Georgia is fast becoming a center of attention for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but government officials and foreign military advisors cite a range of problems that complicate Tbilisi’s attempt to become a member of the Atlantic alliance. Among the concerns: inadequate long-range planning and inattention to budgetary detail.
President Mikheil Saakashvili has expressed hope that Georgia could become a candidate for NATO membership by 2006. Since Saakashvili became president in January 2004, NATO-Georgian contacts have expanded rapidly. Numerous top-level NATO officials have visited Tbilisi over the past year, a NATO liaison officer and various foreign advisors are attached to the Georgian Defense Ministry, and a new transit agreement, signed on March 2, allows supplies destined for NATO forces in Afghanistan to cross Georgian territory. The scheduled May 10 visit of US President George W. Bush to Georgia is expected to further encourage Georgia’s NATO integration aspirations.
To attain the NATO goal, however, Georgia must first undertake a comprehensive modernization and democratization of its defense establishment, carried out under a self-imposed Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Once Georgia meets its IPAP goals, the next step would be a Membership Action Plan, or MAP. Whether Georgia can meet these objectives – and, if so, how effectively – remains an issue that follows government officials, and worries international observers and advisers.
In a recent interview with EurasiaNet, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili acknowledged that much remained to be done before a MAP could be realized by 2006. Making army brigades NATO-ready is the country’s top priority, he said. Other immediate priorities include; bringing Georgia’s air-surveillance system in line with NATO standards; improving transparency in the logistics and public procurement departments—training procurement, counting equipment and soldiers; creating a career development program for soldiers, and merging Georgia’s navy with its coast guard.
Western diplomats and military advisers in Tbilisi are generally cautious on Georgia’s prospects for meeting its 2006 deadline for NATO membership. “Not with the progress they are making right now,” one source, who requested anonymity, stated. He believed that NATO officials were of the same mind.
Okruashvili concedes that the challenges are immense, but nonetheless argues that considerable headway is being made. “We won’t achieve all of the objectives, but there will be radical progress.”
“My greatest problem is time,” he went on to say. “We are in a hurry. We lost almost 10 years.”
Other security officials agree. “I know the mess,” Georgian National Security Advisor Gela Bezhuashvili said. “I was in the Ministry of Defense for four years. There was no fuel, no ammunition. The stockpiles were empty. Weapons, machines, tanks—they were all in a disastrous position.”
In the rush to reform, Okruashvili, who has served as defense minister since December 2004, has already come under a barrage of criticism for his role in implementing changes. Okruashvili, to give one example, has been accused of reversing earlier progress in establishing civilian control over military institutions. He has also come under fire for reportedly haphazard spending on weapons from countries like Ukraine and the Czech Republic.
Particular criticism has been leveled at his personnel moves, including his decision to accept the resignations of the entire General Staff on the eve of an official visit to Tbilisi by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in February. At the time, Georgian media outlets portrayed the decision as a political tactic designed to remove civilian and military service heads loyal to former Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze.
For Okruashvili, however, it all comes down to housekeeping. “There was not a person around me who was results-oriented and it’s nonsense to keep people who aren’t results-oriented. It’s easier to find someone new and give them a chance,” he said. “I can say I brought in people I trust.”
Observers, however, say the constant turnover of senior ministry officials and the General Staff poses the largest obstacle to a smooth transition for Georgian military. Okruashvili and his chief of the General Staff—not to mention numerous replacements below them—constitute Georgia’s fourth set of civil-military leaders since the November 2003 Rose Revolution.
The military budget is another concern. Recently adjusted, the Defense Ministry’s budget currently stands at 317 million lari, or roughly $173 million, according to Deputy Defense Minister David Sikharulidze. The sum is a sizeable increase from the originally planned 137 million lari, or $74 million. Funds from the government’s privatization campaign, as well as revenue generated by the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, reportedly account for the increase, but Sikharulidze admitted that the budget “should be managed more transparently.”
Some Western observers suggest that the increased cash flow has not encouraged planning for the budget’s effective distribution. “Okruashvili’s access to funds is impressive,” one Western military advisor said. “He’s creating a paper line: Self-propelled artillery, T-72 tanks, helicopters, infantry-fighting vehicles…. [The Ministry of Defense] is just spending. There is no planning. There is no acquisition or procurement process. No feasibility study.”
One source of financing set up not long after the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Army Development Fund, is raising eyebrows. Described by Deputy Defense Minister Sikharulidze as a “non-profit foundation” whose main contributors are “businessmen living abroad who wanted to contribute to Georgia,” the Fund was ostensibly created to help kick-start Georgia’s military reform. But ministry personnel today concede that they are not fully aware of how the Fund operates. Sikharulidze put the Fund’s budget at $12 million for 2004, while Nika Rurua, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security, indicated that up to $93 million (or about 170 million lari) could be spent this year. “The money is spent on procurement—for purchasing military equipment and food supply,” Rurua said.
Spending without a concrete reform plan will not put Georgia in position for NATO membership anytime soon, Western observers argue. “Systematic institutional reform? You can’t see anything. Just big-ticket purchases. Big hardware,” said one defense advisor. “It looks cool. But the hard work is building military institutions—and they have done none of this. Logistics, education, personnel—any military worth its salt needs these systems in place.”
Experts explain that military reform in line with IPAP objectives requires institution-building. “They need career paths so a young officer can progress. They need to invest in creating military schools and doctrine,” said one expert. “They need field manuals and military publications…. Without these, you have a broken military with fancy-looking brigades.”
Okruashvili claims that institution-building is an ongoing challenge for him, describing himself as “shocked” by the conditions that existed in the Defense Ministry when he took over in December 2004. “Our main problem is that the country is based on individuals, not institutions,” he said.
The size of Georgia’s armed forces is another top concern. Levan Nikoleishvili, chief of the General Staff, said that Georgia is working towards a goal of 23,000 troops. (Currently, there are about 16,000 troops). He said that Georgia has four land forces brigades plus an additional artillery brigade and a special-forces brigade, but that the majority of these are not “filled.”
Western and Georgian analysts suggest that Georgia could get on the right track by undertaking a Strategic Defense Review (SDR) – essentially an inventory of its existing forces and equipment. An SDR would tell defense officials what military equipment the country has, what it needs, and how many troops are on the payroll. With such data, the government could begin a systematic, economically grounded military buildup—and one that takes into consideration the country’s security threats. Without such a review, the government is doing things “backwards,” analysts said.
The US-sponsored Georgian Train and Equip Program, a $64 million initiative that taught basic combat skills to Georgia’s First Brigade, provides a case in point.
One Georgian source said that the US had continued to provide funding for 600 positions in the brigade even after it had been determined that the soldiers no longer existed on brigade registers. Responding to the report, Okruashvili put the financing for “ghost” soldiers down to procedural oversights that occurred when the GTEP program began, during former President Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration, in 2002. “The main problem was when GTEP started,” he said. “There were no proper contracts with soldiers.” GTEP ended in May 2004.
As a preventative measure, Okruashvili explained that new recruits for the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, the latest US military assistance initiative, will have to pay a 14,000 lari fine ($7,650) if they curtail their service without reason. The program is scheduled to begin in late April 2005.
“We are moving forward step by step,” Okruashvili said. “We are not preparing for war—we are replacing garbage.” He defended his conduct, saying he was making “reasonable decisions.”
Temuri Yakobashvili, vice-president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies and a member of the government’s working group on a National Security Concept, called accusations against Okruashvili “exaggerated” and said, “Without a guideline, there is nothing to measure Okruashvili against. Until then, we give him a free hand to do what he thinks is right. We need a system in place that will eliminate dependence on individuals and move Georgia towards institutions.”
Parliament should adopt Georgia’s long-awaited National Security Concept, which should streamline the reform process, by the end of April, according to Nika Rurua.
Meanwhile, the IPAP remains a classified document. Foreign experts believe that those sections not dealing with sensitive issues should be released for public review. “It’s the whole country joining NATO—not just the Ministry of Defense, or the government,” one defense advisor said. “The Rose Revolution opened the door to Georgia. If we don’t use this opportunity, the door will close and Georgia could become a failed state.”
Editor’s Note: Theresa Freese is a freelance journalist and political analyst who has been conducting research on unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus since 2003.
