Moscow will respond to NATO with Abkhazia
Putin is ready to sign a decree on the unrecognized republics
Marina Perevozkina
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
2008-04-14
The North Atlantic Alliance has requested an explanation from Russian minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov, who said on April 8 that Russia was going “to do everything not to let Ukraine and Georgia join NATO”.
NATO spokesman James Apphaturai pointed out that Russian government was not explicit on which sort of measures they were meaning. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta is able to satisfy his curiosity. We have obtained information about the steps the Russian leadership is planning to take about Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the nearest future.
Georgia is not going to like them.
According to information obtained from sources within the Kremlin, the President of Russia is going to sign a presidential decree “on the basic directions of developing the Russian Federation’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. The text of the decree is currently being reviewed by lawyers within the president’s administration. According to our sources, this decree will give Russian ministries and other state bodies the right to open representations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Their purpose will be to engage direct official cooperation with the counterpart structures of both unrecognized republics.
The right to open representations will also be given to Russian regions. Consulates, however, will not be opened. “It is most likely that a single representation will be opened to deal with the protection of the interests of citizens of the Russian Federation [residing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia]”, our source claims. The offices of the other Russian bodies could then be opened under the umbrella of that representation.
Russia will also deploy active diplomats in these representations. That is the main difference between the Russian initiative and the so-called Taiwan scheme discussed by a number of experts. Under that scheme, the U.S. maintains ties with Taiwan without recognizing it through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private non-commercial institution. The ATI issues American visas, receives passport applications, provides support to American citizens and defends American trade and business interests on the island. It is in fact an unofficial American diplomatic representation. American diplomats working in Taiwan resign for the period of their deployment there.
The diplomats that are going to work in Abkhazia will not resign for any period of time. Officially they will be registered as employees of the Russian embassy in Tbilisi, although they will have no official accreditation and no Georgian visas. In fact, the Georgians themselves will not issue visas to them.
Generally, our sources recommended not to seek any analogies with Taiwan or any other case: in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia is going to implement its own original scenario. The presidential decree, which was prepared by the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, was probably amended by the Presidential administration. Our sources expressed hope that the decree would be signed by the outgoing Russian President, Vladimir Putin, before he steps down in early May, to avoid reopening the procedure with the new administration of President Medvedev and to avoid the consequent risk that the decree could not be adopted after all.
“Now it might not be the best time for taking radical decisions,” thinks Konstantin Zatulin, the deputy chairman of the Russia’s State Duma committee on CIS issues and Relations with Compatriots. “The bureaucrats are trying to find out what the new president is going to like, and what not. So, they have to be very careful. I think that a decision on formal recognition should be postponed until December. Dmitry Medvedev should not start his presidency with steps that would deteriorate extremely his relations with the west. Abkhazia’s recognition is a risky move. But on the other hand it might be worthy to take that risk today, because it might be late tomorrow. The Kosovo case will not remain acute forever. Now our steps towards unrecognized republics will be met with understanding by the world, as a step in response to the U.S. recognition of Kosovo. If we fail to resolve the issue now, it will remind about itself by the [2014 Winter] Olympic Games [in Sochi]. And we already have the example: China-Tibet.”
Zatulin thinks that Russia’s leadership is more radical than the Duma and foreign ministry and is preparing for the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But this step must be very well-prepared. “We should do all the preparations before December, including opening air and sea links. It is necessary to raise the contingent of peacekeepers to the maximum permitted by the agreement. Today, this contingent constitutes only 1/3 of that maximum.” Zatulin also thinks that Russia should sign agreements on economic and cultural relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “I suggested doing what the U.S. is doing: they do not recognize Taiwan, but they have a defence agreement with it. Actually, I said nothing about the military cooperation. Still, even that moderate proposal of mine did not pass the Duma committee: some deputies decided that it is not possible to sign an agreement with an unrecognized country, even though the example of the U.S. demonstrates that an agreement is possible, even with an unrecognized country.”
Mr. Alan Kasaev, a well-known expert on Caucasian issues, thinks it is unlikely that Putin would sign the document during his last month in office. “This is a very serious step,” he said. Mr. Medvedev will also refrain from addressing the issue immediately. It is thus probable that the final decision will be postponed till autumn. If the decision is made before the upcoming parliamentary elections in Georgia, it will have a very negative impact on the chances of opposition parties there. From this point of view, it is not the best timing.
Establishing the consulates should not present major legal or practical problems. Russia has many citizens in these unrecognized states, and they have restricted access to their state. The consulates will be there to ensure the access for those citizens and to protect them. Reaction from Georgia’s side will probably be very aggressive, but limited to rhetoric. Georgia is not expected to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Russia; there is nothing else it can do.”
Another interviewee, a Russian diplomat with extensive experience of working in Georgia, thinks that this is the very moment to adopt such a decision. “The Republican administration in the U.S. is finishing its term. Bush has no interest to get involved in this case. He needs to create at least an illusion that U.S.-Russian relations are positive,” argues the diplomat. “The US presidential candidates will also pay little attention, because American voters do not focus much on foreign policy apart from Iraq. Can Abkhazia and South Ossetia become priority issues? I doubt. Any new president will need at least a couple of months to become acquainted with the situation, but it will be too late by then. Americans will of course express their dissatisfaction and maybe do so with very tough rhetoric. But I do not believe they will take any practical steps. I also don’t see much chances of having strong reactions from Georgia. What can they do? They themselves can do very little. They will of course address the U.S. with this issue. But I doubt they will get the expected outcome, because the present U.S. administration does not need to portray U.S.-Russian relations in a negative light and those who will inherit the power have not made their minds yet.”
“Petty states like Poland, Latvia, and Estonia will of course react. But their abilities are extremely limited. I do not expect that Georgia will throw out the Russian ambassador, because this is the last thing that Georgia needs. Georgians would not gain anything from such a step, but would lose much. And anyway, we don’t give a damn about what the Georgians will do. It is not a big problem if our ambassador is removed. Georgia is not a country where we need to act politely. Georgia is the one state that is the most interested in having good relations with us. We ourselves do not have any serious business with them, and do not depend on them.”
The diplomat added that Russia would do everything possible to prevent Georgia from joining NATO, including a direct military presence in the disputed territories.
Though not mentioned in the presidential decree, further steps being considered by Russia may include military agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia modeled after agreements between U.S. and Taiwan. This would be followed by the deployment of Russian forces on the Gudauta military base (now closed, its infrastructure, including the airport, is intact), reopening the navy base in Ochamchire and deploying Russian submarines there. This would make it impossible for NATO ships to cruise along the Abkhaz shore. As to the formal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, according to our sources, the foreign ministry recommended to the President to do this in two cases: if Georgia actually joins NATO, and if there is military aggression against the Abkhaz and South Ossetian republics. The interviewees of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta in the Russian foreign ministry think that “this should have been done a long time ago, in 1993”.