Local Elections: New Divisive Issue for Opposition

The Georgian political landscape is a strange scene these days. The epicenter of political and social protest is on Rustaveli avenue, the parliament is essentially a one-party affair, with the ruling party consolidating power through a series of repressive legislation and strengthened repression, albeit abstaining from the outright violence of winter days. Meanwhile, the opposition struggles to unite and find relevance as its role inside the country is largely limited to commenting on the developments from TV screens and social media. With October 4, when the local elections are slated to take place, approaching fast, the rift may widen further. Should the pro-European opposition take part in those elections? And if yes, under what conditions?

Georgian Dream Stays on Message…

The Georgian opposition has long been criticized for failing to mount an effective challenge to the ruling party, both before and especially after the contested October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections.

Some commentators argued the opposition should have presented a united front before that crucial vote to offer an alternative to Georgia’s increasingly authoritarian system. Others believed running separately would give voters a more authentic choice.

Indeed, even considering the reported vote rigging, election day violations, use of administrative resources, and GD’s poor record on social, economic, or foreign affairs issues, the opposition’s inability to persuade the large majority of Georgians to convincingly vote out the Georgian Dream after its 12 years in power seems quite extraordinary.

Even more so, considering that the Georgian Dream has not altered its messaging significantly during these twelve years. When the GD pundits speak, one fundamentally hears the usual litany of claims: GD ensured there was no war in Georgia; United National Movement was criminal and should be outlawed; GD alone is the protector of Georgian traditions and values.

Indeed, there are adjustments and variations on the theme to match the political agenda of the day. The “no war” message is framed as a combat with the Global Party of War, which more recently morphed into “Deep State.” As the former arch-enemy fractured, the UNM-bashing has now extended to “collective UNM,” which currently encompasses all pro-Western opposition, with promises to ban what GD calls UNM “successor parties“. Meanwhile, GD’s “protection of Georgian values” has increasingly taken an anti-EU hue.

Strikingly, the GD, which had often campaigned on social protection, hardly included these promises in its 2024 campaign. The “no-war”, political retribution, and identitarian messages were judged sufficient.

…while tightening repression

Predictably, after the contested victory, GD ramped up repression. The opposition’s failure to mobilize its supporters en masse cast a shadow over its effectiveness. Mass protests began when the government announced it would not pursue EU accession negotiations.

For better or worse, civic activists, CSOs, and ordinary citizens steered these mass protests, while the opposition figures stayed in the background. This took the authorities by surprise, as they struggled to identify the specific organizers and scrambled to neutralize the leaders to neutralize the resistance.

As a result, the punitive machinery cast its net wide to intimidate the masses: violent dispersals, human rights violations, and tactics reminiscent of Russian and Belarusian regimes were deployed. This led to widespread local and international condemnation, triggered international sanctions against the Georgian Dream officials and the regime enablers, and sustained resistance. In response, GD shifted its tactics, moving away from overt violence and toward systemic repression – exorbitant fines, kangaroo courts, shutting down financing to civic activism and critical media.

For Georgian Dream, the local elections held as planned prove that there is no political crisis and that the proverbial Potiomkin facade of Georgian democracy is more or less intact. They may even consider the legislative adjustments to the functioning of the electoral commission and the rules of the local elections to be sufficient to win comfortably, thus shedding the patina of illegitimacy that remains on the party after the October 24 elections.

Opposition Remains Fragmented

Amid escalating repression, the opposition has struggled to maintain its relevance. It has achieved a degree of coordination: no opposition party has yet entered parliament. Similarly, the opposition made its voice heard on the international scene, acting as a spokesperson for the ongoing protest (now over five months) and exposing repression. This checked the GD’s efforts to gain international legitimacy and led to continuous sanctions. However, while various coordination platforms were attempted, the opposition failed to achieve strategic coordination domestically and did little to nothing to regain the trust of the electorate.

There were attempts to rally around President Salome Zurabishvili, first through the Georgian Charter created before the elections and then under the recently established “Resistance Platform. ” Yet, while Zurabishvili effectively advocated for support, democracy, and Georgia’s EU integration abroad, she could not consolidate opposition domestically and showed no intention to lead that movement. She also ostensibly missed a key opportunity to build unity before her term expired in December.

Internal disagreements persist even in the face of what the opposition describes as an existential challenge to Georgian statehood and sovereignty coming from the Georgian Dream. Key recent points of contention include:

• Parliamentary Commission Appearance: When uniting under the Resistance Platform announced by Salome Zurabishvili, all four main opposition forces agreed to boycott GD’s investigative commission, denouncing it as illegitimate. However, Giorgi Gakharia, leader of “Gakharia for Georgia,” broke ranks and testified before the commission in mid-April. In response, the UNM withdrew from the Resistance Platform, citing failure to maintain unity on one of the key issues agreed upon at the creation of the platform.
• OSCE Secretary General’s Visit: When the OSCE Secretary General Feridun Sinirlioğlu visited Tbilisi on April 22, the Coalition for Change declined to meet him, protesting his silence on state repression, failure to engage with civil society, and to meet with the victims of the police violence and with parents of the detained protesters. However, UNM-Unity, Lelo, and Gakharia for Georgia did meet with him—Gakharia’s party held a separate meeting.
• UNM grievance related to Saakashvili’s pardon issue: UNM’s chair, Tina Bokuchava, criticized President Zurabishvili for failing to present a clear resistance strategy at a key rally on March 31 and expressed ongoing frustration with Zurabishvili’s refusal to pardon party founder Mikheil Saakashvili. UNM left the Resistance Platform.

Enter Local Elections

As the October 4 local elections approach, the contours of the next rift are becoming more and more visible, which could further add to the frustration of the opposition-minded electorate. The fundamental issue is whether to participate.

Those parties and pundits who think the opposition should boycott say that participation under the current circumstances would only legitimize the current regime. At the same time, the legislation and practice would preclude a fair contest.

Giorgi Butikashvili of Coalition for Change argues: “By participating in the local elections, the opposition would be supporting an illegitimate process that has been distorted by changes to the existing electoral system: the reduction of proportional representation, the revision of electoral districts (gerrymandering), and the increase of the electoral threshold.” In Coalition’s view, these changes serve only to consolidate the power of the Georgian Dream and exclude the proportional representation of the opposition.” On top of that, “the participation in such elections would seriously undermine the protests and demands of the Georgian people for fair elections.”

Irakli Pavlenishvili from UNM-Unity further explains: “In circumstances when political parties are being abolished, all kinds of repressive laws are being adopted, the institution of observers has been abolished as a result of the recent electoral changes, it is inappropriate to talk about any political party participating in the electoral process, leaving aside the moral side… There can be no talk of any electoral process in this country when there are no more electoral laws.”

Grigol Gegelia of Lelo-Strong Georgia avoids taking an unambiguous position, claiming that “raising the issue of self-government elections ahead of time is only in [Bidzina] Ivanishvili’s interests.” He sees the local elections as a distraction, saying his party’s attention “is devoted to achieving new parliamentary elections. The only thing that will restore peace and stability in our country is new elections held in free conditions and the immediate release of political prisoners.”

Gakharia for Georgia is a party that refuses to stake out its position. Beka Liluashvili says his party “does not want to support the propaganda on this issue,” but “is preparing for all kinds of elections, all kinds of election formats, including new [parliamentary] election.” He argues that there is still a pretty long time left before the local elections, and their decision would depend on the circumstances. Earlier, leader of the party, Giorgi Gakharia did not rule out taking part in the local elections, and said both local and new parliamentary elections could be held in October.

There are some voices that say the opposition should take part in the local elections polls. Hans Gutbrod, long-time commentator of Georgia affairs, argues that it is still worthwhile to enter the unfair fight and use local elections “to contest whatever space there may be”. “In Georgia at this point, there is a lack of leadership and a surplus of bickering,” says Gutbrod, “In my mind it is the superior strategy to throw oneself into the election, fusing local issues – where the incompetence of the Georgian Dream is most keenly felt – with the broader lack of justice and legitimacy.”

The divergence of opinion is not too surprising, given that there are oftentimes differences of opinion even among the supporters of each political force. Both supporters and opponents of participation in local elections agree, however, that repression is likely to escalate exponentially in the runup to the polls.

As the opposition readies to present a united front for the May 26 celebrations of Independence Day, it looks as frail as ever. Will the local elections become a new pretext for division, or will efforts be focused on developing a viable vision and strategy? Meanwhile, with authoritarian consolidation showing no signs of abating, hope is slim.