Will Peace Break out Between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

A stable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan could make the South Caucasus significantly more secure, strengthening the sovereignty of its countries and expanding their options for foreign partnerships. While Georgia may face some immediate economic fallout, in the long run, a more stable and interconnected region would enhance its own security, economic opportunities, and geopolitical standing.

Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst in the South Caucasus specializing in security, peace processes, and foreign policy

Over ten days have passed since Armenia and Azerbaijan announced the conclusion of peace treaty negotiations. This is a positive step but not a guarantee of an imminent agreement. Azerbaijan insists on preconditions, primarily the amendment of Armenia’s constitution, which references the 1990 Declaration of Independence and the prospect of Nagorno-Karabakh joining Armenia. This change requires a nationwide referendum, which cannot realistically happen for at least another year and a half, keeping the prospect of a signed treaty uncertain.

Avoiding a new war

Delaying the peace treaty leaves the door open for renewed military clashes. Over nearly 35 years of conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought two major wars – the latest in 2020, which ended with Azerbaijan’s victory. Baku regained most of what Armenian forces controlled in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. A small part remained under the watch of Russian peacekeepers, but Azerbaijan seized it in 2023, taking advantage of Moscow’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.

Today, the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, stretching over 1,000 kilometers, is effectively a front line, marked by trenches, hundreds of military positions, and thousands of soldiers stationed in rear bases. While the situation is never completely calm, exchanges of fire occasionally escalate into full-scale clashes, often resulting in casualties among both soldiers and civilians.

Azerbaijan’s military now holds a significantly stronger position, controlling strategic heights along the border. A new escalation could not only lead to further territorial losses for Armenia but may also threaten its sovereignty. The consequences of such development would extend beyond Armenia, affecting the entire South Caucasus, including Georgia. Increased instability would weaken the region’s investment appeal and transit potential. Past clashes have already pushed Armenia to seek external support, leading to Russian troop deployments along its border after the 2020 war. While Armenia has since shifted its foreign policy toward the West and begun withdrawing Russian border guards, renewed hostilities could once again bring Russian intervention back into play.

Opening borders

If signed, a peace treaty could stabilize the South Caucasus and enhance the region’s role as a vital transit hub. Armenia remains isolated, with its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey closed due to the conflict. A peace agreement would pave the way for diplomatic relations with both countries, ultimately leading to open borders and economic cooperation.

Among the key issues is the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border. The two countries have engaged in intensive dialogue through special envoys for over three years, strengthening high-level political contacts and advancing technical preparations. Armenia, as the most invested party, has actively worked to build trust, taking symbolic and practical steps – sending humanitarian aid to Turkey after a devastating earthquake, recognizing Palestine following a call from the Turkish president, and recently extraditing two criminal suspects wanted by Turkey.

The economic benefits of open borders are clear. Direct trade between Armenia and Turkey, which currently relies on transit through Georgia, could finally begin. Restored transport links would also grant Armenian businesses easier access to Turkish seaports. While this may initially reduce trade through Georgia, in the long term, a more connected and stable South Caucasus would strengthen its appeal as a transit corridor and attract foreign investment.

Yet, Turkey maintains that reopening the border depends on finalizing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty – a stance neither regional nor foreign actors have managed to alter. Western capitals continue to press for an agreement, yet time may be running out – broader geopolitical dynamics could play a decisive role. If ongoing U.S.-Russia negotiations lead to a ceasefire in Ukraine, Moscow may shift its focus back to the South Caucasus, and there is no guarantee that it will support the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process or the immediate reopening of the border without seeking to advance its own interests in both areas.

Lessons from two-sided process

The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process offers Georgia valuable lessons. Over the past year, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have proceeded without international mediation. While this has accelerated discussions, leading to a finalized peace treaty, it has also forced Armenia to make significant concessions due to the absence of external mediators.

One of Yerevan’s most notable compromises was agreeing to the potential termination of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA). This mission, similar to the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia after the 2008 war, was deployed in Armenia two years ago following a major border clash. From the outset, Azerbaijan opposed it, blocking initiatives like establishing a “hotline” for incident management and cross-boundary dialogues similar to Georgia’s Ergneti IPRM meetings. After significant pressure from Baku, Armenia ultimately conceded.

Another major Armenian concession involved removing all references to Nagorno-Karabakh from future bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. In the finalized peace treaty, both countries recognize each other’s territorial integrity and agree to withdraw all legal claims related to the conflict. This effectively closes any future avenues for revisiting the issue, even though over 150,000 Karabakh Armenians remain in Armenia, many of whom wish to return to their homeland.

Historically, Armenia avoided such extensive concessions through international mediation, particularly through the OSCE Minsk Group, which included the United States, Russia, and France – permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, that group’s influence waned after the 2020 war when Azerbaijan refused to engage with it. The process stalled entirely following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which disrupted diplomatic coordination between Russia and the West. Since then, no new mediation format has emerged, whether under Russia’s or the EU’s initiative. Azerbaijan has consistently rejected international mediators, viewing such involvement as an attempt to impose external agendas rather than foster lasting peace.

This situation offers crucial lessons for Georgia. While the Geneva International Discussions on Georgia’s conflicts may be slow and often criticized, negotiating directly with Moscow without international mediators would likely force Georgia to abandon existing agreements stemming from the 2008 war. Tbilisi, as a weaker side, would also face increased pressure to make unilateral concessions for quick results. Yet, Armenia’s experience demonstrates that even such concessions do not guarantee a final result.