Stories of the “Velvet Coup” do not Seem to Hold Water
Recent stories on preparations of a velvet coup to unseat President Eduard Shevardnadze seem to be stirring the storm in a teacup. Tired with uncertainty and braced for the conspiracy theories, Georgians find it hard to tell the pre-election PR from the genuine news. But Shevardnadze seems to have rolled a test-ball, and has got acceptable returns on the margin.
The news of conspiracy broke on influential independent TV company Rustavi 2 on February 4. Quoting unnamed sources the channel reported several top officials, including the State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze and Interior Minister Koba Narchemashvili to have met informally, together with some Citizens Union leaders to plot a constitutional coup, that would unseat President Shevardnadze and give Jorbenadze the reigns of power.
The news found fresh substantiation as most of the opposition leaders said the conspiracy was indeed possible. Both Zurab Zhvania of United Democrats and Mikheil Saakashvili of the New National Movement said they had some information about such developments.
Additional spin to the news was given by Levan Gachechiladze of the New Rights, who fleshed out the initial rumors on February 5, saying the conspirators were planning to expand the authority of the State Minister by giving him control over the Defense, Interior and Security Ministries. They also said, an attack of February 3 on their party headquarters was a part of the plan to trigger political instability in the country.
President Shevardnadze’s reaction was double-edged. He said the rumors were groundless, but at the same time remarked “it was not advisable” to plan the coups in presence of the wives and children, apparently alluding to the family setting in which the conspirators have allegedly met. Shevardnadze also ordered the Prosecutor-General to investigate the case.
Even today, the issue of Jorbenadze coup continues to spin despite having very little evidence to substantiate the allegations. More importantly, the mainstream argument assumes coordination of too many events from the central “conspiracy” quarters for being credible.
The question is, if the most opposition leaders have “heard the rumors” of the “secret supper” allegedly held during the New Years holidays, how did the information escape the ears of Shevardnadze?
Even if we take on as credible the imagery of Shevardnadze as an isolated patriarch, there are still too many governmental players who should have heard of the planned scheme and were obliged to take action.
It is especially true, as the allegations do not speak of a “grand conspiracy” of all the executives against Shevardnadze. According to the statements of the New Rights, who offered the most extended version of the conspiracy, the State Security Minister Valeri Khaburdzania, Counter-Intelligence Chief Avtandil Ioseliani, Border Guard Commander Valeri Chkheidze and the Defense Minister Davit Tevzadze were not partaking in a covert design.
On the other hand, Avtandil Jorbenadze definitely does not rank among the popular politicians, who could have counted on garnering wide popular support after capturing the power. According to the December 2002 polls, 57,2% of the respondents rated Jorbenadze negatively, with the disapproval figure second only to President Shevardnadze whose actions were disapproved by 65,8%.
If anywhere Jorbenadze did increase his influence, it was in the State Chancellery and in the Citizens Union of Georgia, a pro-presidential party that he leads. Here, it seems, there could be an explanation for understanding persistence of a coup issue on the agenda for such a long time.
Throughout past months there have been persistent rumors leaking from the executive government that Shevardnadze was growing impatient as Jorbenadze increased his backstage power without diverting a heat of criticism from Shevardnadze.
Already on June 30, 2002 Shevardnadze, speaking at a CUG assembly, said he might endorse Jorbenadze as his successor in 2005. Analysts argue Shevardnadze thus set his State Minister up for the opposition pressure and executive intrigues to balance his growing power.
In much of the same way, Shevardnadze has diverted the partisan arrows against then Parliamentary Chairman Zurab Zhvania in spring 2001, offering Zhvania to-be-introduced prime-ministerial position.
Simultaneously, the opposition was also nervous about Jorbenadze’s re-building of the pro-presidential CUG, fearing that the pro-presidential force would rely on illegal support of the local administrations to rig the votes in 2003 parliamentary elections.
Fears grew, as CUG became a center of the ramshackle pro-presidential majority, which despite its fragmented character, managed to push through the controversial budget draft through the parliament in early 2003. Currently, Jorbenadze is in charge of working on election legislation, crucial for the opposition on the eve of the elections.
Thus, it seems that the interests of President Shevardnadze and the opposition forces at large converged in presenting Jorbenadze a painful blow, which would upset his comfortable balance in the State Chancellery.
It depends to be seen, what actions Jorbenadze would make under current circumstances, both on stage and backstage. So far, he chose to lay low, but the storm seems to rage on requiring his urgent action.
commentary by Jaba Devdariani,
Editor-in-Chief, Civil Georgia
