Op-ed | Europe must tie the knot with Georgia

From the day Georgia filed its EU membership bid alongside Moldova and Ukraine, we have been hearing that this is a unique window of opportunity in the history of EU enlargement, a chance not to be missed. This assertion has put an extra weight on the shoulders of the Georgian people.

Katie Shoshiasvili is researching democratization in Georgia. She works at Transparency International – Georgia.

Earlier this year, Nana Malashkhia and Salome Kenchiashvili stood up against the water canons with the EU and Georgian flags proudly flying in their hands. Their photos, which made the rounds in the European newspapers, showed that Georgia will not give up on its future in the European Union. But they have also implied that in this fight, Georgian people are often pitted against their own government.

Georgia took off on its EU journey soon after restoring its statehood and freeing itself from Soviet claws. Ukraine and Georgia traveled a similar path toward Europe, advancing as far as possible through PCAs, AAs, DCFTAs, and all other abbreviations Brussels made available to them. 

The desire to join the European family stems from these countries’ aspirational alignment with European values and culture and the vision of their future as democratic, prosperous, and free.  

This is also a choice taken against the Russian menace. The imperial shadow of Russia repeatedly brought death, starvation, war, degradation of national identity, and destruction of its institutions to Georgia and Ukraine. The two nations have made their choice clear a long time ago. What they lacked was a path and a roadmap to get the membership. Russia’s war of aggression and Ukraine’s heroic resistance ultimately made Europeans realize the responsibility to provide such a path.

But progress – even if desired – is often not linear, and Georgia meets this moment in bad shape. Once the front-runner of the Eastern Partnership, Georgia fell behind Ukraine and Moldova in the recent EU enlargement round last year, primarily due to a lack of alignment with the EU foreign policy and failing to implement comprehensive democratic reforms. 

Russia’s continued occupation of the Georgian provinces, death, and destruction that Moscow brought onto Ukraine has raised the specter of traumatic fear in Tbilisi. Georgia has experienced intensified Russian malign influence since the start of the war, and the current ruling party, which came to power pledging to deconflict its relations with the Kremlin, showed a willingness to come under that influence.

While Russian-style narratives of conservatism proliferate on state-controlled media and social media channels, and Russian-style policy decisions are taken – like the “foreign agents law” that Ms. Malashkia and Ms. Kenchashvili protested against – Tbilisi also became enchanted with Victor Orban’s “illiberal” project. 

Mutual visits between Prime Minister Garibashvili and Orban have proliferated, and two countries have even held a joint cabinet meeting. At the conservative bash in Budapest, Garibashvili praised Orban as a leader and a “good Christian.” 

The ultra-conservative alliance with the worst enemy of Brussels, the bashing of the MEPs, and Georgia’s Western partners that became habitual in Tbilisi make Georgia an unpalatable candidate. Yet, it is crucial for Europe not to waver and to hear the underlying call of the Georgian people. Tying the knot with Georgia is also a pragmatic decision to make.

The EU must learn from its Balkan experience. In the past decade, the Union has faced the “before it’s too late” dilemma in the Western Balkans and chose to equivocate. As the EU hesitated to expand, the region’s countries proved hesitant to embrace democratic reforms in the rule of law, media freedom, fighting corruption, and more. Things got worse, not better. The EU’s “pragmatism” in the Western Balkans has put its reputation and security at risk, as Russia and China have gained political and economic ground. These external powers demonstrate that physical distance doesn’t negate the political influence of the authoritarian power, emphasizing the EU’s need for a cohesive political strategy amid growing power competition and challenges in the Western Balkans. 

The recent flareup in Kosovo showed that the specter of armed confrontation still hangs over the Balkans. It is crucial not to make a similar mistake in the Eastern neighborhood. 

Georgia is gearing up for parliamentary elections next year, and only hopes won’t suffice if the EU is serious about wishing to return the country to the path of democratic governance, rule of law, and reforms. The accession process could provide an incentive by mobilizing Georgia’s pro-European citizens and professionals, who can act as an internal leverage on the government. If wisely used, the accession process can also give the EU external leverage through various technical assistance and stabilization instruments.  

Officials in Brussels must increasingly come to terms with the fact that “Geopolitical Europe” is also a more decisive Europe. Giving in to the bully tactics of aggressive leaders leads to costly stalemates at crucial moments, as demonstrated by Orban’s willingness to hold the enlargement decisions hostage to his private pecuniary and partisan benefit.

The EU conditions need to be clarified and strengthened. The EU and European capitals must nudge the Georgian Dream to let the civil service do its job without partisan intervention, be open to sharing power even with parties it does not like, stop attacking the civil society and media, improve the protection of human rights, end political persecution and restore the independence of the courts. The EU must understand that these decisions are politically costly for Tbilisi – but the outcome of the EU membership is what Georgian people want, and if the path to getting to that objective is clear, any political force wishing to stay in power will have to adapt – or eventually leave. The EU must now demonstrate its raison d’être and let the Kremlin witness a milestone in the Georgia-EU relations.

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