Analyst: Georgian Revolution Holds no Lessons for Armenia

Q&A with Richard Giragosian

Armenian police has disbanded the rally on April 13 and dashed the hopes of the oppostion leaders for the regime change similar to Georgia’s “Revolution of Roses.” Use of force by the government has underscored the need for further protests against Armenian President Robert Kocharian, opposition says. However, as the analysts suggest the political situation in Armenia today is significantly different from that of Georgia in November 2003 when former President Eduard Shevardnadze was forced from power on the wave of peaceful protests.

Richard Giragosian, Washington-based analyst and a frequent commentator on events in Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus, who contributes to RFE/RL Regional Analysis Reports, talked to Civil Georgia about the key differences between today’s Armenia and Georgia’s “Revolution of Roses.”

Q.: Armenia President warned the opposition they would fail to import the revolution scenario from the neighboring Georgia. Do you think there are preconditions for bloodless revolution in Armenia?
 
A:  The political situation in Armenia today is significantly different from that of Georgia in late 2003 when former President Eduard Shevardnadze was forced from power in a peaceful “revolution of the roses.”

The key difference lies in the power of the state, as the latter period of the Shevardnadze era in Georgia was marked by the cumulative effects of a loss of state authority and power, devolution from the central government in Tbilisi to the increasingly assertive and restive regions, as seen in Adjara.  This trend resulted in a substantial loss of legitimacy as well as authority. 

Thus, it was this vacuum of power and weakening of the state that emerged as the most significant opportunity for Mikheil Saakashvili, Burjanadze and, by the end, Zurab Zhvania, form taking advantage of the situation to force Shevardnadze to resign.  It also became apparent that it was up to Saakashvili and his political allies to emerge as the “saviors” of the Georgia state. 

This also means, however, that the Georgian people’s expectation are very high and the demand for a fight against corruption and a restoration of Georgian national pride and strength now rests on the shoulders of Saakashvili and his still new government.  There is hope, however, that with the success in three areas, the Georgian government is on the way to finally correcting the decline in state power, authority and legitimacy. 

For Georgia, these three successes comprise the following gains: managing the Adjarian situation and taking on Abashidze, as well as the ambitious reforms in the Defense Ministry and positive results in tax and revenue collection and some early effective measures against corruption.

In Armenia, however, the reverse is true. A strong and assertive state is exercising its powers of control and intimidation against the traditionally marginalized and usually divided opposition.  The key difference between the revolution and Georgia and the outlook for Armenia, rests in the Armenian government’s overreaction to events.  The threats posed to the regime by the opposition are neither as serious nor as illegal as the authorities in Armenia have contended.  In fact, the Armenian opposition remains limited by a reliance on personality over platform, although the sate is locked in a cycle of violence and an “arrogance of power” that threats to only bolster the opposition. 

Moreover, the Armenian state, through its use of harsh repression, mass arrest and by an arrogant demonstration of “disdain for democracy,” is actually only legitimizing the politics of the opposition.  By acting, or reacting, with the full weight of the state and by utilizing the coercive levers of state control, there may actually be a point where Armenia reaches a pivotal period of confrontation between an overbearing state acting under cover of defending law and order with a disregard for democracy.   

Q:  Non-governmental organizations have played a prominent role in Georgian revolution. Are Armenian civil society groups influential enough?

A:  Despite some initial comparison, for Armenia, the Georgian model of transition is unique and holds no real lessons for the Armenian situation.  The change in the Georgian government stems from a complicated combination of factors, very few of which are seen in neither of Georgia’s neighbors.  In many ways, the outcome in Georgia was due as much to the weakness of the state as from the strength of civil society. 

But the most significant difference with the Armenian situation is the fact that the Georgia’s civil society was able to emerge victorious from its confrontation with the Georgian state apparatus because the state (under Shevardnadze) had lost its authority and legitimacy.  The Georgian state under Shevardnadze was marked more by a looming state of collapse, with discredited political elite, a bankrupt state economy and constrained by corruption and a failure to exert any control over many key parts of the country.  Although this is rapidly being corrected under President Saakashvili, the Armenian state remains in full control and retains authority and legitimacy.

Specifically, the Armenian state remains firmly entrenched, with a monopoly over the elements of force and power that it has not hesitated to use, most recently even overused in a naked pursuit to hold power at all costs.  And despite the potential of the Armenian civil society, there is no easy or open avenue to confront the government, despite the illusion of the opposition’s demands for impeachment and sporadic demonstrations in the streets. 
 
Q: Is opposition in Armenia strong enough and popular enough for staging more protest rallies?

A:  The opposition remains hindered by a fairly shallow reliance on personality, at the expense of a political platform, and is mainly united on the inherently limited basis of anti-government feeling or ambition.  But just as the opposition is only superficially united, the pro-government camp is also aligned in an unnatural combination of four political parties, united only in support of President Robert Kocharian. 

There is also a key internal divide separating the Republican Party from its more democratic, but weaker partners in the pro-government camp.  Specifically, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the “Country of Law” party (Orinats Yerkir) are increasingly troubled by the outright swaggering ambition of their larger partner. 

This may actually lead to some changes or shifts within the ruling camp.  This internal discord provides President Kocharian, who is not tied to any political power base or party of his own, with an important opportunity to exploit the internal dissension by utilizing a fractured political base as a means to rule by coalition, without the emergence of any one overwhelming party to potentially challenge him. 

But the main point is that the true test for the stability and legitimacy of the Armenian government rests on its handling of the current crisis.  The Armenian government may very well be the author of its own demise, by overreacting to an exaggerated threat posed by the opposition.  The disdain for democracy may become too much for the international community, and too much for the Armenian population (and its Diaspora). 

But the power for “regime change” in Armenia is held by the authorities and not the opposition.  It remains to be seen whether the Armenian government’s recent pattern of violent reaction will continue or, if the leadership recognizes the danger of their actions, will be halted and replaced with a return to toleration and discourse.

The fundamentals of governance and power in Armenia can be seen by the Kocharian government’s preference to look to Russia as a political idol.  The Russian political model offers Armenia specific tactical and strategic lessons for the less experienced Armenian president and his associates, including precedents for restraining an independent media, marginalizing the opposition, subverting the rule of law, and keeping the parliament powerless and ineffective. 

Specifically, this Russian model of a strong authoritarian presidency, free of effective “checks and balances” or oversight, has appealed to most of the post-Soviet Armenian political elite.  The lessons from Putin’s moves against the opposition and independent media have not gone unheeded in Armenia, just as attempts at meaningful constitutional reforms remain relatively symbolic and incomplete.

Thus, the real threat to Armenian democracy is most clearly demonstrated by the tendency for governance by strong individual leaders over strong institutional leadership.  This dominance of “strongmen” over statesmen has emerged as one of the most formidable obstacles to conflict resolution and regional reintegration.