The Russian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement, in which it points the finger at Tbilisi, saying that the March 11 attack on upper Kodori Gorge “favored, first and foremost, the Georgian side.”
A report
The Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed such inference. It said on July 17 that the report had triggered speculation, which only aimed at “shifting the blame from a healthy head to an ailing one.”
In particular, the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the U.S. State Department’s position, which had earlier condemned “this violent attack on Georgian sovereign territory” and commended Georgia for “continuing restraint” during the attack, as well as for its cooperation with UNOMIG during the investigation.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said the Georgian side had been “deliberately undertaking actions to further increase tensions in upper Kodori Gorge.”
It said that Tbilisi had used the March 11 attack to further strengthen its grip on the area and “to toughen its position.” This, it said, “in turn has further complicated the situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone.”
Both Sokhumi and Moscow have long demanded that Tbilisi withdraw its forces and its loyal Abkhaz government-in-exile from the upper Kodori Gorge.
The UNOMIG report was the culmination of a four-month investigation carried out by the Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG), involving UN observers and Russian peacekeepers, as well as the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. The final report was approved by the JFFG. It had an inconclusive tone, however, which was a clear reflection of the politically sensitive nature of the probe.
The Russians, in their press release on July 17, were keen to exploit this inconclusiveness to their advantage.
“The JFFG’s findings have clearly stated that difficulties created by the terrain and weather conditions in upper Kodori Gorge on March 11 made the involvement of aircraft in the attack near impossible,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said.
The report, however, says, “there is a considerable degree of corroboration on” the appearance of more than one helicopter in the upper Kodori Gorge, which remained there for the duration of the incident.
Based on a detailed analysis of specially prepared meteorological reports and air traffic control records made available by the Georgian authorities, the report finds that “helicopters used multiple approaches from the north” to reach the upper Kodori Gorge. The Russian border is to the north of Kodori Gorge.
Also based on meteorological reports and analysis of the terrain, the report claims that a combat mission reaching Kodori Gorge on March 11 “was doable with considerable risks.”
“Only state-of-the-art combat helicopters with skilled pilots possessing high level of currency in night flying and, as an added advantage, familiarity with the terrain, would make such a mission possible but with grave risks,” the report reads.
On March 11, upper Kodori Gorge also came under artillery attack. The UNOMIG report, again suggests, but does not explicitly claim, that 122 mm rockets designed for the BM-21 launcher were fired from Abkhaz-controlled territory.
The Russian Foreign Ministry seized on a line in the UNOMIG report, which says the presence of helicopters during the firing of artillery at the same location or in the line of fire “is not possible.” Helicopters must be separated from the artillery fire by either ‘time’ or ‘space’.
However, based on witnesses’ statements, the UNOMIG report says that there was a separation by ‘time’. It concedes though “the differing locations of witnesses, the low visibility at night with inability to spot the helicopter(s), and a general state of alarm amongst the civilian population are factors that prevent a definite conclusion.”
The actual details, however, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “are not important.”
“It is important to see, who was interested in this incident. And here everything points to the Georgian side,” it said.
