Dr. Laure Delcour: EU is placed in a situation where it has to develop a regional vision

On November 13 the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) and the Georgian Office of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) organized an event “Strategic Crossroads or Hotbed of Threats” Scope for EU Engagement in the Black Sea”, dedicated to the presentation of the policy paper with the same title by Dr. Laure Delcour. The policy paper addresses issues such as what strategies the EU should adopt to engage effectively in the Black Sea region and how EU policies in the region affect Georgia and other countries of the region. Civil.ge took the opportunity to ask Dr. Delcour about her views on developments in the Black Sea region, the role of the EU in the region, whether the EU has a vision for the Black Sea region as such, and other issues.

Civil.ge: Dr. Delcour, thank you very much for agreeing to answer Civil.ge’s questions. First of all, could you briefly summarize for our readers what has led to the growing importance in recent years of the Black Sea for Europe?

Dr. Delcour: In the early 1990s when the USSR collapsed, the EU was very much focused on its own integration process . It shifted its attention to the Black Sea region parallel with its enlargement processes. especially in preparation for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, which happened in 2007.

And therefore it is no coincidence that the first attempt by the European Union to develop a strategic vision was made in 2007 with the Black Sea Synergy. So this is a kind of internally driven process.

But Russia’s actions- the war against Georgian, the annexation of Crimea – also contributed to shifting of of the EU’s attention to the region.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine further attracted attention to the Black Sea, not least because the region has taken center stage in Russia’s war, especially in recent months with Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal and attempts to block Ukraine’s exports and to block navigation in the Black Sea.

The EU’s attention has shifted to the region, but whether the EU sees this area as a region per se is another debate.

So can we say that the first big step has been taken now that the EU has realized that the Black Sea region and the Black Sea are closely linked to stability and security in Europe? And what should this realization be translated into?

I wouldn’t go so far as to call it a kind of realization. The EU’s attention has shifted to the region, but whether the EU sees this area as a region per se is another debate. Over the last two decades, EU policies and instruments have been scattered across a number of different frameworks, with the Neighborhood Policy, the former Strategic Partnership with Russia, EU enlargement with Turkey and now obviously Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. So this number of different frameworks and instruments makes it problematic also for the EU to act regionally, even though there is an increased focus on the region.

But do you think that the fact that these three countries of the Black sea region are now part of the enlargement package, it means that now the EU perceives them in a Black Sea region prism?

Yes, definitely there is greater attention to this region also because of the forthcoming negotiations and accession. However, as we know, the accession process is quite long, cumbersome, difficult, as has been the case for the Western Balkans, but also for a Black Sea country, Turkey.

And it’s interesting to note that in fact, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia are kind of joining Turkey in the waiting chamber. Turkey has been in the EU waiting room for a very long time and will remain there for a very long time now because of its own shift toward authoritarianism. However, even with a similar framework, there are huge differences with the three associated countries in relations to the European Union, which only complicates the design of a regional approach. What is needed for this vision to be translated into facts- first of all, the EU should develop a vision. Currently, EU has no vision for the Black Sea as such.

Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia are kind of joining Turkey in the waiting chamber […But the EU] has no vision for the Black Sea as such.

Back in 2007, it gave a first try at developing a vision for the Black Sea that was the Black Sea Synergy, which was altogether flexible because it did not replace existing framework. It came as a complement to bilateral frameworks and it was also inclusive in that the EU tried to engage with all regional players. This is no longer possible because of Russia’s action.

The EU is used to this kinds of broad comprehensive visions and now it’s placed in a situation where it has to develop a regional vision, meaning going beyond the existing bilateral frameworks, at the same time it cannot incorporate into this vision the elephant in the room, meaning Russia. So this is problematic for the European Union.

So first of all the EU should design a vision and then this should be translated into the facts by specific regional instruments and not only bilateral ones.

And what is needed besides the policy toolbox is a crucial element, namely support from EU member states, which has been lacking for an EU-wide Black Sea regional policy. In fact, the EU launched two initiatives almost simultaneously in the late 2000s meaning the Black Sea Synergy in 2007 and then the Eastern Partnership in 2009. And it gave precedence to the latter.

From the outset, the Eastern Partnership had much wider political support from the Member States than the Black Sea Synergy. And I’m not sure the political support from the Member States is there for a new initiative around the Black Sea, even though there is a growing awareness of security changes in the Black Sea.

So we’re talking about countries that are more on the other side of Europe.

Not only. Take Poland, for instance. Poland initiated the Eastern Partnership and Sweden became a vocal supporter of the Partnership, not of the Black Sea Synergy. Recently, Poland came up with the Three Seas initiative linking the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, which is promising. Yet, this has to translate to the greater support by a greater support by a wider number of the Member States.

If I may ask you about Georgia as well. Georgia’s relevance for the EU has also increased because of the increased relevance of the Black Sea. Since Georgia is seen as an important part of the so-called Middle Corridor, what do you think Georgia can do to further increase its own relevance?

Well, Georgia can follow its integration path with the EU, meaning the proceed with domestic change as requested by the EU and the forthcoming candidate status. This is the first thing I think.

This especially concerns political reforms, governance reforms as requested by the European Union.

And how will Georgia’s candidacy affect the other countries in this region, particularly in the South Caucasus taking into account their geopolitical outlook?

I think it might have an effect, but it’s not the only factor. There are other factors such as the Karabakh conflict and its outcomes and also the political developments in the two other countries, meaning the entrenched authoritarianism in Azerbaijan and the demand for democracy in Armenia.

Armenia is a big question mark because the authorities have become increasingly vocal in criticizing Russia. Whether this will translate into Armenia dropping the Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization is another question. But if Armenia engages in dropping these two organizations, then there is no reason why it could not follow a similar path [with Georgia], meaning the association agreement that it had negotiated, reforms in line with the demands and then, maybe an EU membership perspective. But this is up to the Armenian people and authorities. So, Georgia is not the only factor, relations with Russia and perceptions of Russia’s role also play a key role.

But it would be a signal to Armenia that another way is possible.

Last week there was a big celebration in Georgia as EC made recommendation to the European Council to offer candidacy in December. Do you think that the December decision is going to be a  positive one?

I think so. There are several reasons why recommendations of the European Commission in the past were not followed. Either because of bilateral disputes – Greece and North Macedonia, Bulgaria and North Macedonia – or because of reluctance to welcome a new country, a case of France and the UK back in the 1960s. Or out of desire for reform of the enlargement policy: that was the case when France and Netherlands vetoed Albanian and North Macedonian applications back in 2019.

This is not the case right now. None of these reasons is present. Georgia has no bone of contention with any member states.

I can see no reason why the Commission’s recommendation would not be followed by the member states.

There are talks about further reforming the enlargement process, but it’s not a hot topic. I can see no reason why the Commission’s recommendation would not be followed by the member states. It is also an important signal to the Georgian population, society and the world.

What is the role of geopolitical considerations in this case?

I think the geopolitical considerations are key, but not only for Georgia, for Moldova and Ukraine as well.

The EU is facing this big overhaul next year, because there will be a new Commission, a new Parliament. Do you expect this to have an impact on the EU’s perspective and its policy in the Black Sea region? Could it be something like a stumbling block?

It will start with the elections of the European Parliament’s elections. And then the appointment of the president of the European Commission crucially hinges on the outcomes of the Parliament’s elections. I would not expect any major shift as it is likely that the two large groups will remain the Parliament, meaning the European People’s Party and the Social-Democrats. Neither of them are averse to enlargement. And on top of that, Ursula von der Leyen had really prioritized enlargement. Should she stay in charge of the European Commission, she would likely persist.

You’ve mentioned in your report that during the last war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, we saw a rather low profile of the EU in the region. And you explain that one of the reasons is that the EU wasn’t really involved in the relevant negotiation formats. So there was this kind of demonstrated lack of muscle, political muscle. Do you think that there are any prospects for EU to improve that kind of record and to have more leverage in the region in general?

Yes, I think the EU has drawn the lessons: from 2020, among others, by acting as mediator as mediator between the two sides, since 2021, by holding high-level political meetings under Charles Michel’s auspices. This was a shift because prior to that the EU was not involved in the Karabakh conflict at all. So this was a shift.

However, the recent takeover of Karabakh was also a blow to the EU. It showed that Azerbaijan doesn’t need the EU to sort out the issue. I think the EU has also to develop clear lines for its engagement in conflicts: whether it wants to be a neutral broker, which would mean acting equally, carefully, cautiously between the two sides, or whether it wants to act as an honest broker, meaning just being open, transparent to all, but also with principles.

In the case of Karabakh, I think the EU has tried to preserve as much as possible a balance and therefore has failed to gain leverage, especially vis-a-vis Azerbaijan. This was translated into facts. A second shortcoming, in my view, was that EU has insufficiently sought to engage with civil society in conflict resolution. This is perhaps also true in Georgia, in Abkhazia, where societies are key to a long term solution.

About Turkey – because it is such an important player in the region, a NATO member state. For Georgia it is also a staunch supporter of Georgia’s membership in NATO and plays a very important gatekeeper role with the Montreaux Convention. How does the EU view Turkey in the context of the Black Sea region? Has there been a change there?

There has been as shift in Turkey’s policy – not only in domestic politics, where we have shift towards authoritarianism, but also in foreign policy. Turkey has sought to counterweight the EU, or to act as spoiler against some EU member states in several regions, whether in Cyprus, in eastern Mediterranean or in Libya, or finally in Karabakh. So, yes, it’s a NATO member, but a NATO member that buys weapons and equipment from Russia, so I would not call it a reliable partner right now. It’s definitely an important country and should be treated as such, whether we can consider it an ally, regardless of in NATO membership is debatable.

Can it be called a rival of EU in the region?

No, because Turkey doesn’t have similar ambitions in terms of transforming the countries, but it can be certainly called a challenger, an independent player.