stability during the transition. Georgia will continue EU integration and joins Ukraine and Moldova.

While the outcome of these scenarios will hinge on internal political dynamics, public resistance, and the influence of international actors in shaping the country’s trajectory, one thing is certain: Georgian Dream can no longer unite the country, as it has lost both moral and political legitimacy.

Vano CHKHIKVADZE, Open Society Georgia Foundation, Tbilisi, Georgia

It seems that GD is getting ready for the following waves of sanctions. At the same time the priority issue for GD is to get legitimacy from the international partners and they will try to get it and use all possible opportunities for that. The Western reaction whether to keep Georgia high up on the agenda will depend on whether the popular protest continues in Georgia. Hence the Georgian society needs to keep on protesting and not agree on the outcome of October 28 elections and the decision of Kobakhidze of November 28 on suspending EU accession process.

Additionally, GD would aim to diminish popular support to the EU integration, which is the last bastion that stops GD to openly go against the EU accession. Society needs to address the GD propaganda on EU integration and debunk the GD myths. Hence the role of Georgian society are threefold: 1. Prevent GD getting legitimacy from the West 2. Debunk the myth and disinformation that GD is promoting on EU and European values 3. Promote European values and keep high support towards Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic Integration in the country.