Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine has had a devastating impact on regional and global security, felt first and foremost by the aggressor state’s immediate neighbors. We turned to Hanno Pevkur, Minister of Defense of Estonia, the country on NATO’s eastern flank that faces unique security challenges due to its proximity to Russia. Despite this vulnerability, Estonia has shown remarkable resilience and determination in resisting Russia’s hybrid warfare and has established itself as a key player in regional security dynamics. Join us as we explore issues such as Western support for Ukraine, Estonia’s strategic outlook and defense priorities, NATO enlargement, and lessons from Estonia-Russia relations.
Civil.ge: As Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine entered its third year, there are no indications that Putin is giving in to fearless Ukrainian resistance despite the vast casualties on the Russian side. What is your outlook on the ongoing war in Ukraine? How long would you say it would last, and what shall be done to hasten its end?
Because of delays in military aid reaching Ukraine, the situation on the battlefield is rather bleak at the moment. However, this must not be taken as an excuse for retreating into defeatism and inactivity – rather, the opposite. The time to act is now. By act, I mean: send ammunition, send money, send weapons, send anything possible to help Ukrainians push the aggressor out of their homes.
The outlook very much hangs in the balance, and nothing is decided at this point, but as the saying goes, it is darkest before dawn. Speculating on the duration is a precarious undertaking today. What we have estimated in our strategy for Ukraine’s victory, a discussion paper from last December, is that the year 2024 will be one of strategic defense for Ukraine – a time to hold on as long as possible before the additional surge of aid reaches the front lines. With defense production increasing among Western allies, the outlook is steadily improving, but the speed needs to increase considerably. If all the members of the Ramstein coalition would commit as little as 0.25% of their GDPs to sustained military support for Ukraine, the scales can be tipped in Ukraine’s favor within the coming two years. With our economies combined, we are 27 times stronger than Russia. It can be done. Democratic societies are by nature slower in their decisions than dictatorships, but good will prevail over evil in the end.
The invasion of Ukraine by Putin’s Russia also endangered the security of the Baltic region, dangerously exposing NATO’s eastern flank; in this regard, are you seriously considering any military escalation between Russia and NATO in the Baltics in your contingency planning, and if yes – please describe briefly what defense and security measures you undertake to discourage Russia from waging another war in Europe.
Like Georgia, we endured Soviet Russia’s occupation for 50 years, so the Russian threat has been the basis for our defense development since we regained independence. Russia has been and for the foreseeable future will remain a hostile neighbor. There was hope in the 1990s of Russia changing, but that has now all but disappeared. We kept our reserve army model, we joined the EU and NATO, all with the aim of developing our state and protecting it at the same time. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, in that sense, did not change our planning other than bringing everything forward, making the planned investments faster, and increasing our defense spending to over 3% of our GDP. Estonia has never been as well protected as it is today. We have invested unprecedented sums into ammunition, weapons systems (air defense, short and mid-range fire, naval mines, etc.), and developing our Defense Forces wartime structure. We are also developing a defensive line along our border, which will include bunkers and prepositioned defense installations.
Our defense is built on three strong pillars – the will to defend, our own defense capabilities, and our NATO Allies.
Our defense is built on three strong pillars – the will to defend, our own defense capabilities, and our NATO Allies, who are here and ready to defend every inch of allied territory. At the same time, with this attack on Ukraine, Russia has shown that it is capable of grave miscalculations and has also stated that its goal is to restore the security architecture to pre-1997 era status, which all points to the fact that we cannot rule out aggression against NATO. This, in turn, means that we have to be as well prepared as possible to drive home the understanding in the heads of Russian leadership that attacking us, i.e. attacking NATO, is a no-win decision. After the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, NATO has regained a realistic understanding of the Russian threat and has updated its defense plans accordingly.
Lukashenka’s Belarus, which has been used for launching ground and air assaults against Ukraine, is now hosting Russian nuclear warheads, Russian military units, and decapitated Wagner mercenaries on its soil. How would you assess the security risks stemming from Lukashenka’s Belarus and its military-political alliance with Russia for Estonia?
There is no difference between Russia and Belarus.
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has significantly bolstered security in the Baltic Sea. It also proved that despite Putin’s ultimatums on thwarting NATO expansion, the doors of this military alliance remain open. In light of this, what are the prospects, the preconditions, and the time horizon for Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO?
NATO Article 10 sets out the open door policy for the Alliance, which also says that it must be a unanimous agreement among all its member states. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, member states agreed to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, and that intent has been reconfirmed at subsequent summits. At the last summit in Vilnius, heads of state also stated in the final communique that to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, Georgia must make progress on reforms, including key democratic reforms, and make best use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP). Estonia supports the further Euro-Atlantic integration of both Ukraine and Georgia.
Estonia has an institutional memory of Soviet occupation and relatively normal bilateral trade-economic relations with Russia. Now, you are one of the staunch supporters of Ukraine’s fight against the Russian invasion. Your military-political and diplomatic support of Ukraine comes at the expense of cutting off almost all ties with Russia, thus facing significant economic losses and political tensions. From that perspective, what lessons have been learned from Estonia-Russia relations, and in this context, what would you recommend to Georgia?
We cannot choose our neighbors. In a perfect world, relations between neighbors would be mutually beneficial and supportive. However, if your neighbor is a terrorist state, where human rights and the rule of law are not basic tenets of societal order, there is not much common ground to stand on.
If your neighbor is a terrorist state, where human rights and the rule of law are not basic tenets of societal order, there is not much common ground to stand on.
When it comes to economic ties between Estonia and Russia, they started to weaken already in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea and the eastern regions of Ukraine. By 2022, Russian import-export impacted only about 2% of our GDP. Economies will adapt to changes, the hard times produce new solutions and innovative ways of adjusting. Normal political relations cannot continue until Russia has withdrawn from Ukraine, those responsible have been held accountable, and Russia has paid reparations for the immense suffering and destruction that they have caused in Ukraine. There are no grey areas here, this is a time for a principled stand, there can be no appeasement that would allow Russia to advance toward fulfilling its imperialist ambitions.
Many in Georgia are asking, what if Ukraine fails? What if we are left alone with Putin’s Russia? What if Georgia’s further Euro-Atlantic integration triggers another war, like in Ukraine? Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns fuel those fears, causing uncertainty and disorientation in Georgian society, as well as provoking anti-western sentiments. What would be your message to those who fear and consider appeasement as the best tool while dealing with Putin’s Russia?
As Winston Churchill once said, “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” The most successful part of the Russian strategy thus far has been the spread of fear, which has delayed or crippled action. However, allowing fear to dominate and submitting to defeatism rules out any chance of getting to where you want to go.
