Ahead of the crucial report by the European Commission on candidacy, the ruling Georgian Dream prepares the political ground to steamroll dissent, whatever the decision.
What is happening?
Early this year, the Georgian Dream tried to dramatically shrink the civic space by adopting the so-called “foreign agents” law modeled after the Russian legislation. Having been strongly rebuked in the streets, the legislation was recalled, but the intent to shut down the critical voices remained intact.
After the initial cool-off period, the Georgian Dream used the uncertainty about the EU candidacy to shame the civic actors into limiting the criticism of the government while amplifying pressure from the controlled media and the security apparatus on civil society organizations, individual activists, and the donor community. By fanning the fears of “war” and establishing the phantom of a “revolution,” the party tries to convince the public that their reactions in support of independent non-state actors in March were misguided and that the “foreign agents” law would have nipped the alleged “revolutionary processes” in the bud.
Augmenting Pressure on “Extremist Projects” and the Critics
After the March 2023 protests, unexpected for many in their scale and intensity, the Georgian Dream has been trying to demonize, coopt, or isolate the key actors.
- Lazare Gregoriadis case, where a young man is being tried for allegedly throwing a Molotov cocktail at the police, was used to type-cast the youths as “destructive, anarchist” and inherently violent. This effort aims to sap public support – obvious in March – from the “kids” who braved the riot police and overturned the situation in civic actors’ favor.
- Attacks on and violence against politicians, liberal-minded activists, government critics, and youth organizations have intensified since the March events. Zurab Japaridze, leader of the Girchi-More Freedom opposition party, was punched in the face on his way to a liberal youth camp in June. In an orchestrated move, the youth camp was attacked by a violent mob the same day, forcing it to cease its activities for the safety of the participants. The persecution of organizations uniting liberal-minded youth became a mediatized campaign against youth organizations and universities: Franklin Club – a youth organization based at the University of Georgia whose activities include educational and media projects, research, political discussion, and civic activism was vilified in attacks condoned by the ruling party. Other incidents included the beating of critical-minded students at Tbilisi State University, where the leader of the GD, Irakli Kobakhidze, was giving a lecture; an attack on the respected liberal scholar Levan Berdzenishvili in the street of Tbilisi; an attack on the presenter of the satirical news program critical of the government, Misha Mshvildadze; the beating of the UNM member.
- “The Trainings Case” is a repressive and communications exercise spearheaded by the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG), which announced on September 18 that “a certain group of people, both inside and outside of Georgia, is currently planning to orchestrate destabilization and civil unrest in the country” with the ultimate goal of forcibly overthrowing the government. The plans to create a scenario akin to the “Euromaidan” are attributed to the USAID-funded project, headed by three Serbian trainers affiliated with the Serbian NGO – Center for Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies (CANVAS). All the actors – CANVAS, the US Embassy, the US, the individuals mentioned by the SSSG – have denied the allegations. But the interrogations – whose content has been classified – are still ongoing and span not only civil society leaders but actors, artists, and other Georgians with active civic positions. The aim is to create a narrative link between CSOs, international donors, and Georgians “who don’t look like you and I” and destructive violence.
- “Posters’ Case,” in which obviously non-violent protesters were detained and dragged through a drawn-out kangaroo court and fined for “hooliganism,” was supposed to serve as a warning and a disincentive to non-violent civic activists. Even those holding empty sheets of paper were arrested, and police officers gave statements at the court, which were easily dismantled by video evidence. Yet, such evidence was not admitted. The partisan control and the control of the judiciary were laid cynically bare, and the intention to repress dissent became obvious.
- Follow the money: One of the pivotal political motivations of the “foreign agents” law was to stem or establish control of the flow of the – mainly Western – funds to non-state actors. After the March protests, the ruling party aims to demonstrate that such funds are used for destructive purposes. People’s Power – a radical offshoot of the ruling party – stated, and the government-sponsored media picked up, the message that USAID and the Soros Foundation are financing the special fund to “rescue criminals” with “black money.” This relates to the report from October 20 that the Georgian Democracy Initiative (GDI), a watchdog, set up a Freedom of Expression Support Fund (FESF) to help individuals overcome the financial burdens imposed on them for the non-violent exercise of freedom of expression. GDI said it helped 12 beneficiaries.
- The Speaker of Parliament has demanded explanations from USAID and EED for their decision to fund “people who violate the law and use violence during demonstrations.”
- An attempt to impeach President Salome Zurabishvili, who aligned with protesters in March, served to demonstrate that even the holders of high political office will be held accountable for insubordination. Even though it was doomed to fail from the outset, the impeachment helped tie Zurabishvili, who has personal ties in Brussels – with the scenario of “destabilization.”
- With the tenets of the conspiracy solidified in media and political discourse, the range of accusations spread wider. On October 24, the leader of the Georgian Dream Party, Irakli Kobakhidze, called “a disturbing act” the discussion entitled “Protest and Resistance in Georgia in the 20th-21st Century,” planned by the Indigo media for October 31. The event is tied to the publication of the special 200-page edition of Indigo Magazine, which examines the history of protest in Georgia. The publication and the event are supported by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the oldest German party foundation associated with, but independent from, the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), was also targeted.
Candidacy: the State of Play
The European Commission (EC) is expected to publish its assessment of Georgia’s implementation of the twelve conditions by November 8.
The GD Government has been criticized by the Georgian opposition and civil society, as well as by EU representatives, for failing to address those conditions fully. During the European Commission’s oral report in June, the EC stated that Georgia had implemented three of the twelve conditions (related to gender equality, ECHR judgments, and appointing a public defender). Georgian CSOs are more critical, noting in their latest report that Georgia has fully implemented only one (ECHR judgments).
Despite the criticism, the representatives of the GD continue to make statements emphasizing that Georgia’s status as an EU candidate state is assured. PM Irakli Garibashvili underlines that the Government has successfully addressed almost all conditions except the one that he blames on the opposition’s lack of cooperation (depolarization). During his visit to Georgia, EU High Representative Josep Borrell disagreed, affirming that the work on the nine conditions needed to continue. He noted: “There are no shortcuts,” adding: “Accession requires hard work, political will, and a clear commitment to EU values.”
Nonetheless, party leaders have continuously stressed their “positive expectations,” with Georgian Dream Secretary General and Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze even declaring: “We say with 100% guarantee that our country will get the [EU candidate] status.”
In anticipation of the EC recommendation (which has to be acted upon by the Council of the European Union in December), the ruling party aims to stay on the same rhetorical side as “the people.” GD argues that the opposition lobbies against the candidacy by being critical of the government’s actions and that it craves a negative EC/EU decision to use it as a pretext for “destabilization” (meaning street protests) and “the coup,” which the ruling party members likened to Ukraine’s “Euromaidan.”
By evoking “Euromaidan,” even if it was a public insurrection against the Victor Yanukovych government’s U-turn away from the EU, the Georgian Dream tries to invoke the images of street fights, destruction, and death, which, according to the GD narrative – eventually led to Russia’s invasion in Ukraine’s case. In this imagery, the Georgian Dream draws on and instrumentalizes the propaganda clichés widely promoted by the Kremlin for its own purposes.
What is to come?
As the EC decision hangs in precarious balance, GD is positioning itself to take credit for the positive outcome while blaming the opposition for the negative one. In both cases, it is readying to steamroll dissent and is trying to have the public on its side – or silent. This may become feasible if after receiving the EU candidacy, GD is perceived as acting with the authority of the preeminent pro-European force against the capricious, scheming opponents. Or, if after the failure to receive the candidacy, GD is acting as a protector of order and security against what it paints as an impending Western-inspired, EU/US-financed “revolution.”
As Chairman Kobakhidze said: “We tried to pass the [foreign agents] law, but the very forces that are financing the revolutionary processes in our country organized a protest against it, and this is categorically unacceptable.” He is intent on not making the same mistake twice.