Interview | Bernard Guetta: We should make it more profitable for Ivanishvili to compromise than not to

On December 12, the delegation of Members of the European Parliament visited Tbilisi and held meetings with the Georgian President, civil society organizations, and media representatives. MEPs said their visit was a sign of support to the Georgian people and called for the rerun of the recent elections, which they deemed neither free nor fair. They reaffirmed their commitment to Georgia’s European future. Bernard Guetta, a member of the European Parliament from France and a member of the Renew Europe group as one of the delegation members.

MEP Bernard Guetta is born in 1951, and had an illustrious career as a journalist. He began his professional career shortly after the events of May 1968 in Paris and has strong pro-European but also Atlanticist views, which place him in the left centre of the French political spectrum. As a journalist, he covered various countries during and after the fall of the USSR, including Africa and the Middle East, but also Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 2005, as a radio journalist, he campaigned for the European Constitution and supported French military intervention against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. He was elected to the European Parliament in 2019 and re-elected in 2024 on the list of the centrist parties supporting President Emmanuel Macron. The newly elected Prime Minister François Bayrou is vice-president of this alliance.

Civil.ge’s editor, Nata Koridze discussed with MEP Guetta issues related to ongoing developments in Georgia, how things can develop in the country, the EU’s role in this process and other issues.

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Nata Koridze, Civil.ge: This is your first visit to Georgia. My first question is about your impressions of the ongoing events and what you see as a solution to the current political crisis.

I don’t understand the situation. The situation is frightening. It could get a lot worse. It could. It’s not a certainty, thank God, but it could.

And I don’t understand the explanation which was given to me and to us. Because the Georgian Dream and its founding father had won the election, they were not fair. There were manipulations, fraud, and so on. But they won the election. And nobody reacted in Georgia against that. There was no demonstration against the result of the election. A lot of people, of course, were indignant. Because they knew and understood the magnitude of the fraud.

But they didn’t want to go on the streets for that. And so, actually, the situation was rather good for the authorities. And all of a sudden, they decided to provoke the country, not only the opposition but also the people voting for them, because nobody in your country, and for good reasons, likes Russia. And except for some, for many intellectually sophisticated people, being pro-European means, in Georgia, being anti-Russian.

And so, when this party, the Georgian so-called Dream or nightmare, announced it was postponing the negotiations with the European Union, immediately the people were on the streets and not only in Tbilisi, in the entire country.

So why did he [Bidzina Ivanishvili] do this? It wasn’t a necessity for him. Not at all. I understand the explanations. Well, he wanted to provoke the country. So to have people demonstrating, and to be able after that to organize repression, and to turn Georgia into the Chile of Pinochet. But I don’t buy it.

 So what do you think why it happened the way it happened? Why did he decide to do that?

This is the point. I don’t understand.

You know the Occam’s razor principle, saying that the simplest explanation is usually the correct one. A lot of people in this country believe that he basically just wants to consolidate his power. And  the EU is not compatible with that. And when people didn’t immediately take to streets after the rigged elections, he thought that that’s the moment to do it.

Yes, I heard that. That’s possible. But I’m not really convinced by that. But I don’t have my own explanation. Unfortunately, no, absolutely not.

Have you asked people why they initially didn’t take to the streets right after the elections?

Because the people, I would say they were ready to accept, let’s say, false elections, manipulated elections. And it wasn’t surprising for them.

So, basically, I think that this leader from the shadow miscalculated the situation. He probably didn’t want to go too fast in joining the European Union, and he probably wanted to please Putin, but he made an enormous mistake.

Now, you have an extremely frightening situation in your country because I don’t see an easy possibility of getting out of this deadlock. Even if he makes big concessions to appease the people, the people will think, and rightly so, that he’s weak.

And they will push. And if he doesn’t make any concessions, the people will not accept that. And so, there is possibility first, of economical and social difficulties, second, a growing anger against the authorities, and third, violent demonstrations, maybe not in January, but maybe during the spring.

We are not speaking about a short-term evolution. This is a medium-term, if not a long-term, evolution.

So, I just had a discussion with one of the leaders of the Georgian Dream. And I told him precisely that, that I was afraid of the situation and that they made an incredible mistake with this announcement and that the responsibility to find a way out was theirs.

When did you have this conversation? On this visit?

Yes, 30 minutes ago.

Is it a very high-level person?

Reasonably high. Reasonably high.

And what was his response? Or hers?

This person was clearly upset. Clearly upset.

By your words or by the situation?

No, by the situation. And basically, or apparently, he shared my view that it was a mistake. He didn’t say that. But when I told him it was an incredible mistake, he didn’t tell me otherwise.

And I told him: “You could do something. You could tell the country, well, we don’t want a violent evolution of the situation, and in order to ease the situation, we will organize in three or four months new elections.”

He was listening to me very carefully. He didn’t tell me it was absolutely impossible. He didn’t approve. But he didn’t say anything. And I told him, if you would do that, you would be applauded by a lot of people in the country, and abroad, certainly.  And so, you could win those new elections, maybe with the support of some small parties or personalities.

I don’t think they will [hold elections]. I’m afraid they won’t. But except for this very bold step, I don’t see a solution. And I told this person, Trump, and Putin, and everybody will try, and Zelensky and everybody will try to find a solution for Ukraine. And if there is violence in the streets of Tbilisi and Georgian cities, it won’t help in the search for a solution for Ukraine.

And so, the situation is dangerous not only for Georgia and the Georgian people. It is becoming increasingly frightening for the stability of Europe, of the continent, I mean—not only the European Union, but the continent.

He didn’t tell me that I was dreaming. And he was clearly upset.

And he probably knows that there’s nothing much he can do because there’s only one person who takes the decisions in this country. But it’s a very interesting story that you told me right now because it shows, indeed, that there are people inside the Georgian Dream and their supporters who are either having second thoughts or turning away from the GD, and we’ve seen that recently. We also have been seeing the Georgian Dream crack down ruthlessly on protesters and opponents of the regime. We’ve seen the elections that were assessed as rigged by the local observers, by the President herself, she called them the Russian special operation. Many in Georgia are somewhat bitter that the reaction from our Western partners, including the EU, is too little and too late.

What do you think the EU can and should do in these circumstances?

Well, we should tell the truth more bluntly and more clearly. We told the truth by the resolution of the [European] Parliament, and it was already rather clear. But I would like the Council, I mean the leaders of the European Union, the 26 (27th minus [Viktor] Orban), to endorse the facts. Maybe they will. I’m not sure of that, but maybe they could.

Would it help? Would it solve the problem? I’m not sure.

The endorsement of what exactly? Of the assessment of the elections or the sanctions? Which part do you mean?

Two different points. I certainly wish the European Council would say clearly that this election was ridiculously stolen. And I would certainly wish the European Union to take personal sanctions. By that, I don’t mean sanctions against the country, against the population, but against Mr. and Mrs. so and so, responsible for this and that. But after all, it wouldn’t be a solution. The solution could come only from Mr. Ivanishvili, really – from realizing the mistake he has made and from trying to repair the mistake.

Wouldn’t the sanctions help him realize that he made a mistake? Especially sanctions personally against him and against his entourage?

Yes, it would help him to understand that the situation is difficult, even for him personally. And for his friends.

But Mr. Ivanishvili could survive the sanctions. So, the real necessity is that you, the Georgians, including Mr. Ivanishvili and the people on the streets every night, find a compromise, find a solution, find a way out.

Because it’s not the European Union even with sanctions and everything that could solve the problem. It’s you. And again, by you, I mean Ivanishvili and the opposition and the young generation demonstrating on the streets.

What could be the solution? I don’t know. Well, it’s very difficult.

I will tell you an anecdote. On Tuesday, I had a discussion with a university teacher, a smart person who is a supporter of the Georgian Dream.

And I asked him, why do you support Georgian Dream? The answer was very clear: “You know, I’m extremely afraid of those demonstrations because they could lead to real violence and real violence, civil war in the country would lead to a Russian invasion and I don’t want to see that.”

Okay, I understand. So, I  asked: would you then support a compromise with Putin on the future of your country? And he looked at me, and he told me, no, certainly not. Why not, I asked. “Because it’s impossible: he’s a liar, he’s a barbarian, he’s a murderer. You cannot find a compromise with him.” I asked: “So, what would you want to do? “And he told me the only solution for my country would be to join NATO.

And you know, it was so incredible because he started as an extremely moderate person and ended as more radical than the most radical ones.

And this moment was very interesting for me because I thought, well, actually, this country is completely confused. Because nobody likes Russia and the Russians. Everybody, or 90% of the Georgian people, are afraid of Russia and hate Putin, clearly.

But they don’t know what to do. Because they feel trapped by geography, and that’s it.

How intelligent can he be if he says such illogical things? He basically contradicts himself.

Completely. I told him this, and he told me, yes, you’re right. I know, but this is the situation. Yes.

The situation is contradictory.

That really shows you the power of propaganda.

 Well, it shows the propaganda, but not only the propaganda, because the propaganda is partly reality.

The critics of Georgian Dream say it has effectively dismantled the only security leverages that this country has, which is our relations with Western partners, while also constantly threatening the population with war. And this person is a very good illustration of that.

I will shock you, but I disagree with you. I disagree with you for two reasons.

First, the United States, specifically Mr. Trump, but generally speaking, the United States, are not interested in being involved in Georgia. Not at all. They don’t care about your country.

They could be moved by your situation, but they just left – Biden, not Trump. They just left Afghanistan. They want to beat China economically speaking. That’s their obsession. Not only Georgia, but Europe in general, is not their problem anymore. And so, my dear European friends, including Georgian friends, good luck!

Second point, it’s not the same situation with the European Union. Not at all. We, as the Parliament, as the European institution, as many people in the different member states, we understand what is at stake in Georgia and in this crisis.

But firstly, a huge part of our voters – they don’t know where Georgia is or what it is.  Secondly, we don’t have money. We are not that poor, but we don’t have a lot of money. And we are not enthusiastic about the idea of fighting directly Russia without American support, by the way. And thirdly, we are in the process of rebuilding the European Union as a political player with a common defense, and so on and so on. It will be long. It will be difficult.

We are not ready to fight for Georgia.

But nobody is asking the EU to “fight” for Georgia. I mean, your point on Afghanistan is well taken. Yes, it’s been a tragedy and a disaster and a very hard blow for the US image too. But then, I don’t think you can compare Afghanistan with Georgia because, despite state capture, Georgian people are in the streets relentlessly rallying for a democratic European future. So, there is something to fight for here.

I think, the United States, while pursuing its global agenda, is also realizing that whatever happens in Georgia is going to have an effect on this region. You have countries who are watching what’s happening in this region and in Ukraine, including China, and watching whether Russia can get away with what it’s doing. I think it’s really a stretch to say that the United States does not care what’s happening here.

As for the EU, you’re saying that it doesn’t have a lot of money, which is true, but then it’s the largest aid provider to Georgia and all over the world too. And the EU has huge soft power which it really doesn’t take credit for. Some in Georgia argue that it would put an end to this regime if the EU just withdrew the visa-free regime with Georgia; that would make people here who voted for Georgian Dream realize that this party is really taking the country away from the EU to, and so this would disarm the GD propaganda, which says that Georgia is still on EU path. So, proponents of that move by EU say this would show that the Georgian Dream is not a pro-European force.

It’s the Georgian Nightmare.

Yes. I think the EU really has a lot of tools at its disposal. It just needs to be willing to use them.

And in addition to the visas, what?

Another tool is the sanctions. I mean, we understand Hungary’s position is an obstacle. But then again, even if it starts with personal or diplomatic passport sanctions, it’s still a tool. For decades, the EU has been unwilling to use the tools at its disposal vis-a-vis Russia as well, saying, “Oh, we depend on Russian hydrocarbons.” And then look at the EU now—it is completely not dependent on them. And nobody looked at the other side of the picture – that Russia was heavily dependent on the money that was coming from the EU in exchange for its gas and oil. When you are a huge block, economically powerful block, of 27 states, why don’t you use that power that you have behind you?

Certainly, yes, you’re right. Right.

But let me ask you something else. Let’s switch to France. President Macron yesterday had a telephone conversation with Bidzina Ivanishvili. Do you think that this call is a sign that France is ready to play a more active role in resolving this crisis? And do you think that Ivanishvili’s French citizenship and property there has any relevance in this context?

I don’t have an answer to the second question about Ivanishvili’s properties in France. I don’t know how many properties he has in France. I guess he has many in the UK, the US, the Bahamas, and so on.

The answer to the first question is yes. Emmanuel Macron will try to play a role in your country by trying to open the way to a solution, which would certainly be a kind of compromise. I don’t know which one, but a compromise certainly. And he will try. He’s certainly willing to do so. And he’s certainly pushed by many people in Paris to do so.  

So he will try. Of course he will. For two reasons. First, after all, the mastermind in your country is French citizen and the President also.

Oh, actually the President is not anymore. Although she has a French background.

Yes, I know, and yes, absolutely, she’s French. Maybe not by her passport, but she’s French. And, by the way, much more than Ivanishvili.

And don’t underestimate the weight of the Georgian immigration in France, there are many influential big families. And so, yes, he will try. And for another reason: he [President Macron] will be very involved with Poland, the Baltic countries, and Germany (after the next election in February) in the Ukrainian crisis. And the two crises, Ukraine and Georgia, will be more and more linked. And so, yes, he will try to play a role, and he could succeed. That’s very possible. At least, I wish he would.

The phone call, by the way, was very smart because he didn’t call the prime minister. And so, he didn’t recognize the prime minister.

In your view, how does Donald Trump’s election influence the EU foreign policy?

A lot. The first Trump election was a U-turn for the European Union. Why? Because until the first Trump election, nobody except France in the European Union supported the idea of a common defense. And all of a sudden, thanks to Trump, it wasn’t a taboo anymore.

And now we have a commission of our defense. And now we are looking for money to develop our defense. And we will find this money. I’m sure of it because we want to and because there is a necessity. And because everybody, including President Orban, sees the necessity of the common defense.

And do you think that affects EU policy towards this region?

But it’s completely linked. If we have a common defense, we will have a common diplomacy. At least on two or three of the biggest crises, the biggest problems.

Do you think that makes the EU more consolidated?

Absolutely. And it will turn, and it is turning, the European Union from an economic union to a political one. The majority of people are skeptical about it, but I’m not at all skeptical. I’m sure we will turn the European Union into a political union. Why? Again, out of necessity. We won’t have another choice. We will have to do that.

Is it good news for this region?

I think certainly, yes. So, we could come back to our first point. What the European Union could do for you in this crisis? Frankly speaking, I don’t think we could do anything real. Maybe helping to find a compromise. That would be extremely important of course, but it wouldn’t be a real solution. But if we succeed in turning the Union into a political union, it would be completely different, not only for you, but for Ukraine, but for Moldova, and so on and so on, and for the entire continent.

But when do you think this is going to happen? What’s the time frame?

I will give you two completely different answers. First, in any case, to build up a defense, you need at least 10 years, with a political agreement, and so on. If we don’t have a real political agreement, it will take 25 years. But on the other hand, what Macron, Tusk, the Baltic states, and so on and so on- are discussing now, the deployment of European forces along the demarcation line between “the two Ukraines”, if there is an agreement.

If there is demarcation along West and East Ukraine, like in the case of the two Germanies or the two Koreas, most probably, the forces along this line will be European. Most probably. And not at all American. Maybe with some [US] financial support, I don’t know. But basically, European. It would be immediately the birth of a political Europe.

Will it be the sort of a coalition of the willing?

Absolutely. It wouldn’t be the 27. But it would be a coalition of the willing, including the UK, which is very interesting. And step by step, all 27 members would join.

Do you think the war in Ukraine has increased the significance of the Black Sea region to the European Union?

Well, we are just discovering this area. Yes, this is true. It didn’t exist for us until the war in Ukraine. Now we understand, at least, the rulers and the militaries, some journalists, and many members of the European Parliament. We are discovering the importance of this area, certainly yes.

And it had to take a war, unfortunately…

As usual. Yes.

I know that during your career, you have covered and watched developments in Central Europe and Eastern Europe before and after the fall of communism. Some say that the Soviet Union in fact is still crumbling down. So, the war in Ukraine or even developments here, you call them phantom pains or whatever, but that is still sort of parting ways with the Soviet Union. Do you agree with this assessment?

Oh yes. That’s why I was a big supporter and personal friend of Gorbachev. He wanted to turn the Soviet Union into another common market on the model of the European common market.

Yes, but that was doomed, don’t you think, from the very start?

Well, maybe. We don’t know. But in any case, it would have been an evolution reform and not a revolution. And the revolution, we know, is always very costly in wars, misery, and very long.

I agree with you that this war in Ukraine, this crisis in Georgia, this question mark on Moldova, etc., are the consequences of the sudden bankruptcy of both the Soviet Union and communism. Well, I always wrote at that time that we had seen the shock therapy, the conditions in which the Soviet Union ended, and the conditions of the independence would have terrible consequences.

And why? This is very difficult to say that. Even you, you are shocked. I see that on your face. And it’s very difficult to say that now. Because when you see the aggression against Ukraine there is only one thing you can say: stop, stop this aggression, Russia is completely barbaric and so on and so on. And so, everything is, and rightly so, everything is in black and white. But 20 years ago, it wasn’t in black-and-white, Ukraine. Not at all.

But 20 years ago, there was criticism that had been addressed towards the West, that it had been appeasing Russia. Especially since Putin’d speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 pretty much laid out what Russia was going to do. Do you agree with that criticism?

Yes, I do. I do, certainly, completely, with no restriction. But, I do think that 20 years before that, we made an enormous mistake by not supporting Gorbachev and his will to reform to avoid a revolution.

But when was there a revolution?

Yes, there was a revolution. It was a shock therapy organized by Yeltsin and his supporters.

He tried to reform the Soviet Union. There was perestroika, glasnost, all those initiatives.

And it wasn’t nothing.

Absolutely. And I think to his credit, he didn’t want bloodshed, and he really tried to bring in some kind of democratic changes, if you will.

I knew him personally, and I can tell you that he was, surprisingly enough, a real democrat.

More than that, he was a man of goodwill, really. And very peaceful. And… But it is history.

What he wanted to do was great, but don’t you think it was incompatible with that system? You could not reform the Soviet Union. And you had the 15 republics, which were completely different in their ethnic composition, religion, culture, language, etc.

Germany, France, Italy, and Netherlands were completely different when we organized 50 years the common market.

But that was voluntary.

Absolutely, but dissolving the Soviet Union and turning it into a common market could have been voluntary, too.

What should we expect from the discussions on Monday, December 16, meeting of EU foreign ministers regarding Georgia?

I think they will be tougher than we expect them to be. And they will be weaker than necessary.

Do you think the sanctions will follow?

Some.

But you don’t believe they will play a role?

They will not change the situation, no. It would be a necessity. I do support it—all of us in this [EU Parliament] delegation. And frankly speaking, it won’t change the situation radically.

Do you think there is room for compromise with Ivanishvili? From what we understand, his personality is very much like Putin’s in a way. He only recognizes the sheer power.

As far as I understand, the man (whom I don’t know and never met) is a businessman and not an ideologue. I don’t think he really cares about politics. He cares about money and power.

Power because it gives money, and money because it gives power. And so, if at one point he sees that it would be more profitable for him to make a compromise than refusing the compromise, he will make the compromise. And so we should work on that.

So you make him see that it’s more profitable?

Exactly, that’s it. You know, I always thought that a corrupted person is much less frightening than a person with pure ideology. Because with the first one you can negotiate, with the second one it’s impossible.

I agree with you. And so. Let’s hope.

Let’s hope.

Thank you so much.