Hard-Pressed, GD Brings the War Back into Focus
The resistance to the Georgian Dream takeover of the country’s institutions and foreign policy agenda continues. And while many protesters feel frustrated that the movement has lost some steam, the Georgian Dream’s domestic and international legitimacy crisis perdures. Its recent effort to take back control of the political agenda draws on a familiar pattern – portraying UNM as the key nemesis, associating the whole opposition with it, and blaming them for the war. The GD parliament’s temporary investigative commission, led with her usual vitriol by the indefatigable Tea Tsulukiani, has taken up this task. Since last week, it has been methodically picking on the old wound – the August 2008 War.
This was to be expected. During its pre-election campaign, GD patron Bidzina Ivanishvili asked his supporters to deliver him a Constitutional majority to hold the “Nuremberg Trial” for the “collective UNM.” Short of such a majority and mired in crisis, GD settled for the “investigative commission,” with its predetermined verdict to serve as a prelude to banning its political opponents. But the partisan dissection of the war story took a more sinister turn.
Quasi-court in bad taste
The investigative commission, chaired by Tsulukiani with her familiar inquisitorial zeal, comprises GD and even more radical People’s Power deputies. The commission claims to investigate the alleged misdeeds of the UNM’s political leadership during the 2008 war. Its members have hammered home two key messages. First – the war was avoidable; therefore, the UNM administration (and Georgia) carries some blame for its outbreak. Second – the UNM leadership failed to anticipate military threats once the conflict escalated and betrayed Georgian citizens stuck in the battleground due to a mixture of incompetence and deliberate treachery.
Tsulukiani does not hide the public relations objective – she said the commission aims to “educate” young people. Indeed, many of the protesters that GD so fears are people who were born or at least came of age after the war; they have seen no government other than the Georgian Dream. Fearing that the utility of UNM as a political scarecrow is fading, Tsulukiani uses the bully pulpit to (re)vilify the key figures of the “UNM regime.” Many were summoned for interrogations, but most refused, saying they wouldn’t appear in a show trial. Yet, some former military leaders responded to the summonses.
Particularly striking were the interrogations of General Zaza Gogava, who served as the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces in 2008, and Mamuka Kurashvili, then Chief of Staff for the Georgian peacekeeping contingent in the Tskhinvali region. Despite being members of the UNM since 2012, both men said they felt a moral obligation to the families of those who died in the 2008 war. Both insisted that they could not refuse scrutiny, even within the confines of a one-party parliament that they do not recognize as legitimate. In a telling move, both resigned from the UNM just a month before the hearings, choosing to present themselves as non-partisan figures in a highly politicized investigation.
Tsulukiani’s accusatory comments implied that the generals could and should have foreseen the impending war. “Since 2006… has there been anything that would have made you, someone that civilians like me are supposed to trust, think that dark clouds were gathering over Georgia?” she asked Gen. Gogava, who said that the Georgian armed forces were not preparing for war with Russia.
Tsulukiani recalled an earlier testimony of then-Deputy Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze, who had reiterated the known story that then-President Mikheil Saakashvili had been told by Vladimir Putin months before August that Russia would “respond” to the U.S. “through Georgia.” Chairperson of the Commission said the former president had ignored the warning, saying that if she had been in charge, she would have immediately contacted the general “to avoid” the inevitable threats. “Did he ask you to prepare?” she asked the General with a prosecutorial flourish.
Moreover, the commission has claimed that many Georgian high officials at the time were on vacation just days before the August war, including Commander-in-Chief Mikheil Saakashvili. “Does this imply that the commander-in-chief was calm and even in a state of nirvana?! Do you remember that?” Tsulukiani questioned, in her theatrically outraged tone.
Apart from the drama, the commission turned its focus to the events of August 2008, pressing each general to expose alleged shortfalls – promptly painted as crimes – in Georgia’s handling of the war. Particular emphasis was put on the alleged role of civilian officials such as then-Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, then-Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, and, most importantly, then-President Mikheil Saakashvili in affecting the military operations.
The generals were pressed to recall the extent of Merabishvili and Kezerashvili’s involvement in wartime decision-making, as well as whether if Saakashvili’s order to open fire on enemy positions around midnight on August 7 was feasible from the military standpoint.
“When did you tell the Chief of the Joint Staff that you would have to save the civilians and that things were not good?” Tsulukiani grilled General Kurashvili. Losing control, Kurashvili responded, his voice rising in outrage, “What does ‘TO SAVE’ mean? We were trying until the very last second to avoid conflict! What is it you want from me already?!” Tsulukiani, exuding authoritarian confidence, scolded the General, ordering him to “respect” the military uniform, “lower his tone,” and “behave. “PERIOD,” she barked, her voice cutting through the room with finality.
Such tensions flared during the questioning of both Gogava and Kurashvili, as the commission scrutinized the former military leaders’ decisions and actions during the war, particularly their failure to evacuate civilians from Tskhinvali. Gen. Gogava explained to the commission that announcing an evacuation would have signaled Georgia’s open intention to launch a military operation—an act that, he said, “would have gotten me convicted in The Hague [International Criminal Court] a long time ago.” Tsulukiani replied, “I will not respond to you on that.”
Although the commission insists that it respects the military and is only investigating the decisions of the political leadership at the time, General Gogava seemed to be blamed for giving an order that led to a case of “friendly fire” exchange between the Georgian battalions.
It was clear throughout that the commission was not trying to find the truth, but to furnish whatever additional facts or perceptions it could scrape to match the already-made conclusion. “The military was right, the civilians were right, but in the hands of politicians, they were turned into toys,” Tsulukiani told General Kurashvili. “Whatever the blame, the facts are inescapable: this country had an irresponsible political leadership that saw the army, the state, and its sovereignty as playthings – and did not care about the victims. What mattered to them was Saakashvili wandering around with his podium, flanked by a cohort of journalists, portraying himself as the new Davit the Builder,” she added.
Occupied Tskhinvali was quick to use the Commission’s hearings to promote its narrative of the war, with its so-called foreign ministry stating the need for the commission to “accurately and transparently” assess the 2008 events. The statement said the war remains an “open wound” for South Ossetia and insisted that those “guilty of unleashing military aggression, ordering the invasion of South Ossetia, attacking peacekeepers and committing acts of genocide against the Ossetian people must be punished.”
Means to an end
Tsulukiani credited the Georgian Dream for defending the country and its military, snatching political and legal victories from the jaws of UNM’s military defeat. She told Gogava, “We have proven that the Georgian military was right in the Hague.” She continued: “The Georgian Dream’s government has set an example in Georgia’s modern history as a responsible political force, one that successfully puts aside personal interests to defend the country from war.” She ended, “We owe this to our main leader and founder, Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili.”
The tactical political objective of these hearings is obvious – to precipitate discord in the weakened protest movement. It brings the focus back on GD’s arch-enemy, Saakasvhili. Languishing in the prison hospital, with more and more convictions to his name, GD’s top political prisoner is only too happy to get back into the limelight. And by that act, he is seen stealing attention from many young protesters who were thrown into prisons recently. In many ways, Saakashvili’s controversial legacy is a toxic fissure in opposition ranks that may see the UNM confront other protesters. So is the 2008 war, the issue that can pry loose the erstwhile GD allies who joined the protest movement. Salome Zurabishvili, speaking at a large rally on March 31, was heckled by Saakashvili’s supporters for not blaming Russia for 2008, and large banners for freeing Saakashvili were unfurled behind Zurabishvili as she spoke – optics that many younger protesters loath.
The strategic point is also apparent – legally eliminating the opposition. As GD stated, the tame Constitutional Court would be asked to draw on the commission’s conclusions to ban the UNM and “its successor parties.” New legislation is in the works that would prevent the former members of UNM from forming new parties, too.
Undoubtedly, the protesters and opposition see through these plans. Another matter is whether they manage to step over their oversized egos to unite.
Also Read:
- 16/12/2022 – ICC Concludes Investigation Phase into 2008 Conflict
- 14/09/2024 – In Gori, Ivanishvili Blames Outsiders, UNM for 2008 War, Broaches Apology “to Ossetian Brothers and Sisters”
- 08/08/2024 – Zakharova Blames Former Georgian Government for 2008 War
- 07/08/2023 – Politicians’ Remarks on the Anniversary of the Start of 2008 Russo-Georgian War