The local elections in Georgia on October 4, 2025, and the subsequent events triggered a flurry of commentary from Russian political and expert circles.
Tensions flared in Tbilisi on the day of the partially boycotted October 4 local elections when, following calls from mass rally organizers, a group of protesters attempted to occupy the presidential palace. Police repelled and dispersed the crowd, later arresting five leaders and vowing to identify and apprehend others. Georgian Dream officials described the events as an attempt at a foreign-orchestrated coup and pledged to respond decisively.
The reaction of Russian politicians and experts to the elections and subsequent protests in Tbilisi is shaped by the assertion of external interference, attempts at destabilization, and emphasis on the threat to regional security, while raising questions about the protection of state interests and the territorial integrity of Georgia. (ria.ru)
Egged on by the coverage on state-sponsored media, Russian officials rejoiced in what they saw as the “failure of the Maidan scenario” – in other words, the Western-sponsored plan to drive the country in Russia’s “near abroad” away from Moscow. Veteran of Russo-Georgian relations Grigory Karasin, who currently chairs the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, stressed that the events have proven the “political technologies” of the Maidan to be outdated. Karasin, who represented the Kremlin in a high-profile inter-state consultation initiated by the Georgian Dream administration to normalize relations with the Kremlin, noted with satisfaction that Georgia has “grown out of” and is responding calmly to such attempts from the West (lenta.ru).
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Viktor Vodolatsky, first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots, said that the countries of the South Caucasus are the focus of European intelligence services seeking to undermine their statehood, and that the intervention of external forces poses a threat to the stability of the region (tass.ru).
Russian experts, who in the warped Russian media sphere serve to embellish and anticipate the Kremlin’s positions, also spoke at length. Alexei Martynov, director of the International Institute of Newest States, suggested that the protests are “the farewell chord” struck by the “Western curators,” in particular the former head of British intelligence MI6 Richard Moore. He noted that the events showed the continuity of the practice of interference in the internal affairs of post-Soviet countries. Martynov did not miss the opportunity to add that the new head of British intelligence, Blaze Metreveli, is “the granddaughter of a Ukrainian traitor and Georgian collaborators.” (ria.ru).
Propaganda outlets such as Baltnews focused on what they framed as the coordination of protesters’ actions with Western countries, including the Baltic states. They emphasized to their readers that accusations of election violations come from Western structures, not from observers within Georgia, without referring to (baltnews.com).
More radical opinions have also trickled in. The ardent propagandist of the “Russian World,” Alexander Dugin, wrote on his Telegram channel: “Georgia is the only country in the South Caucasus where things have been getting better for us lately, not worse. And neither she nor we will be forgiven for this.” He called to make the “enemies’ life “much, much worse, and quickly,” before they exert revenge. ,
The Russian Media’s Running Commentary as it Unfolded on October 4–5, 2025
On October 4–5, 2025, events in Georgia became one of the main topics in the Russian state and pro-government media. On the morning of October 4, RIA Novosti reported that thousands of citizens had taken to the streets of Tbilisi and were heading to Rustaveli Avenue to participate in an opposition rally. The publication noted that the protests were taking place under the slogans of a “peaceful revolution” and “the return of democracy.” At the same time, the agency emphasized that the authorities were expecting provocations and possible violence, creating an expectation of instability among readers. That same evening, RIA Novosti reported that a group of protesters had broken into the courtyard of Mikheil Kavelashvili’s presidential residence and that special forces had used water cannons and tear gas. The wording about the “storming of the palace” and the “attack on the residence” heightened the emotional tone and emphasized the threat to public order.
The next morning, RIA Novosti, citing the Georgian Ministry of Health, reported 27 casualties, including 21 police officers. This emphasis on the injured security forces is typical of rhetoric that portrays protesters as the source of violence. Later, RIA Novosti published a statement from the Georgian State Security Service that an arsenal of weapons, allegedly intended for sabotage, had been found during searches and that it could have been supplied by representatives of Ukrainian military units. Here, the propaganda element is clearly visible — the “Ukrainian trace” in the context of the unrest in the neighboring country.
A similar tone was echoed by TASS. The agency quoted Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who called the events an attempt to stage a “Maidan” and overthrow the government, “coordinated from abroad.” The very use of the word “Maidan” in the Russian media traditionally has a negative connotation and appeals to the Ukrainian experience of 2014. In other publications, TASS (TASS) reported on the gradual displacement of demonstrators, the dismantling of barricades, and the return of special forces to their bases, emphasizing that “the situation is under control.” An expert at the agency, former official in the Shevardnadze administration, and former member of parliament Petre Mamradze, said in a comment to TASS that “the opposition has been dealt a blow in its attempt to overthrow the government.” Such vocabulary — “blow,” “overthrow,” “Maidan” — reinforces the perception of what is happening as part of a scenario of external destabilization.
Other Russian media outlets followed the same line, following RIA and TASS. An article on Lenta.ru reported on clashes between protesters and police and an attempt to “storm the presidential palace.” The publication described the use of water cannons and gas grenades, as well as the detention of the most active participants. At the same time, Gazeta.Ru quoted Georgian authorities accusing the European Union of “interference in internal affairs,” thereby expanding the narrative of external involvement and support for the opposition from the West.
Regnum and Vzglyad added details about the detentions—according to their information, former Prosecutor General Murtaz Zodela and singer Paata Burchuladze were arrested and charged with “calls for a violent change of power.” Both publications referred to a statement by the Georgian Interior Ministry, which claimed that the opposition’s actions were “coordinated” and aimed at “destabilizing the situation.” These formulations create an image of the protest not as internal discontent, but as a crisis controlled from outside.
The Russian media paid particular attention to the version about the “British trace.” RIA Novosti quoted political scientist Martynov as saying that the protests in Georgia were “supervised by the British intelligence service MI6.” This statement is unsubstantiated, but typical of propaganda rhetoric, as it links internal unrest in neighboring countries with the activities of “external forces,” specifically the UK and Ukraine.
Smotrim.ru reproduced statements by the Georgian prime minister, who claimed that the unrest was caused by “destructive forces acting under foreign influence.” Such quotes were presented without critical context, emphasizing the authorities’ determination to “maintain order.” Russian Senator Grigory Karasin, quoted by Lenta.ru, took a similar line, stating that “Maidan-type strategies have had their day.” This statement effectively summed up the ideological thrust of the entire coverage campaign.
Most of the materials from central agencies and major portals did not report the protesters’ position, discuss the reasons for their discontent, or outline their demands. All the news followed the same logical line: the protest was a consequence of Western interference, and the authorities were the guarantors of stability. Even reports about casualties and the use of force were presented in a way that placed the responsibility solely on the participants in the rally.
This approach created a coherent but one-sided picture. In it, the events in Georgia are interpreted as a repeat of the “Maidan scenario” inspired by external players. At the same time, the authorities and security forces are portrayed as defenders of order. The vocabulary used — “attempted coup,” “storming of the palace,” “sabotage,” “Ukrainian trace” — has a distinctly propagandistic tone, aimed at reinforcing the image of an unstable post-Soviet space, where Russia acts as an outside observer and guardian of “legality.”
At the same time, even those publications that formally belong to the “general political” category (such as Gazeta.ru or Lenta.ru) repeated the key theses first voiced by RIA and TASS, without offering alternative interpretations. Taken together, this creates the impression of a unified media narrative reflecting the official Russian position: the protests in Georgia are not the result of an internal crisis, but part of a broader geopolitical struggle in which Moscow is on the side of “law and order” against “external provocateurs.”