Interview | Stefan Meister: We are Seeing the End of Russian Hegemony in the Region
The 8th Tbilisi International Conference 2024 brought together diplomats, politicians, think-tankers, and media representatives. Among the distinguished participants was Dr. Stefan Meister, Head of the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), a prominent German foreign policy research institute. From 2019 until 2021, Dr. Meister worked as director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s South Caucasus Office. Civil’ge‘s Nata Koridze took the opportunity to speak with him about Georgia, the South Caucasus, and EU’s policy towards the region.
The Tbilisi International Conference is organized by the McCain Institute for International Leadership at Arizona State University and the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC). It is also supported by the UN Association of Georgia, this publication’s parent organization.
Nata Koridze, Civil.ge: Thanks so much for your time. As the Georgian government has taken steps unequivocally pointing at the hardening of the authoritarian trends, there’s been a lot of criticism that our Western partners, including Germany, have for years overlooked signs that Georgia has been moving in this direction. Would agree with that assessment?
Dr. Stefan Meister: I think the signs were visible that this government and this leader were moving in an authoritarian direction and had no interest in EU integration because it would challenge their power. So, I think the signs were there.
I think there was not enough attention from neither the German side, nor from the EU side. Georgia was still doing “good enough”. And others were doing worse. “So, let’s not create problems with this,” was the approach.
And I think the EU is also not very good at acting, it’s not really united. Also, how the Georgian Dream engaged with Hungary for instance, dividing the EU and trying to divide member states- that shows they are sometimes smarter than one might think.
And from the German side, this is just not a priority, to be honest. After the invasion in Ukraine started in 2022 all the resources went to Ukraine; and this was the case even before. And we are so much eaten up by our own crisis now that there just was a lack of attention for Georgia as a key country and the South Caucasus and beyond.
There is also a lack of a long-term strategic approach from the European side. I have always been an advocate of offering Georgia a membership perspective, much earlier, when there was a different dynamic in Georgian politics. So, there has been in a way lack of interest from Europe, but the US is also backtracking.
The factor here is the paranoia of one man. He takes the country hostage…
And then, you know better than I do, the factor here is the paranoia of one man. He takes the country hostage because he thinks it’s about his own personal survival and his own two billion in a Swiss banking account. And that’s the problem. This party [Georgian Dream] only serves one man; it’s not about Georgia, it’s about himself and his politics, that he’s afraid of getting jailed or whatever after he loses the election, so it’s about his survival in a way.
Do you think that this trend of a lack of a strategic approach, of a strategy towards Georgia or towards the South Caucasus region or the Black Sea region, has essentially changed?
It is changing but not sufficiently enough, I would say. I think we lack, in a way, a strategic culture. We are also lack strategizing long-term interests in different regions. And European and German politics is very reactive. We are reacting to others. Russia has still the escalation dominance in Ukraine because we are reacting to this situation.
However, we will have a new Black Sea strategy in the EU. We also see the EU being more active in the South Caucasus. We are now offering a membership perspective, candidate status, and so on. So, I think this is a strategic move of the EU and it’s a shift. But people are still asking why and for what purpose we are doing this.
As for the region, there will be a new regional security order in the South Caucasus. Everything will be reshaped. Russia is weakened.
We will see more China, more Turkey, more Iran maybe also in this region, more Arab countries. And Europe is more active, but it does not really know what it wants in the South Caucasus. This is my impression.
There’s a lack of strategic depth, and there’s also a lack of leadership in the EU to push certain kinds of policies.
So there’s a lack of strategic depth, and there’s also a lack of leadership in the EU to push certain kinds of policies. The EU only has a neighborhood and enlargement policy, but we need a foreign and security policy. Why did we have Borrell as EU foreign policy chief? Because he’s weak. Nobody wanted a strong chief.
What about the next EU High Representative?
I find Kaja Kallas interesting. I met her and talked to her. She’s different, but she comes from a small country, so she doesn’t have the powerful backing of a big country behind her. But she’s much smarter and she has a good strategic understanding, she understands this whole region and Russia very well.
So I think she’ll be more assertive and more strategic in some ways, but at the end of the day she’s a moderator. The role of the foreign policy person is to be a moderator.
The South Caucasus region is really becoming important for Europe in terms of connectivity. It’s the hub between East-West and North-West. But is there a recognition in the EU that what’s happening here, though less dramatically than in Ukraine, is part of a broader standoff between authoritarianism and democracy? And as such it is bound to have an impact on how things develop in Europe.
I think there is an understanding that we have to connect regions and we need connectivity to Asia and Central Asia, and it’s also important what happens along the way. I think in the EU now connectivity is the main policy, and the South Caucasus linking the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea is very crucial.
Things are very much driven by the bureaucracy in Brussels, by its bureaucratic logic. We’re lacking political ownership.
But I don’t think the rest is sufficiently understood. Things are very much driven by the bureaucracy in Brussels, by its bureaucratic logic. We’re lacking political ownership. You need political ownership by particular [EU] member states, by powerful member states that drive policy.
You have Scholtz, who meets the Central Asian leaders because we need oil and gas and other resources from there. You have Macron, who wants to have uranium because he has problems in Africa and so on.
We have lost the ability to understand how geopolitics works, what bargaining is, what leverage is.
So you have this kind of unilateral policy and you just try to tie it together in a connectivity strategy. But we have lost the ability to understand how geopolitics works, what bargaining is, what leverage is. So I think we don’t have that kind of neorealist thinking about global politics.
We see more investments. We see the EBRD being the main investor here and so on. But we will also see China investing in key infrastructure projects to control the points.
So, Ukraine was not sufficient to actually make this sort of shift in the politicians’ minds.
I would say it’s a big, big move from before 2022 to now. In 2014 nothing really happened. The war had already started. Europe is now supplying weapons. This is a big shift for us. We opened the accession package- it’s a big shift for Europe. We’re investing also in our own military. So, I think if you understand from where Europe is coming from…
…Then are you saying the glass is half full?
Yes, I would say it’s half full. Yes, I would say it’s half full. You know, I’m very critical, I’m sometimes depressed, but I also have to say that a lot of things have become possible that weren’t possible before. Germany completely decoupled from Russian gas. We now will have LNG terminals in a couple of months. In a few months we will have LNG terminals. That was impossible for 30 years and we’ve been discussing it for 20, 25 years. There is also some military support, there is some military support for Armenia now.
I think it’s not sufficient for how quickly everything is changing and how this new regional security order is emerging, but still for Europe it’s quite fast and it’s also about sanctions and so on. I think it’s not so bad. So, let’s say the glass is half-full. Some of us want more. But we have what we have, and we have to work with this. And that’s what we are getting at the moment. And we have to push, and there will be more. But it’s too slow and too little, I know.
Can I ask you about German domestic politics, as voters in the German states of Saxony and Thuringia put the far-right Alternative for Germany in the lead in the recent elections, while the parties that make up the current federal coalition government fared modestly. Can we say that the pro-Russian forces gained the upper hand at these elections, and how might this affect Germany’s foreign policy toward Russia and Ukraine?
It’s still at the local level, and the local level doesn’t have that much say in foreign policy. But it’s picking up the mood in a society that wants peace and doesn’t want to leave its comfort zone. People are even saying they want cheap Russian gas back. A lot of people in Germany are saying that.
Still, it’s a big shift in German politics.
Now it’s possible to vote for a neo-fascist party and they get more than 30% in some of the lands. You have a radical left-wing party that gets 15% – it’s very new, with elements of right-wing parties as well and Sarah Wagenknecht’s party is very much about stopping this war, very pro-Russian. So, that means you have in some parts of Germany 45% to almost 50% supporting this kind of parties, that will have an impact.
It will have an impact on the federal government, they will adapt to this, they will change their rhetoric, and if this gains more influence it will eventually impact our support for Ukraine. There is a consensus among the democratic parties, but it’s a waning consensus. You can already see on the local level that the Christian Democrats are also talking about “peace” and stopping this war. So, this influences the whole discourse. This is more important. They don’t decide, but they influence the whole discourse and there’s a shift for peace and for stopping the war. And this government is getting weaker and weaker.
And it will affect the next government, it will have an impact on the federal elections next year, it will impact on other local elections. And because the German government is so dysfunctional at the moment, it will further gain momentum in the populace.
You said during the panel discussion that “we have been making Russia stronger than it is.” Could you elaborate on that just a little bit and do you think that trend has changed now?
I think Russia is a destructive declining power that takes advantage of its enemy’s weaknesses. And for at least 10 years now Russia has been at war with us -the West, including Europe and Germany.
…We’re creating weaknesses on our side. We are not supporting Ukraine as we should. We are questioning our own approach to Russia and this is exactly what Russia is using: these kinds of weaknesses.
And we’re creating weaknesses on our side. We are not supporting Ukraine as we should. We are questioning our own approach to Russia and this is exactly what Russia is using: these kinds of weaknesses.
It plays with disinformation, with its hybrid attacks, with doubts in our societies. It undermines our cohesion. And Russia uses the mistakes that our politicians have made in terms of communication, in terms of solving issues, in terms of supporting Ukraine in the way it needs to be supported, or also in terms of enlargement policy. Russia is using this and it makes Russia stronger than it is. It’s the same as when the US withdrew from Syria and the Middle East- Russia just stepped in. Now also here, in the South Caucasus, the US is in a way withdrawing, in a way.
What they [Russia] can do is split, divide, threaten, they are very good at threatening. Take, for example, the whole nuclear debate you have in Germany, this German fear that we will end up in a nuclear war. Russia is doing it, Medvedev is doing it, Putin is doing it, the masters of disinformation are at the highest level in Russian politics.
Our media is picking it up and discussing it as a serious option. And it’s not learning. I don’t really see a learning process. And Sahra Wagenknecht and AfD are playing with this: we don’t have war, we don’t have a nuclear war, stop supporting Ukraine and then the war will end and we will live in peace. Which is an illusion.
So, we’re creating these weaknesses. Also, Trump is an opportunity for Russia in a way, in the US. Divided society, social problems, all these social media things. Russia doesn’t have to pay that much: a couple of hundred million and you can manipulate the whole society.
Let’s switch to the US. What’s your prognosis for 2025? If Trump wins, for example in the United States. Can we say what will happen?
No, we can’t say because we don’t know. You cannot predict what Trump will do in the end. He can do one thing, he can do the exact opposite. He’s not a reliable, rational person. That’s the problem.
Trump can do one thing, he can do the exact opposite. He’s not a reliable, rational person. That is the problem.
Maybe he’ll help Russia win the war, maybe he’ll do the opposite. Maybe he’ll get into a big conflict with China. I think what will happen is more instability, less reliability and credibility of US policy. It will create more opportunities for authoritarian states to undermine the order that still exists.
So there will be more chaos in international politics and this will strengthen countries like Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran – those who don’t have many resources to shape the big order.
…The main trend is the reshaping of the regional order – in the South Caucasus, in the Black Sea region, in Central Asia but also in the Middle East.
We talk so much about this big global order and China, and so on when the main trend is the reshaping of the regional order – in the South Caucasus, in the Black Sea region, in Central Asia but also in the Middle East.
We are observing the rise of smaller states like Azerbaijan that are willing and capable to win a war, to cut off all independent voices and they just do it. They are increasingly doing it with military force: Russia is trying to recreate a European security order, Azerbaijan is doing the same thing in the South Caucasus. I think Azerbaijan is a key player in the South Caucasus right now. We see it in relation to Turkey.
It will be very transactional, it will be very much cooperation and conflict. And bargaining all the time. I don’t see a new order coming. It’s a lot of “transactionalism.”
What we are seeing is the end of Russian hegemony in this region.
But what we are seeing is the end of Russian hegemony in this region. Russia is no longer strong enough to maintain it as it was before. And others are testing Russia and bargaining with it.
And I don’t see the U.S. or Europe really taking this responsibility. They could do it. They could do more in terms of security. They could invest more, and they could also be more present – traveling, meeting people, putting pressure, investing in some key infrastructure sectors. This is how China is doing it, plus through digital connectivity and norm setting. This is how you shape the regional order and different regional orders. So Russia is still a master of that.
One of the theoretical options would be an authoritarian Georgia, but Georgia integrated into the connectivity projects and this whole regional context and having a trade, having all these kinds of interactions with the EU and with other countries. And then it’s just a transactional relationship, nothing else. But that’s not what a lot of people in this country would like to see happen. Because we don’t want to be interesting to the EU just because we’re a technical hub of this or that sort…
But I think this is what Bidzina [Ivanishvili] wants. He wants to make money from everyone. He even sells parts of Georgia to someone if he earns money with it. So, he wants to be open to everybody and have no commitments to anybody.
I don’t think that it’s possible to build up a full-fledged authoritarian country in Georgia. I don’t think that this society will accept it. It’s not Belarus.
That’s what Georgians tell themselves often and I hope we are not overly optimistic.
Okay, maybe then this whole young generation will leave the country and go to Europe and the US and so on. Maybe that happens, but there will be a fight. It’s not like in Belarus…
There have been a lot of Belarussians in the streets in 2020…
Yes, but there was a moment when they should have done the coup, and they did not do it. When Lukashenko left the helicopter with the machine gun, he understood this was the moment when the coup could happen and when he might lose also the security forces.
And then the Russians came in and the society was not able to kick him out. And I think in Georgia, the society is different, and they are willing and able also to do this.
It’s also very dangerous because there is this violent experience from the civil war from the beginning of the 90s. So, you have lots of very short periods of violence. But still, I just don’t think that this society accepts any kind of one authoritarian ruler.
There might be a paternalistic part of the society- older the generation, they just want to have a normal life. And we all understand the social question is the key question for Georgia. It’s not only Russia like the opposition is saying, granted it’s also a key question. But I think it’s a social question. It’s a very vulnerable society and they [GD] is playing with this vulnerability of this society.
…I don’t think authoritarianism is possible in this country. It will not work.
But I don’t think authoritarianism is possible in this country. It will not work. This is also what Aliev thinks and I don’t it will work. You need sustainable peace with Armenia and you need to end this warlike situation, until then no private investment will come to this region on a bigger scale. I talk to businesspeople, people from Deutsche Bank, etc, and they all say this.
My last question: You mentioned that Russia is a declining power and its hegemony is waning. What do you think Russia would be willing to do if it sees the Georgian Dream lose power? Do you think we should expect any sudden moves from Russia, considering that GD has been threatening the citizens with war rhetoric in the pre-election period?
But this is part of their disinformation and their manipulation campaign. The same as the narrative that “we are dragged by the US into the war in Ukraine”, “there’s a threat of Russia”, “if we’re dealing with Russia, we can also have a deal with Abkhazia”, and so on. This is all manipulation.
…If Russia uses military force in Georgia, it will only play against the Georgian Dream.
We all understand if Russia uses military force in Georgia, it will only play against the Georgian Dream. Because this is deeply, in a way, anti-Russian society. It goes back not only to 2008 but much further back.
I think it wouldn’t be clever from the Russian side to do it, would be bad for the Georgian Dream and I also don’t think that Russia at the moment wants to go there, it has very limited resources at the moment. It’s bringing all its professional soldiers to Ukraine. You saw what happened with their peace forces in Karabakh, they didn’t manage it anymore.
I think it’s more a narrative of the Georgian Dream government to threaten society, than a reality. You never know with Russia. But though I would not exclude it completely, I’m very skeptical if they will do it. They will do it maybe differently, they might help security forces to do certain kinds of things, but even here I’m skeptical. It won’t be accepted by the people in this country.
